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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Glavpu Deputy Chief on Restructuring in Military [G.A.Stefanovskiy; AGITATOR No 2, Jan 89]	1
Maj Gen Gamov Proposes Alternate Use for Defense Reduction Resources [I. Gamov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Jan 89]	4
Readers' Responses on Reforming Officer Pay [R. Shaykuba; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 19, Oct 88]	5
Call for More Honesty From Military Press [S. Dorokhin; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 24, Dec 1988]	6
All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Organizations Formed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jan 89]	6
Critique of Military Delegates' Performance in Local Soviets [P. Ishchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jan 89]	7
Response to Criticism on Treatment of Dependents of Servicemen in Armenia [A. Konobeyevskikh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 89]	10
Discussion of Criminal Aspects of 'Non-Regulation' Relations [A. Smerdov, Ya. Geyvandov; SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA No 20, 1988]	11

MILITARY SCIENCE

Discussion of Changes in Tactical Training Based on Qualitative Parameters Continues [I. Vorobyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Feb 88]	14
--	----

ARMED FORCES

Gen Army Lyashchenko: Rural Youths 'Fear' Army Service [N. Lyashchenko; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 14 Feb 89]	17
Fear of Excessive Drinking Means Quarantine in GSFG [V. Kazantsev; SOVETSKIY VOIN No 21, Nov 88]	18
Central Financial Directorate Responds to Proposal on Economic Work [S. Korennoy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Dec 88]	19
Defense Charitable Funds Noted [I. Bukato; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jan 89]	19
Readers' Responses on Pensions for Officers' Wives [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jan 89]	20
Letters Note Lack of Official Response on Housing [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Jan 89]	21
Draft Criminal Laws: Proposals on Military Authority [V. Bakharev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 89]	23

GROUND FORCES

DT-10 Jointed, Tracked Transporter, Parts I-II [I. Pleshakov, et al; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 11, Nov 88, No 12, Dec 88]	25
BTR-80: Preparation for Winter [V. Moskaev, et al; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, Nov 1988]	28
BTR-70: Engine Ignition [V. Donets; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 11, Nov 1988]	33
Air Transport of BTR-80 [A. Mosunov, V. Chepelevskiy; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 11, Nov 1988]	34
Laser Simulators Used in Combat Training [A. Plotnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Feb 89]	35

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Mi-24 Rotors [V. Sidorov; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 11, Nov 1988]	37
Mi-24 Fuel System Maintenance [TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, Dec 1988]	38

NAVAL FORCES

Chief of Naval Combat Training Interviewed on Combat Readiness [A. Kuzmin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 89]	40
Warship to Be Named for Admiral Kuznetsov [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 89]	41
Morale 'Crisis' in Search and Rescue Service [V. Gorbunov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 89]	41

CIVIL DEFENSE

Further Details on Military Air Transport Effort to Aid Armenia [A. Andryushkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jan 89]	44
--	----

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Defense Industry Converting to Civilian Output	46
Chernyshev Outlines Plans [V. Chernyshev; TASS, 6 Feb 89]	46
Karpov on Problems of Conversion [D. Makarov; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 5, 4-10 Feb 89]	46

DOSAAB

Young Students Oppose Military Education, Russian Language Studies [PADOMJU JAUNATNE, 3 Dec 88]	49
--	----

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Protectionism Cited in Educational Facility Admissions [I. Komarov; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 24, 88]	50
Statistics on Students of Military Educational Facilities [AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 24, Dec 88] ..	51

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

French Nuclear Forces and East-West Balance	52
French Posture Considered [ZA RUBEZHOM No 44, 28 Oct 88]	52
Further Development Could Block Arms Control Process [V. I. Yerofeyev; ZA RUBEZHOM No 44, 28 Oct 88]	54
Nikitin Examines U.S. Naval Policy, Strategy in Mediterranean [Ye. Nikitin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Jan 89]	57
B-2 Dependence on AWACS Noted [A. Polrovov; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 10 Jan 89]	58
Comment on U. S. Decision to Modernize Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities [V. Lapin; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 10 Jan 89]	59
Cuban Presence In, Withdrawal From Angola Discussed [V. Vinogradov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Jan 89]	60

AFGHANISTAN

'Immorality' of Requiring Veterans to Pay for Property Losses in Afghanistan [Yu. Sokolov; IZVESTIYA, 10 Jan 89]	61
Letter Calls For Honest Treatment Of Afghanistan Veterans [V. Dementev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 14 Jan 89]	63
Allegation of Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons 'Refuted' [A. Biryukov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 Jan 89]	63

Glavpu Deputy Chief on Restructuring in Military
18010176 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 2, Jan 89
pp 37-40

[AGITATOR interview with Lt Gen G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Army in the Mirror of the Restructuring"]

[Text] Lt Gen G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, answers questions submitted by the editors.

[AGITATOR] The Armed Forces have always enjoyed the love and respect of the Soviet people. In recent years, however, certain negative facts pertaining to a weakening of military discipline and relaxation of vigilance in the forces and the fleet have been publicized. This has to alarm our people. A session of the Politburo of the CPSU CC analyzed the fulfillment of the party CC's decree on strengthening military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy. What can be said about this?

[Stefanovskiy] In the words of M.V. Frunze, our Armed Forces are an exact "copy" of the society, sharing the same life with it, and the same problems. It has always been the case that when the society changed, the military also became different. That is the way it is today. The restructuring is gaining speed in the forces and fleets, and throughout the nation. All of its components—radical economic reform, democratization, reform of the political system and development of the ideology of renewal—are all being carried out in the formations and units and on the ships, based on the specific nature of the military service, of course.

The reality is that negative processes and unresolved problems have accumulated more rapidly than they have been resolved in the army and navy, the same as in the society as a whole. Everything which has occurred in the nation—the violations of legality, the despotism and repression of the '30s, the difficult war years and the joy of victory in the '40s, the stagnation and complacency in the '70s and at the beginning of the '80s—none of it missed our Armed Forces. An orientation toward quantitative and technocratic tasks predominated for many years at the center of the military's vital functioning to the detriment of the combat and political training, the effectiveness of the educational work and the social development of the military collectives. The end result was a lowering of qualitative indices for the combat readiness, a weakening of military discipline, organization and order, and the emergence of stagnation in the educational work and spiritual life of many military collectives.

Decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, the state of affairs and important practical missions made it incumbent

upon us to assess all aspects of army and navy life, to rethink many things, to work out a concept for restructuring the Armed Forces and create the mechanism for its implementation.

We attach particular importance to implementation of the comprehensive program for the training and advanced training of officer cadres, upon which the enhancement of defense development and improvement of the training and educational process depend to a crucial degree. Many manifestations of stagnation in the army and navy have resulted precisely from errors in the practical work style and methods of the officers and generals. **Our position is the following: the prestige of the individual must conform to the prestige of the position. Authority and responsibility, these two sides of the work of command and political cadres, must be merged into one.**

There is just one criterion: if there are not good end results, there is no good evaluation of the worker, which means that he has no right to be in charge of people. This is why a number of important lead workers have been relieved of their positions in the districts and fleets—for major failures in their work, for exploiting their service position for their own purposes and for distancing themselves from the people. As many as one half of the generals, admirals and senior officers at the leadership level have been replaced in the past 3 years. Poor work and moral qualities have caused several dozen commanders and chiefs of political organs to be relieved of their positions. Over all, there has been a considerable renewal of the command and political cadres.

A number of documents have been worked out which ensure significant enhancement of the authority and the role of party and Komsomol organizations, public institutions, assemblies and councils, and courts of honor, and strengthen their influence upon affairs and the situation in the military collectives. Permanent certification commissions have been set up in the directorates, formations and units and on the ships to thoroughly evaluate the cadres. A center for the study of public opinion functions at the Main Political Directorate. Councils and groups for international relations are persistently proving themselves at all levels.

We consider it highly important to increase the results of the ideological and educational work and its linkage with life, to achieve spiritual closeness between officers and subordinates, to equip our cadres and the aktiv with methods for organizing the training and education of the servicemen in the situation of democratization and glasnost, and to be able to rely on general party experience in the restructuring.

[AGITATOR] The military is a school of patriotic education. Our soldier-internationalists have manifested the best military qualities—courage, stamina, patriotism

and a preparedness to assist—in the situation of combat operations in Afghanistan, and they performed with confidence at Chernobyl. It seems that military heroism is not dying out.

[Stefanovskiy] First of all, I stress the fact that the Armed Forces have not abandoned their educational role, and service in them is a school of life, courage, honor, patriotism and internationalism, a real "university of manhood." Over the past 5 years a total of more than 190,000 soldiers have been awarded orders and medals for the honorable and selfless fulfillment of their military duty, an important constitutional obligation. Hundreds of thousands of our young men have undergone a serious test of their political, moral and physical maturity, the school of courage, heroism and internationalism in Afghanistan. A fourth of them have been awarded orders and medals, and more than 70 have been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. It is not just individual soldiers who have glorified themselves and the socialist homeland with their combat feats and who carry and continue our people's heroic traditions, but entire military units and formations as well.

The Guards airborne regiment in which seven soldiers and officers have become Heroes of the Soviet Union during the past 9 years is widely known in the Armed Forces, for example. They include Col V. Vostrotnin, the commander. Let me cite a fact from the regiment's heroic history. Twelve attacks by a detachment of "Black Storks" (a special subunit of religious fanatics of the military opposition in Afghanistan) were beaten off by 39 Guardsmen of a company representing nine of our homeland's nationalities. Loyal to their oath not to surrender a hill as long as even one soldier remains alive, the company fought to the death. No one flinched or abandoned the battle site. Six of them died heroic deaths, and nine were wounded. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred (posthumously) upon Gds Jr Sgt V. Aleksandrov and Gds Pvt A. Melnikov. All of the company personnel were awarded orders.

Today we can place such people as Hero of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Demakov, a deputy company commander for political affairs, alongside the heroes and legendary commissars of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. He saved his subordinates at the cost of his own life. Thousands of people recall Aleksandr's radioed last words: "...wounded four times... one grenade left. Tell them that I die like a Soviet man."

Thousands of other examples demonstrate the courage and selflessness of individual soldiers, NCOs, officers and generals, and serve as the best proof of the fact that Soviet patriotism and a profound, pure love for the homeland is organically combined in their hearts with a sense of internationalism.

[AGITATOR] There is talk about alleged cases of "aggression and cruelty" among the youth returning after serving in Afghanistan. Is that true?

[Stefanovskiy] No, it is not. In connection with my service duties I have repeatedly met with the soldier-internationalists within and outside of Afghanistan. I saw many of them in a combat situation and after their discharge into the reserve. I can honestly say that today they stand out particularly for their civic maturity, their social and political activeness. This frequently alarms passive people who do not want to work in the new way and sometimes even leads to conflicts.

I will say more than that. The soldier-internationalists are distinguished by fairness, boldness, an active civic stance and the ability to defend their point of view. They are accustomed to getting things done and doing them harmoniously, of viewing life as a test of one's strengths and capacities and one's ability to achieve the assigned objective. This is why the soldier-internationalists are so intolerant of conservatism, bureaucracy and stagnation. Upon returning to their native land, they actively engage in the restructuring and show acute interest in problems of social justice, the results of the military-patriotic work, the spiritual life of the youth and their preparation for military service.

It is a strange thing, but there are people not just in the West but in our nation as well who try to ascribe to the Afghan veterans those negative things which were characteristic of the American troops in Vietnam, to contrast the soldier-internationalists to the rest of the Soviet youth, to impose the "lost generation" syndrome upon them. Unfortunately, even some of our mass media have permitted themselves to be led by those "sages." The soldier-internationalists can distinguish the reality from the imaginary, the truth from lies, a position from a pose. They know that their energy is required today for the restructuring, for the renewal of socialism and the defense of its gains. It is the duty of the military-political cadres and of the party and soviet organs to see that their potential is realized in the interest of the restructuring.

[AGITATOR] There are many complaints about the pre-draft training of the youth. What is being done to correct the situation?

[Stefanovskiy] In General, our army and navy are receiving good replenishments. As I have already stated, most of the youth perform their constitutional duty with honor and dignity. Good reports come in on draftees from Minsk, Gomel, Nikolayev and Kursk oblasts and the Komi ASSR, for example. The Lipetsk youth particularly stand out, however. In 2 years not a single draftee from that oblast has committed an infraction of military discipline or committed a crime in the forces.

The preparation of the youth for military service today requires focus and specificity, new and unorthodox work forms and methods, and smooth interaction among all the organs and organizations responsible for the moral-political and military-vocational preparation of the youth to serve in the military, including the military commissariats and DOSAAF.

The following are among the acute problems in the preparation of pre-draft and draft-age youth, which affect how long it takes them to master the military specialties and how well they succeed. They include inadequate moral-political and psychological preparedness of the youth to serve in the military and fulfill the requirements contained in the regulations, and underdeveloped abilities to subordinate themselves to orders and overcome difficulties. There have been cases in which draftees from Moscow, Dnepropetrovsk, Rovno, Zhitomir and Sverdlovsk oblasts, the Estonian SSR, the Yakut ASSR and a number of other regions in the nation, lacking the necessary knowledge, solid ideological conditioning and, naturally, work experience, frequently underestimate all of the responsibility placed upon them for the nations' security and commit serious errors.

Unfortunately, a lowered sense of responsibility for preparation for the military service is to be found not merely in a certain part of the youth, particularly the students, but also in certain lead cadres. As a result, military registration discipline has dropped and pacifist sentiments have emerged in some of the youth in a number of republics, krays and oblasts. In the spring induction, for example, 430 young men attempted to avoid being sent into the forces in Moscow alone. There were cases of refusal to take the military oath for religious or other reasons among the youth inducted into the military in 1987 from Rovno, Volyn, Brest, Karaganda, Rostov and Kokchetava oblasts, Altay and Krasnodar krays. Draftee P.V. Pergament (Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Moscow), influenced by the questionable "Faith" group, even sent anti-Soviet letters to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and also to a number of international organizations.

It is difficult, of course, to count on qualitative changes, when only 20-30 percent of the schools in Moscow, Mary, Kamchatka and Chita oblasts, the Turkmen SSR and the Udmurt ASSR have the necessary training facilities. The classes are conducted by unqualified specialists at many schools in the Uzbek and Kirghiz SSRs, in the North Caucasus autonomous republics and in Irkutsk and East Kazakhstan oblasts.

It is a known fact that there are parents who prefer for their children to perform their military duty under privileged conditions or not to be drafted into the Armed Forces at all. In a number of republics and oblasts a significant portion of the workers in the party and Komsomol apparatus have never worn the army or navy overcoat and do not know the realities of military service. Is it any surprise that they avoid resolving problems of pre-draft training and military-patriotic education of the youth?

There continues to be a large portion of the young draftees with a poor command of Russian. With undisputed priority for the study of the national languages, we must still not forget that for the Armed Forces the

Russian language is the means of international communication and the professional language, without a solid knowledge of which it is difficult to count on the successful mastery of military affairs, the modern weapons and equipment, and consequently, the accomplishment of the combat training missions. Does it need to be demonstrated that a language barrier does not contribute to the rapid and painless development of a young defender of the homeland or to the unification of the military collective?

[AGITATOR] Letters from the readers sometimes ask when the military is going to put an end to cases of nonregulation relations—infringements on the rights of young soldiers by older servicemen, insults and degradation of the individual's dignity.

[Stefanovskiy] The central newspapers and magazines are in fact today writing a great deal about so-called "hazing." There is even more talk and rumors which considerably distort the real state of affairs, since they are generated by people who most frequently have not served in the military. This creates tensions in families readying replenishments for the Armed Forces and alarms those with the service ahead of them. We know and we do not conceal the fact that, unfortunately, there are cases of nonregulation relations in a number of units and on a number of ships. We also know the factors behind their emergence and viability, and are taking the most resolute steps to eliminate them. To consider these negative developments to be a product of the army and navy is to greatly oversimplify the problem, however. The military is a part of the society and absorbs everything in the life of the latter. It is not a matter of the "honor of the uniform." Local party, soviet and Komsomol organs and organizations also have to improve the ideological and political and the moral education of the youth and their preparation to serve in the multinational military collectives, which are still highly variegated with respect to level of development and attitudes toward the work. Sociological studies have shown that the young man encounters violations of the standards of socialist communal living and the ethics of interrelations, rudeness and degradation of human dignity before entering the military and frequently absorbs that "experience."

With respect to the Armed Forces, the problem of eliminating "hazing" cannot be resolved with administrative prohibitory measures alone, without active assistance from the party and Komsomol organizations, from the soldiers themselves and from the entire army and navy community. Everyone today is roused for the fight against barracks hooligans. Every instance of this is exposed to glasnost. Extensive use is made of the force of public opinion, including that expressed in the press, as well as the preventive and punitive force of the law. Those directly involved in criminal violations of an individual's rights, regardless of military rank, service position or former merits, is brought before a military court.

During the past 3 years the situation has been improved somewhat with a common effort. As a result, beginning in 1986, there has been a drop in the number of incidents, crimes and gross violations of the law. This year up to 85 percent of our regiments and ships and up to 90 percent of the subunits have completely eliminated instances of mockery and other infractions of the law among the personnel.

[AGITATOR] Have glasnost and the activeness and independence of the party organizations undergone development in the situation of the restructuring? If so, how is this manifested?

[Stefanovskiy] There is every basis for answering that question in the affirmative. It is manifested primarily in the stepped-up role and influence of the party organizations on all areas of the work of the military collectives and in the establishment of a climate of fairness, openness, extensive and increasing criticism and self-criticism. Open party meetings and sessions of committees and bureaus are being adopted universally. On the cruiser Groznyy, for example, it has become the rule that all of the ship's personnel are informed of party decisions.

Party meetings are being held in an acutely militant and polemical atmosphere. The Communists and all the personnel of the army and navy submitted more than a half-million proposals and critical comments during the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference and then its decisions, for example. The USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the central military newspapers and magazines received around 250,000 letters. The increased public-political and service activeness and sense of responsibility in the soldiers were particularly graphically demonstrated during the recent Osen-88 exercise. Most of the formations and units participating in it demonstrated improved training, persistence in the achievement of new quality indices and a high level of awareness and discipline. Army and navy primary party organizations are taking an active and productive part in the indoctrination and evaluation of cadres.

The development of glasnost and democracy is manifesting itself during the report and election campaign. The recommendation of alternate candidates is extensively practiced in the elections in party and Komsomol organizations. The work was evaluated as unsatisfactory in almost 80 cases in the lower party organizations and groups during the first 2 months of the reports and elections. Trustworthy Communists were elected to head them.

But let us be candid: the process of democratization and the enlargement of glasnost and the activeness and responsibility of party organizations is not proceeding smoothly everywhere, unfortunately. Stereotypical thinking and methods of performing the party's tasks

which have developed over the years are hampering things in a number of formations and regiments and on a number of ships. The retardants are still powerful. We also have many primary party organizations in which criticism has lost its constructive nature and turned into demagoguery. Some people have delayed switching from generalized discussions, empty words and meetings on every occasion to the detriment of the cause. Up to 90 percent of the complaints received by the CPSU Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the central organs could have been resolved at the site.

The restructuring in the Armed Forces is irreversible; it is gathering force.

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Maj Gen Gamov Proposes Alternate Use for Defense Reduction Resources

*18010356 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Maj Gen I. Gamov, chief of Rocket and Artillery Troops of the Ural Military District, under the rubric "Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR": "Recognize the Acuteness of the Problem: Mandates From the Electors"]

[Text] In many units the soldiers devote more time and effort to various kinds of housekeeping work than to their main job, combat training. They do so not at their own will. Everyone, from the platoon commander to the minister of defense, unanimously believes that taking the personnel away from their training is inadmissible and harmful. Circumstances are frequently stronger than good intentions, however.

I once attempted to calculate how much of the officer's work time he spends improving his occupational skills and how much he spends on the direct duties of his position. It turned out that he is mainly occupied with housekeeping concerns, trips "wherever a superior sends him," various kinds of procurement operations, requisitions, TDY assignments which are not always justified.... How can we expect some sort of professionalism and good quality indices in this situation? An excess of tasks and dissipation of effort have never yet produced good results.

Paradoxical though it is, instructions conceived in offices and divorced from reality are a significant hindrance to the restructuring of the combat training. I shall demonstrate this with an example. Recently, the author of an article in one of the military magazines explained to its artillerymen/readers the great benefit gained from using minicomputers for performing various fire tasks. He demonstrated that the time required for preparing the firing data is cut by a factor of 3, 5, even 10.

Have we truly succeeded in breaking through the blank wall of bureaucratism, I thought. They have proven the obvious, and the artillerymen will finally receive what they should have had at least 20 years ago: modern computers.

"Here," I said, "look at this and don't tell me again that the artillery and missile troops are not authorized to acquire minicomputers for the combat training." Workers in the finance section looked at the magazine, looked at the instructions and then frankly said: "It's not authorized." I went back to my office. The place was deluged with telephone calls from unit commanders. They too had read the magazine and were trying to find out where the computers could be obtained. What could I tell them? If I told them about the prohibitory instructions, they would call me a bureaucrat....

I feel that it is essential, with the help of the newly elected deputies, to eliminate the worst word of all for the military: "requisition." So many officers' fates and their noble impulses have been dashed by it. Take construction by one's own means and labor, for example. Is it a good thing or not? It is difficult to say. I cannot think of a single case in which this kind of construction was fully provided with materials—only 30-40 percent at best. And what about the rest? The rest—"Requisition, commander." But how? On the one hand, there are construction deadlines, and failure to meet them is the equivalent of failure to carry out an order. On the other hand, orders arrive just about on a weekly basis stating that personnel are not to be taken away from the combat training. And so the commander becomes a "poor" and inefficient one in either one respect or the other. But is he to blame?

I cannot skirt the question of social protection for servicemen and their families. This is such an acute problem it is simply a torment. At the present time the whole thing is limited to talk, however. In the meantime, the situation has reached the point at which a commander of a remote garrison in the Urals is unable to set up an effective training process due to a lack of instructors. Who is going to agree to accept the difficult—that needs to be frankly stated—work, if a driver/mechanic instructor, for example, cannot expect housing for at least 5 years?

I would like to submit the following suggestion pertaining to the reduction of the Armed Forces. In my opinion, part of the resources freed as a result of this could be left at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense for special use, for resolving the social problems of the garrisons. I submit that the people's deputies of the USSR from among the servicemen have an obligation to demonstrate that this is important for our entire society.

Readers' Responses on Reforming Officer Pay
18010292c Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORYZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 88
p 36

[Article by Capt R. Shavkuba under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion": "Incentives Need to Be Provided. But How?"]

[Text]

Articles discussing the need to improve material incentives for the work of military personnel are appearing more and more frequently in the military press. They include letters from Maj V. Mikheyev and Lt Col P. Rempel, published respectively in issues No. 2 and No. 9 of the magazine. They and certain other writers propose differentiating the pay for officers and warrant officers, rewarding some of them for their success and penalizing others for shortcomings. The opinion is also expressed that the corresponding commanders (or officers in charge) should decide who is to receive what rate. Naturally, they would base their conclusions on public opinion, primarily that of the party organization.

I feel that this problem should be resolved differently. In certain subunits of the Air Defense Forces in which I have served, for example, the shortage of officers ranged from 10 to 30 percent, even more for warrant officers. There was frequently a shortage also of NCOs. Just about every officer in those collectives therefore had to perform the work of two or three people. Naturally, he was far from always able to maintain combat readiness or discipline at the required level in his subunit. I am not even discussing the problems involved in providing officers and warrant officers with housing at the "sites," or with a complete and varied diet, the organization of leisure-time activities for them or the lack of jobs for their wives. All of this clearly does not promote what we consider to be normal service.

Under these conditions how can an officer or warrant officer be expected to achieve good results in his difficult job? How can he be penalized for some kind of deficiencies by withholding part of his pay? As a rule, after all, he literally gives everything he has to the job, and the fact that he cannot accomplish everything well is not so much his fault as his misfortune. Furthermore, in my opinion, the incentive system for the work of officers and warrant officers provides an unlimited opportunity for various kinds of military bureaucrats and simply unscrupulous people to take reprisal against those who do not suit them, those who, guided by service interests, criticize those in charge.

I therefore propose something different. First of all, we need to get rid of those who perform their service duties unconscientiously. They must simply be discharged. I anticipate the objection that this will leave us without

cadres. It will not if we seriously set about enhancing the prestige of the officer's occupation. It is no secret, after all, that this prestige has fallen somewhat in recent years. And there are reasons for this: the fairly low military pay (compared with the same amount of work involving the same amount of time in the civilian sector), the more difficult social, climatic, psychological and other features of military service, particularly at remote garrisons and at the "sites." Can the existing situation be rectified? I believe it can. In the first place, we need to change the basis for manning the Armed Forces with officers (giving the officer the opportunity to retire into the reserve at any time after he has completed the required 8-10 years—this must be calculated). And in order to attract gifted youth to the military schools, we need to resolve at a higher level questions pertaining to material, social and cultural, and personal-service support for both the officers themselves and their families. I am convinced that this will create wholesome competition among those who want to link their destiny to the military and will contribute to their conscientious performance in the service.

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Call for More Honesty From Military Press
18010180 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA,
in Russian No 24, Dec 1988 p 10

[Letter to the editor by Sergey Dorokhin]

[Text] I read with interest the material "Yesterday students—today soldiers." The position of the military papers and magazines surprises me. In so far as they still do not want to restructure, to reject old stereotypes. Can it be that it is impossible to depict life as it really is?

I am a student. I was drafted into the Armed Forces in spring of 1987 from Leningrad. I served a short while in two units but did not meet a single student-soldier who did not regret his two lost years. And there were fellows serving with me from higher learning institutes in Moscow, Leningrad, and many other cities.

Despite all that, I am in favor of the conscription of students into the army, since I consider the replenishment of the ranks of our armed forces with enlisted men a necessity. But why pour salt on a wound, depicting it as a genuine blessing for the student?!

I am finishing my short missive not even dreaming that it will be published in your magazine. Unfortunately it has still not "matured" to the level of objective understanding inherent to a journal like LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

Respectfully, Sergey Dorokhin, Kiev.

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All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Organizations Formed

18010315a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Unsigned Article: "Account Number 7000959"]

[Text] Today there are more than 3,000 military-patriotic associations in the country, and approximately 2,000 soviets of young reserve soldiers. In their ranks are more than a quarter million people.

"The All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Organizations will, as we say, gather them under one roof," S. Morozov, leader of the initiative group of young reserve soldiers at the VLKSM Central Committee, told our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent. "In February the first session of its coordinating soviet will be held, where the statute about the association, a draft of which is now being discussed locally, will be approved. The program of the association? It is participation in military-patriotic upbringing of young people, and solving acute problems, such as the lack of information and ties between the clubs and the soviets, low level of training of their leaders, and poor material base. In the future it will include creation of its own publication; a summer all-union defense-sports camp; a training and methodological center; medical consultation points for effective solution of questions of medical treatment; and participation in the creation of a prosthetic appliance enterprise."

[Correspondent] But won't all of this require material expenditures?

[Morozov] Naturally. An association account was opened a few days ago at the Housing and Social Bank [USSR Zhilsotsbank]. We hope that our organizers and founders, as well as everyone who supports our movement, will transfer funds to it.

[Correspondent] Are you counting solely on these voluntary contributions?

[Morozov] No. This is only the first step in creating our own financial and economic base. Presently, for example, the matter of the production of inventory, equipment, and personal gear that the military-patriotic organizations need, and pennants, badges, and other goods having a symbolic association by state and cooperative enterprises, is being resolved. Some of the profit will go to us. A tourist base, established on the basis of economic accountability, will be created. This also represents considerable assignments into our fund.

[Correspondent] But won't these things swamp you, to the detriment of military-patriotic upbringing of young people, and economic concerns?

[Morozov] We hope not. All the more so in that they barely touch the primary organizations of the association—the soviets and clubs. This economic activity will not even throw a shadow on our movement. After all, what is the money needed for? It is to provide, for example, interest-free loans to cooperatives that Afghanistan veterans are organizing, free assistance to the wounded and invalids, and the families of those killed, and material support to the clubs.

[Correspondent] Sergey, at a meeting of the initiative group of young reserve soldiers, held on the eve of the new year, the VLKSM Central Committee proposed you, Pavel Shetko and Valeriy Kurdyunov as candidates for USSR people's deputies from the association. Do you already have an electoral platform?

[Morozov] We do. Its essence is the association program that we just spoke about. Of course, at the forthcoming session of the coordination soviet, it will be made more precise and detailed, but in the main it has already been developed. We are for qualitative improvement in the military-patriotic upbringing of young people, for increasing the role of the komsomol and reserve soldiers in this, and for assisting each Afghanistan veteran find his place in restructuring.

Critique of Military Delegates' Performance in Local Soviets

18010315b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 89 pp 1-2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Not Only for the Sake of Representation—How to Improve the Effectiveness of the Work of Military Deputies in Soviets"]

[Text] Recently a new law on elections of USSR peoples deputies was passed, and extensive preparations for the elections are underway in the country. Needless to say, the ongoing political reform also concerns local soviets. Here many questions have piled up. And radical measures will also be required to solve them.

Practice shows that here much also depends on the deputy himself. But, this is only one aspect of the problem. These notes by our correspondent are devoted to the work of military personnel elected to local soviets. Why, just the same, does the military deputy not always succeed in defending the interest of his electors?

"How are the military deputies working?" Z. Lavlinskaya, secretary, Severomorsk City Ispolkom, Soviet of Peoples' Deputies, restated my question. "Take a look."

And she handed me a deputy's card written in the name of Officer S. Kuznetsov. In the year and a half since his election as a city soviet deputy, Sergey Vasilyevich did not find time to obtain his card.

"I don't even know who he is," states the ispolkom secretary. "He has not been to a single session, and has not presented a single report on work he has done."

V. Zamyatin, chairman of the deputies' commission on socialist law and protection of public order, Severomorsk City Soviet, confirmed this statement.

Assuming that there is some sort of misunderstanding, I drive to the border guard unit where Officer Kuznetsov is serving. Here one other detail is learned. It turns out that he did not consider it necessary to speak to his electors even once. Apropos of this, one wonders what he would report on, if he did practically no work as a deputy.

"The remoteness gets in the way," Officer Kuznetsov explained his nonfulfillment of his duties as a deputy. And it seemed that he himself sensed that his explanation was not convincing.

So, Kuznetsov turned out to be a deputy on paper, who was merely listed on the roles. It is true that some other arguments that he cited to justify himself seemed much more convincing than his reference to his remoteness. And we certainly will return to them.

This is, of course, an exceptional case, the only one of its kind in Murmansk Oblast. But, at the same time, one cannot also fail to see that it is an expression (albeit an extreme and unparalleled one) of a definite tendency, a pattern.

In the Severomorsk City Soviet there are deputies from the army and navy who have only been present once or twice at sessions, make reports to their electors more rarely than prescribed, and do not display initiative in their work. There are also such deputies in the Polyarnyy City Soviet.

"Comrade Larionov, for example, was not at a single one out of six sessions," notes L. Tukacheva, ispolkom secretary, "although he never refused to carry out any requests we made of him."

Deputy V. Larionov had left for another place of service, and I did not have the opportunity to find out why he did not go to the sessions. Other elected representatives who are merely marking their own presence in the organs of government, explained why by citing the burdens of their positions, lack of time, and other reasons that they considered valid. Well, and does, say, Adm F. Gromov, Northern Fleet Commander, who is a deputy of the Murmansk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, have some special reserve of time that enables him to be present and participate without fail in the work of each session? Seven times, more than any other military deputy in the oblast soviets, he reported to his electors. And Maj Gen Avn V. Pupynin, military soviet member and chief of the political department, fleet VVS [Air Forces], an oblast soviet deputy, also did not skip a single

session. And other military personnel elected to the oblast soviet can serve as examples of conscientious fulfillment of their duties as deputies. Nevertheless, the tendency remains alarming.

The activity of deputies in military uniform, which is not in general a "closed" topic, previously was discussed in a onesided way, according to the well known principle: either say something good or nothing at all. I became convinced of this having become familiar with articles in the press touching in one way or another the work of military deputies, including those in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in the 1970s. Virtually everything that concerned their activity was kept in an irreproachable rosy light. There is no argument—many of them participate actively in governing the state. And the conscientious work of military deputies brings great benefit to those who elected them, and serves to strengthen the unity of the army and people.

It has not been easy for Senior Warrant Officer N. Polivkin, a platoon commander in one of the fleet VVS units, who was elected a local soviet deputy for the first time. His lack of political experience can be seen. But, Nikolay Aleksandrovich compensates for this with his initiative. Residents of the settlement have long complained about the lack of a "direct line" to the nearest city—the lack of inter-city communications. Displaying remarkable persistence, Polivkin achieved a favorable solution to the problem.

A triviality? I don't think so. Under conditions of the Polar Region, this is far from a secondary matter. And the deputy solved something that many leaders were not able to accomplish. Quite naturally, the authority of the senior warrant officer in the settlement immediately rose.

It is precisely such people who have decisive influence among the military deputies. But problems that accumulated in the period of stagnation are reflected in their activity. The authority of real power was fixed ultimately in the executive organs. Therefore, as was the case throughout the country, in Murmansk Oblast, by and large it was not the deputies who gave assignments to their ispolkoms, but the other way around. The apparatus dictated what the deputies would be involved in. This resulted in a lack of independence and indifference in some of the elected officials, both civilian and military.

Everyone with whom I spoke agreed that this practice is unconstitutional. But how can we break out of this situation?

The suggestions vary greatly.

Undoubtedly Officer Kuznetsov is right when he says that he was immediately assigned under conditions that deliberately doomed him to working with less than full output. The border troops nominated him as candidate for deputy, and soldiers and officers who belong to a unit

in another branch of arms elected him. Now it is difficult to establish why this took place. The city ispolkom leadership that decided a year and a half ago which electoral district would vote for which of the candidates for deputy has been replaced. This notorious allocation even here can be seen by anyone.

Needless to say, those who elected him also could not help but notice it. At one of the electoral meetings in the unit a soldier stood up and asked a direct question: "Why must we elect a border guard? We have our own deserving people." It wasn't very difficult for the meeting's organizers to convince the electors that "that's the way it had to be." But, for whom was this necessary? In any case, it was not necessary for the electors. And we already know how border guard Kuznetsov represented their interests in the soviet.

By the way, it is evident that the city soviet is also at fault here. In a year and a half it was unable to, as we say, call to task its undisciplined deputy, and make strict demands upon him. Ultimately, the question of the deputy's powers of Kuznetsov can even be examined at a session (let us note that the electors also can recall him as not having justified their trust). For some reason, the party group of the city soviet also did not react in any way to what was happening. It also struck me that in the six sessions that were held not a single report from a military deputy was heard.

There are many explanations for this "forgiving regime." It must be said that the other deputies as well, who are civilians, are not "tormented" by control. Nevertheless, there are also entirely specific causes. I heard this assertion from many ispolkom deputies and workers: not having any real authority in the garrisons, the cities, and the villages, where the main population consists of military personnel and their family members, the soviets simply do not wish to quarrel and spoil their relationship with the military. And to me this seems convincing. As before, the soviets are greatly dependent on the ministries and departments, and if we are speaking about local soviets in garrisons, on the corresponding military command.

It is also interesting to analyze the composition of the military deputies. Let us take the Polyarnyy City Soviet. Here there are three warrant officers, and the rest are senior officers, representatives of the garrison command. There is not a single senior sergeant or junior officer. In Severomorsk the relationship is approximately the same. Among the military deputies of the Murmansk Oblast Soviet, the percentage of admirals and generals is highest, and the lowest rank is lieutenant colonel.

The patterns here are distinctly obvious. Needless to say, we are not talking about "usurpation" of the military leaders (I also heard this), but about the powerlessness of the soviet. By this unique method of "electing" for itself high ranking officials, the soviet protects itself from its own lack of authority. Due to the unclear nature of the

legal status of a deputy, at times his official position, and the authority inherent in his duties, become the only working instrument. "The reason it is convenient for us when a military deputy is a ranking official, is that it is easier to solve problems," notes N. Dudin, chairman, Severomorsk City Ispolkom.

"Having become a deputy, I immediately felt that I was wearing merely the insignia of a senior warrant officer," states Nikolay Aleksandrovich Polivkin. "No matter which senior official I see on my deputy's duties, he immediately enquires as to where and with whom I am serving. It is as though the deputy's card is insufficient. By the way, at times it is in fact insufficient. It is doubtful that the problem of the inter-city telephone communications would have been solved, had I not gone for assistance to Maj Gen Avn M. Dovzhenko, fleet VVS deputy commander for rear services.

Maj Gen Jus V. Irtegov, chairman, fleet military tribunal, a city soviet deputy, showing me the copy of a letter that he wrote to appeal to the chief of the naval engineering service, at the request of his elector, stated:

"Do you think that I indicated here my military rank merely automatically? Not at all. This was done to give the letter greater weight."

As we see, circumstances have worked out the only acceptable variant under the given conditions: Only a senior official is capable of most effectively fulfilling the obligations of a deputy.

Is it possible to bring the situation into accord with our present day views about the role of a deputy? The answer to this question is known. We also know the method of achieving this: return full authority to the soviets. If they have power the military deputy will also have more than enough support in the form of his high position and title.

Visiting in the ispolkoms and meeting with deputies, I asked how the specific situation in which they fulfill their duties is taken into account in work with military deputies. And with considerable amazement I heard from some ispolkom leaders: Is it necessary to do this? After all, all the deputies are identical, equal. Despite the attractiveness of this argument, on the whole the answer does not bear criticism.

"At times I feel that I am extraneous and unnecessary in a session, our interests are so far from the questions brought up for discussion," states Maj Gen Avn V. Pupynin. The workers in the ispolkom apparatuses also have an understanding of the abnormality of this situation. "The specifics of the military situation, unfortunately, are not taken into account," stated A. Dorofeyev, deputy chief of the organization and instruction department, oblast ispolkom. "And it has long been time to do this."

And how should this specific situation be taken into account? Perhaps in this way. A small analysis of the work of military deputies that I made shows that at times their potential is used most unproductively. They are wasted on various standing commissions of deputies, and at times are involved in matters where their knowledge and experience finds virtually no application.

And what if they were all combined into a single commission of deputies, called simply the military commission? By the way, the name is not the important thing. United by common tasks, representing the interests of military electors, the deputies would be capable of effectively solving the broadest circle of problems, and doing so comprehensively.

However, the presence of a military commission of deputies in the soviet will make it possible, not verbally but in fact, to strengthen the link between the people and army. The soviet, through this commission, will be able to influence the garrison and unit commands, and help handle various educational, social and everyday matters. And the military personnel themselves, in turn, become able, through "their" deputies, to influence the soviet when necessary. Military-patriotic indoctrination of young people, their preparation for service in the armed forces, and organization of assistance to the population in case of disasters, should also be included in the duties of this commission.

Ispolkom workers also reacted to this proposal with interest.

"Yes, it makes sense to create a commission of deputies consisting of military personnel," agreed I. Khokkanen, chief of the organizational-instructor department of the oblast ispolkom. "Only it is necessary to give it real powers. Perhaps several civilian deputies should also be included in its composition." N. Dudin, chairman, Severomorsk City Ispolkom, although he expressed a reservation, nevertheless supported the idea:

"If such a commission were to be created, it would be necessary for the Ministry of Defense to transfer to the soviets some of the funds allotted to it for everyday social and cultural life. This would be the material foundation for the activity of the commission."

I did not hear a single objection. So, perhaps it is here that it is necessary to create them, if only as an experiment. After all, the soviets have been given authority to decide for themselves what commissions of deputies to form.

We have said a great deal and often that to be a person elected by the people is a high honor and a tremendous trust. And we did not notice as the honor and trust more and more went to the forefront, pushing aside the authority of the deputy. Is it not time to return everything to its rightful place? A deputy is elected not for honorary representation, but for specific work.

Response to Criticism on Treatment of Dependents of Servicemen in Armenia
18010349 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Report by Maj A. Konobeyevskikh and KRSNAYA ZVEZDA follow-up under the rubric "KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Spoke Out: Answers, Responses, Results": "What Kind of Instructions Are Needed?"]

[Text] On 6 January 1989 KRSNAYA ZVEZDA carried a report by Maj A. Plotnikov, "No Instructions were received...." It discussed how the families of servicemen removed from the area of the natural disaster found themselves without support or assistance. Many reproaches were leveled at Moscow's military commissariats and rayon ispolkoms. Since the article was published, however, it has been learned that the situation is no better in other large cities in the nation. Here is a response from Omsk, as an example.

The disaster which occurred in Armenia evoked compassionate pain in the hearts of people. They are prepared to share everything they can with the victims: money, clothing, shelter. Boarding facilities, sanatoria and resort facilities have been made available for families evacuated from the disaster area.

Not all of the victims found themselves in this kind of situation, however. Several families—both Russian and Armenian—came to our Siberian city of Omsk from the disaster area. They include families of servicemen. Some of them had relatives here, others merely good friends. In general, no one was left without a roof over his head.

The Omsk residents regarded the situation of the evacuees with sincere compassion. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about local agencies of authority and military commissariats. They are still doing little to provide practical assistance for the earthquake victims. There have been plenty of promises on their part, but this does not go very far toward warming or comforting those who, having lost everything beneath the ruins, came to the distant Siberian region without warm clothing, essential items or money. And the people are simply ashamed to ask for these things.

"We sent all of the clothing we collected to Armenia," reported Igor Imrekov, secretary of the oblast Komсомol committee. When asked what assistance was provided for the people who came to Omsk, however, he was unable to give a specific answer.

Workers at the Bolshevichka Garment Production Association did a noble deed for Ye. Varaksina, wife of a serviceman evacuated with two children from Leninakan. They made the woman a winter coat and her daughter a fur coat for free. While telling me about the kind and responsive people from the Bolshevichka association, however, Varaksina at the same time complained that she was still in a difficult situation because

the state agencies had still not provided either her or the other families arriving from the disaster area with material assistance. Apparently, people in some offices can simply not make a decision on the matter, but are still waiting for instruction.

And there is still a problem with housing, although I repeat that the evacuated families are presently living with relatives or friends. They are living "from hand to mouth," as we say, however. The gorispolkom is in no hurry to correct the matter. There are no vacant apartments in the city, of course. This is an acute problem, but it has to be resolved. All the more, since people affected by the disaster are not asking for mansions. They just want a roof over their heads.

Varaksina turned to the oblast military commissariat to help get a New Year's tree for the children and to acquire essential food items. Lt Col S. Trapeznikov merely listened patiently, however, and provided no help. The woman left him with nothing. Officer V. Antsevich, political worker, acted differently, however. He did everything he could to satisfy the request of the officer's wife.

The community of the military unit in which Officer A. Leonov serves also showed concern and empathy for the families of servicemen who came to the Omsk Garrison from northern Armenia. Around 500 rubles was collected for the victims. Representatives of this military unit presented them with the money and with flowers on New Year's eve. Incidentally, officers V. Antsevich and A. Leonov expressed the opinion that all of these good deeds did not require a great deal of effort. They required only a desire to support an individual in trouble not with words but with deeds. How can we elicit such a desire in local authorities and the military commissariats?

From the editors: Following the first article in the newspaper a number of officials set about defending the honor of the uniform, as they say, instead of taking specific steps to help the victims. For example, Lt Col A. Petrov, military commissar for Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon, called the editors with indignation and let it be known that they were creating discord in the military. Workers with the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense also took the position of defenders and not doers.

Many of Moscow's organizations and enterprises responded differently to the article. The Passport Directorate of the Moscow City Ispolkom's Main Administration of Internal Affairs, for example, accepted documents for filling out temporary registrations for all the wives of servicemen who requested it. Natalya Pagina, the serviceman's wife discussed in the report "No

Instructions Were Received...,” was aided by the Lyubinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, and her children now have food. Workers at the Plant imeni Lenin Komsomol helped to place the children into a kindergarten.

But the editors continue to receive word from people who have been treated cruelly—not just by fate but also by bureaucratic officials. These families have not yet received the benefits specified in the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers and the RSFSR Council of Ministers. What other instructions are needed for this?

Discussion of Criminal Aspects of ‘Non-Regulation’ Relations

18010277 Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA
in Russian No 20, 1988 pp 22-24

[Article by Lt Col Justice A. Smerdov and Sr Lt Justice Ya. Geyvandov: “Criminal Violations of Regulation Rules for Relations Among Service Members”]

[Text] The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens honorably perform their constitutional duty to defend the socialist homeland. Service in the Army and Navy is a school of civic development, upbringing, and physical and moral molding of young men.

Meanwhile serious law violations are being committed in some military subunits. They are integrally connected with criminality in the country as a whole and so have common reasons, which are the objectively existing difficulties and deficiencies of social development.

The special feature of military collectives and specific conditions of service members’ life, routine, leisure time and activities lead to the commission of crimes by some persons, and in particular to violations of regulation rules for relations among service members (Article 244 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code]).

Such factors as a negative influence of family and closest associates and deficiencies in a draftee’s school and production upbringing must be singled out in particular among preconditions for committing criminal violations of regulation rules. Many questions of the pre-Army upbringing of young people are being discussed with sufficient acuteness lately, which confirms the extreme urgency of these problems, which are preconditions of non-regulation manifestations in the Army and Navy. Crimes being committed by service members, including against the regulation order of military relations, depend to a considerable extent on the conditions under which the personality of malefactors, who at one time did not receive a good upbringing, was molded. The family and the school, where a person’s moral principles are laid down, should be put in first place among factors influencing the extent of an individual’s social development. Under Army conditions one does not always succeed in neutralizing negative traits acquired before call-up, especially if they have become rooted and habitual. Being

brought up in an incomplete family or under the unfavorable influence of one of the parents (drunkenness and so on), or under conditions of an absence of proper parental supervision over their conduct was reflected in the behavior of a certain portion of those guilty of committing criminal offenses against the regulation order of relations. An unhappy family and deficiencies of educational work contribute to the fact that such persons as a rule do not strive for success in school and in the circle of school friends; they strive for self-assertion in the group of persons immediately around them who are under approximately the very same conditions. Abnormal forms of upbringing mold such traits as cruelty, a lack of ability and lack of desire to understand another person’s sufferings, and a cult of brute physical force. Because of unfavorable conditions for development, persons of ages 17 and 18 display egocentrism and a lack of restraint, they have a poor realization of the value of the honor and dignity of the individual, and they cannot overcome difficulties and avoid conflicts.

A false sense of comradeship and action “together” are inherent to them and the most malicious ones are distinguished by elements of rudeness, cruelty, cynicism, and a display of the highest degree of contempt for colleagues by humiliating them and by demonstrating their physical superiority over those who clearly are physically weaker, who are weak-willed, or who have certain illnesses or physical defects. These are the people who, having come into the Army with crude negative habits and a negative attitude toward the military collective’s interests, create microgroups based on false comradeship and taunt colleagues in an attempt to ease their own service burdens at the expense of other servicemen, to subordinate them to their influence, and to obtain an illegal benefit to the detriment of colleagues. As a rule these persons have not received proper labor conditioning and have not been instilled with a sense of genuine comradeship or of mutual experience in other people’s sufferings. Servicemen with negative emotional reactions, psychopathic personality features, choleric temperament (aggressiveness, excitability), and an unbalanced nervous system most often fall under their influence. In a conflict situation such “incited” persons may commit crimes on the soil of non-regulation relations among soldiers.

A study of criminal cases indicates that before being called into the Army a considerable portion of the wrongdoers had maximum satisfaction of various needs, including those such as the desire for leadership over contemporaries and for freedom of actions to the detriment of those around them, amusements of a doubtful nature, materialism, drinking and so on. A uniqueness of Army life is the fact that far from all servicemen’s needs can be satisfied. Moreover, one of the tasks and duties of servicemen is to steadfastly overcome hardships and deprivations of military service, which presumes a substantial limitation of those needs and interests which are incompatible with successful performance of military service.

Non-regulation relations are engendered by negative phenomena of our social life. With a growth of material well-being many parents excessively coddle children, protect them against physical labor, and satisfy various whims of a consumer nature. All this engenders individualism, egocentrism, and an elementary inability to live under conditions of a military collective. Finding themselves under conditions of military routine, those "brought up" in this manner become flustered; they do not have elementary skills even in such forms of work as washing floors, and the burden of service seems to them to be excessive. All this generates a desire to shift a portion of their physical loads to other colleagues. This is why forms of non-regulation manifestations exist in some subunits such as payment of money for going on detail, for standing in as orderly or for performing fatigue details for the person who pays the money. If a person is not accustomed to overcoming difficulties, does not have a high level of moral upbringing, and is predisposed to conflicts, as a rule under Army conditions he acquires "leadership" in microgroups with a negative direction and by means of brute force manifests extreme contempt for the members of his military collective who are zealous in service and have high indicators in combat and political training.

For example, before being called into the Army "Z" was capricious and had difficulty becoming acclimated in the collective. In school he was rude to teachers and older students, showed a lack of tact, took to drinking at age 14, and in a state of drunkenness mocked physically weaker pupils at the school, beat them unmercifully without reason, and insulted teachers. "Z" was picked up by the police several times for violating public order; he was convicted and served a sentence for malicious hooliganism. In the Army he displayed rudeness toward colleagues, twice participated in violent group actions against colleagues, and verbally insulted officers. While in a state of drunkenness he mocked and taunted soldiers who were junior in time served and inflicted slight bodily injuries and beatings on four of them, for which he was sentenced under Article 244 of the Criminal Code.

The attitude of wrongdoers toward socially useful labor is an important indicator. Among the persons studied 12 percent did not work or go to school before being called into the Army; 46 percent of those engaged in socially useful labor had worked about one year. A change in work location because of absenteeism, drunkenness or simply the desire to rest and "change" what was in their view a "difficult" trade was typical of them.

A study of the records of convicted individuals showed that violations of regulation rules for relations were committed most often by persons who had been humiliating work and school comrades under conditions of an absence of control before being called up for military service. Being called into the Army and Navy, persons with negative habits and behavior defects take a contemptuous attitude toward colleagues, influence some of

them negatively, and in a number of cases impress on young soldiers that privileges in service must be created for the "oldtimers."

Such preconditions for committing criminal violations of the regulation order of relations among soldiers must be eliminated very much earlier than at the moment the youth are called up for military service. Rayon and city military commissariats are called upon to play a special role. Data on the conduct of draftees outside the school or labor collective, character traits, an ability to get along in the collective, and negative information about being picked up by the police for petty hooliganism, drunkenness and fights are essentially absent from their personal files today. In our view it is necessary to introduce a social-psychological, individual-behavior card which should be sent to military units along with the service record card for each serviceman with the objective of continuing a detailed study of his personality under Army and Navy conditions up to the moment he is released to the reserve. A prompt study of the social-psychological characteristics of personnel will contribute to the forecasting of wrongful behavior by individuals capable of aggressive actions and the humiliation of colleagues. Unfortunately because of the limited nature of psychological knowledge, commanders and the Army in general as a rule identify an aggressive personality after commission of an infraction. Early prevention of crimes against the regulation order of military relations would be genuinely effective with timely and precise organization of the psychological examination and observation of servicemen. In this regard it would appear that a need has matured for introducing the position of military psychologist to military unit tables of organization. He would be capable of actively assisting the command element and political bodies in solving problems of preventing crimes connected with non-regulation relations, relying on the data of a detailed social-psychological examination of personnel from the moment they arrive in the unit until they are released to the reserve.

Before call-up into the Army the family and the collectives of secondary schools, vocational-technical schools, tekhnikums, schools of the working youth, enterprises and establishments are the principal subjects for early prevention of violent actions and a belittling of individual dignity. According to data of a study we made, party, Komsomol and other public organizations have not yet arranged contact with military commissariats for a detailed study of the personality of those being called into the Army; the public shows no activeness in working with those who permit rudeness, insults and petty hooliganism; and it is extremely rare that such wrongdoing comes up for discussion at meetings of collectives at draftees' place of study or work, not to mention the educational influence of comrades' courts. To a certain extent this is facilitated by insufficient procurator's supervision over the implementation by heads of enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions of provisions of Part 4, Article 17 of the USSR "Universal Military Obligation" Law

concerning preparation of youths of pre-draft and draft ages for active military service. Instances of a dismissal of criminal cases brought against minors on the basis of Article 6 of the RSFSR UPK [Code of Criminal Procedure] have not been eliminated in law-protection bodies to this date in view of the fact that such persons cease to be dangerous to society because of a change in the situation, with consideration of the fact of their being called up for military service.

As a result, since he is not subjected to censure either by the state or by the public, the wrongdoer avoids not only criminal but also other kinds of liability for the act he committed containing elements of crime. In our opinion this is inadmissible, first of all because criminality of minors in the country shows no trend toward a sharp drop and according to 1987 data it rose by 23 percent for Moscow alone (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKON-NOST, No 1, 1988, p 11), and secondly because combat weapons and the servicing of modern military equipment are entrusted to such a wrongdoer-draftee. Persons from among unprepared, uneducated youth with serious behavioral defects must not penetrate the Army environment. Going unpunished, the overwhelming majority of them pay no heed to the requirements of military regulations or the schedule of daily routine and commit non-regulation acts of violence under Army and Navy conditions. Social control over their conduct is exercised by the command element and Army community, and in military construction units also by comrades' courts, which perform preventive work with persons who insult colleagues.

Unfortunately first-term servicemen, for whom comrades' courts are not provided by legislation, are placed in an unequal position. This leads to a situation where first-term soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers cannot be released from criminal liability on the basis of articles 7 and 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the commission of acts not representing great public danger. Therefore, it is advisable to set up comrades' courts for first-term servicemen.

An atmosphere of general censure of the slightest manifestations of rudeness or belittling of a serviceman's individual dignity has not been created in some military

collectives. The data of our random study indicate a certain passiveness of the victims themselves and an absence on their part of an attempt to resort to regulation, official measures of protection against offenses. A very slight percentage of victims offered opposition to the offenses or reported non-regulation acts of violence which occurred to the command element. These facts indicate that servicemen are not exercising their right to defend themselves and other persons against a possible offense against the health, honor and dignity of the individual. In the 16 August 1984 decree "Court Application of Legislation Ensuring the Right to Justifiable Defense Against Socially Dangerous Offenses" the USSR Supreme Court Plenum explained that the right to justifiable defense is one of the important guarantees of a realization of citizens' constitutional rights and obligations. Soviet citizens have the right to take active steps in defense against a socially dangerous offense or an attack on the individual involving the use of violence threatening life or health.

A criminal-law means of preventing crimes against the regulation order of relations among servicemen is the application of Article 8 of the Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes (Article 244 of the Criminal Code), which establishes liability for a violation of regulation rules for relations expressed in the form of beatings or other violence or the inflicting of bodily injuries, as well as violations which entailed serious consequences.

And so legal, organizational and educational measures carried out by the command element of units, by political bodies, and by the Army and Navy community in close contact with officers of organs of justice are necessary for eliminating these negative phenomena. Effectiveness in this campaign is possible only with a detailed study of the conditions of soldiers' life and upbringing before their call-up into the Army and Navy. Deficiencies in molding the personality and defects of behavior and upbringing must be the object of unremitting attention and of social-psychological examination both under school and production conditions as well as subsequently during the performance of military service.

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Discussion of Changes in Tactical Training Based on Qualitative Parameters Continues

*18010363 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj Gen I. Vorobyev, doctor of military sciences and professor, under "Combat Readiness: Quality Parameters" rubric: "Freed from Memorized Patterns"]

[Text] "Restore As an Art"—that was the title under which the dialogue between our correspondent and Lt Gen V. Khavikov, deputy chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces, was published on 7 January to begin the rubric "Combat Readiness: Quality Parameters." The questions that it raised evoked a vigorous response from readers. We will encounter some of their letters dealing with urgent problems in the area of combat readiness, field, air and naval combat training of personnel, and the professional training of officers in the pages of the newspaper. Today we will talk once again about how to restore tactics. A military scientist will speak.

A noteworthy characteristic of our time is the active search for ways to resolve urgent problems in all areas, including the military. And this is understandable: perestroika is taking hold. In particular, speaking of military affairs, the profound changes having to do with the practical realization of the demands of our defensive doctrine, its orientation toward qualitative parameters in the development of the military, and the reorganization and reduction of the armed forces simply dictate the necessity of new approaches to the resolution of the tasks in combat readiness. And I see the fact that "Krasnaya Zvezda" asked its readers to take part in that search as a good sign, a sign of a turning to our best democratic traditions that developed back in the 1920's, when the broad body of the army had the opportunity to participate in discussions in the press not only about operational and tactical concepts but also about such fundamental directions of Soviet military development as ways to implement military reform, the formation of a unified military doctrine, and the like. The holding of all-army referenda of this kind made it possible to do a better job of revealing and considering public opinion, to support the new and advanced in the military area arising as a result of the revolutionary reforms, to note negative phenomena in time, and to prevent their increase.

It seems that if such a practice of public discussion of the urgent problems of combat readiness and development of military art had continued in the prewar and later in the postwar years, we would have been able to avoid many errors and miscalculations. It is also clear that the conversation about tactics, which is in a state of stagnation, as Lt Gen V. Khavikov correctly noted in the mentioned dialogue, would now be different.

There are many reasons for such a situation. They accumulated over years, even decades. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a primary factor that, we can say, led us to the "cult of normative tactics," to stereotypical and monotonous methods. That is the intolerance of "heterodoxy" in tactics and the striving to make everything fit the regulations. In short, that which contradicts the very spirit of our tactics, which was always characterized by innovation. "In the civil war," wrote the well-known Soviet military commander S.S. Kamenev, "they rejected the traditional forms that had been bred into the old military officials.... The Red Army did not know any field service regulations; it had its own regulations developed through practice and good sense."

If we take a look at the nature of our tactics in the years of the Great Patriotic War, then, without closing our eyes to the numerous mistakes and miscalculations in the development of operational techniques, we cannot fail to see that most of our commanders were able to oppose a strong and insidious enemy with greater tactical skill. And whereas today we see manifestations of stereotypes and dogmatism in tactics, this is probably not—as some think—a legacy of front experience. Rather to the contrary, one must talk about the loss of continuity in military art, which, of course, cannot be permitted. The combat experience gained by our army at the cost of a huge loss of blood was and remained an inexhaustible source of military wisdom. To try to restore tactics as an art of waging war without a creative assessment of this experience means to start from scratch, from point zero.

But something else is also obvious—turning to history cannot answer all the questions facing tactics today. One cannot copy the experience of any war. The range of weapons improvements and the intensity of the development of tactics in the years of the Great Patriotic War and now, for example, are not comparable. At the same time, there are enduring values such as, say, the ideological orientation of front commanders, creative valor, persistence and action in achieving the objective, willingness to take risks, implacability toward stereotypical actions, closeness to people, and the ability to combine the high fighting morale of soldiers with the power of weapons.... It is probably precisely on the basis of continuity and the development of the best traditions that we must search for ways to resolve many problems of vital importance for us today, including the restoration of tactics as the art of combat.

One of the basic reasons for the ossification of tactics is seen in the difference between theory and practice. On the one hand, tactics itself as a science has not worked out recommendations of what and how the troops should be taught fully and quickly enough. On the other hand, practical persons and methodologists were slow in accepting and implementing these recommendations. As a result, methods have become one of the factors curbing the development of tactics. In the postwar years and today as well, they are being improved more slowly than the logistical and technical support of troops is being renewed.

In the search for a way out of the existing situation, attempts are being made in some places to raise the quality of combat training merely through an intensification of the process of instruction and the strengthening of its practical orientation. And practice is sometimes diametrically opposed to theory. In my opinion, this is a major mistake. Aims that in themselves are correct—improving the field (air and naval) training of personnel and teaching them what they need in combat—cannot yield the proper results if the combat training is not based on a well-developed theoretical scientific foundation and advanced tactics and if officers and all personnel do not have precise and clear guidelines—for what kind of combat and how should prepare. Tactics must not be developed blindly through the method of trial and error. It is axiomatic that military art must illuminate the way of experimental search.

In this respect, by the way, we have had bitter experience. In the prewar period, especially after the events of 1939-1949, when the major failures in the training of troops became quite obvious, the leadership of the armed forces undertook decisive measures to improve their field proficiency. And quite a lot was done in this area. At that time, nevertheless, they were not completely successful in resolving the main task, that of teaching personnel to fight in an up-to-date manner. And to a considerable extent, as everyone knows, this happened because our prewar notions of the nature of combined-arms combat—to which the troops were being prepared at all costs—were far from the reality that they confronted in the very first hours of the war. We had to pay a high price for the fact that we had not mastered in peacetime the means of repelling the sudden invasion of an enemy and that the troops had not learned to set up an invincible antitank defense, to resist the massive strikes of the enemy's armored spearheads, to wage combat with aircraft, airborne assault forces and raiding parties, to fall back, to fight when surrounded....

Yes, forecasting the nature of future combat was always the most difficult task of tactics. Major miscalculations were frequently made in this matter. In some cases, the armies prepared for "a past war," adopting obsolete tactics, and, in other cases, they overestimated the experience of minor wars and drew one-sided and consequently incorrect conclusions from them. In some cases, they did not take into full account the impact of new weapons on tactics and, in still others, they either underestimated or overestimated the military possibilities of the enemy or of their own forces. Under today's conditions, it is especially difficult to foresee, in a manner of speaking, the scenarios of future engagements and battles. Never before has the technical equipment of troops been modernized so dynamically and so fundamentally as today and never before have so many unforeseen circumstances arisen that influence the nature of combat operations. Meanwhile, the task of tactical theoreticians is not only to keep up with the improvement of weapons and to develop means of engaging and defending against the existing combat resources of a probable enemy but

also to "work for the future"—to reveal trends in the development of combat and to take into account the influence of the accelerating scientific-technical progress on its nature.

Under the conditions of the restructuring of military affairs taking into account the direction of our doctrine and the reorganization of the armed forces, it is also necessary to work out new approaches to many other problems. Take even such a question as the determination of the interrelationship between defensive and offensive operations and the development of defensive tactics for the initial period of the war. The negative consequences in this question were manifested rather clearly, in my view. Defense, although theoretically recognized as legitimate, was in practice "neglected" for a long time and was taught superficially with significant shortcomings. Commanders, not wanting to depart from the regulations, rarely made original decisions and developed an unsophisticated defense without always taking care to mislead the enemy, often established a combat formation and a fire and obstacle system in a standardized pattern, and rarely established fire pockets, ambushes and dummy positions or utilized roving tanks, weapons or infantry fighting vehicles.... This, of course, had a negative impact on the training of troops.

To a considerable degree, the postulate affirmed in our theory of the so-called "unified defense" that denies its division into position and maneuvering modes contributed to the imposing of set patterns in the organization of defense. This generally contradicted combat experience. Mobile defense was used during the entire war. It was most prevalent in 1941. It did not disappear even after the well-known Order No 227 of the USSR People's Defense Commissariat dated 28 July 1942 that went into history as the "not a step backward" order. Besides cases in which the military situation truly forced the troops to fight to the death, there were also many cases—in the defense of the security area, for example—when it was necessary to check the advance of a superior enemy, exhaust and wear him down and, at the same time, remove their own subunits from a strike by means of a maneuver (withdrawal) from one position to another. And our commanders successfully coped with this. So that, in reviving the art of preparing and directing defense at this time, it is possible to gain much that is useful from the combat experience of our troops. They proved in practice their ability to establish an invincible and active defense.

As you know, the art of tactics is manifested in a diversity of combat tactics. And this factor is becoming especially important under today's conditions, when we must learn to resolve the tasks in defense and in offensive actions with small forces. A great deal here will depend upon the capability of officers to make effective use of the fighting, maneuvering and protective qualities of weapons and to make bold and extraordinary decisions and upon their ability to outwit the enemy and put him in a difficult situation through a daring maneuver. It

is impossible, of course, to learn this without creative methods. It is possible to develop a completely up-to-date theory of combined-arms combat and to have good field manuals and a very advanced training base but all of this will remain a dead weight if the officers do not learn to teach their subordinates in a new way. Methods, figuratively speaking, are the drive belt between theory and troop practice. New positions in tactics are put into effect in peacetime only through methodology.

At the same time, many problems have arisen in this area. I will tell only a few of my ideas. One of the reasons for the tenacity of stereotypes and dogmatism in the training and education of officers, in my opinion, is that the importance of a fundamental scientific-theoretical preparation in operational and tactical disciplines is underestimated in the schools and academies. At times

the striving to subordinate instruction in VUZ's to the training of an "immediate specialist," a "ready" commander of a platoon, company or battalion. It is difficult to argue with this but it is also necessary to take into account the future service development of the officer. He cannot free himself from memorized patterns, ideas and legal regulations and demonstrate creativity in the search for alternative solutions if his operational and tactical horizon is narrow and if his knowledge in the area of tactics is limited to regulations only.

In short, today, as never before, it is necessary to activate the creative efforts of all officers and troops in the VUZ's so that perestroyka in tactics will produce perceptible results and not in the distant future but as soon as possible.

Gen Army Lyashchenko: Rural Youths 'Fear' Army Service
18010431 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
14 Feb 89 p 3

[Interview with Gen Army N. G. Lyashchenko by Col P. Afanasyev, member of USSR Journalists' Union (Moscow): "Why Does the Soldier Need 100 Rubles"]

[Text] [Afanasyev] A young chap was living his usual life when a notice came from the military commissariat. There was a time when the young country men would receive it nervously but proudly—like a notice of a new life, as evidence of legal adulthood. Now the notice from the military commissariat is more frequently received without joy. What is the matter? Why do strong country boys try to convince the physicians in the commissions that they are ill. Why do their fathers, for whom the "service was a good school" and sometimes even their mothers leave no stone unturned in the military commissariats? It turns out that many rural boys are afraid of the army. They say that there is dedovshchina there. Everywhere there are city rock and rollers, heavy metal freaks, and punks. And the city people have grown up around the sports halls while we "kolkhozniks" have never seen or learned anything.

[Lyashchenko] Yes, such attitudes exist, but at first we attributed them only to Afghanistan. Honestly speaking, there was something to be afraid of... But it turned out that it was not only and not so much the problem of Afghanistan. This was timidity in the presence of the city boys, a fear dedovshchina.

What can we say here? In the first place, as practice shows, the service is much easier for the country boys. Even though they have sports halls and trainers in the city, the country boys are stronger. In the second place, to serve does not mean to be pulling oneself up on the cross bar day and night, to march and to jump. The service is serious work. And country people are more used to work. Boys from rural areas are more independent and sensible. It is not difficult to explain this. In the country where, as a rule, the children receive less attention they mature earlier and acquire the ability to act and make independent decisions. And the fact that they do not know the name of some rock idol is not such a big deal. Check and you will see that within a month it will be impossible to distinguish the country youth from the city youth. Before you can blink your eye they will know all about rock music. But by tomorrow all this will have receded into the background. People grow up quickly in the army.

Recently I learned about the state of affairs with dedovshchina in the military collective headed by Capt V. Baranov. His closest assistants, the ones he could rely on, were country boys. One of them is Lance Corporal Khashakasim Zagastokov. He was recruited from the country. He grew up in a large family and was always

helping his father, mother, and brothers. During vacations he worked on the kolkhoz. All this, of course, could not but have an effect. People like this live sensibly and abide by the rules. They have neither dedovshchina in the subdivisions nor other diversions from boredom.

Under Lance Corporal Zatashtokov is Private Andrey Ivanovets from the village of Zabolotsy in Volyn Oblast and Lance Corporal Andrey Nazarenko from the village of Oktyabrskoye in Dzhabul Oblast. They too are serious people. But there are also others about whom I cannot speak without pain.

[Afanasyev] Nikolay Grigoryevich, in general where do these non-regulation relations in the army come from? Where are the roots of this dedovshchina?

[Lyashchenko] Life is life, and in it everything is interconnected, and the world cannot be divided up into sectors: here—military, there—civilian. Do you really think we did not have a lot of "non-regulation" relations in ordinary life? Or have we already eradicated them.

During the period of stagnation, as we know, the age concepts became displaced. A 40-year-old kolkhoz chairman was called young, and everyone considered him to be young, forgetting that at one time we had 30-year-old ministers and 20-year-old division commanders. Previously when a boy finished a 7-year school he was already an independent person and was thinking about a family, a business, and service in the army. But today they escort you into the army and strew the path with candy... dedovshchina—this is a game. Sometimes it is cruel and inhuman, but it is a game that exists outside the army as well. No, no, do not think that I am trying to make excuses. There is no reason to distort things here. To no small degree we are to blame here. We have not attached the proper significance to this and sometimes have closed our eyes to it. But to reduce everything to the lack of demandingness of the commanders and the weakness of the political and educational work means not to see the very roots about which you are speaking. Up to 60 percent of our recruits are graduates of vocational and technical schools. A questionnaire has shown that these are the first to become acquainted with dedovshchina and undergo, as it were, tempering. Thirty percent of the recruits are from poor families. These are also the ones, you know, who become quite cynical and malicious. But I am an optimist. Renewal is taking place in all spheres of life. I think that soon, quite soon, the young people will stop playing these heartless games and get down to work. Real work that is worthy of our time. Look, today even those for whom yesterday it was "to hell with everything" have now dipped into politics. Perestroyka is attractive. It fills that vacuum which previously everyone filled however they could.

I think that a great deal could be changed even now if in civilian life military patriotic work and preparation for military life met the proper requirements. But today it seems that there are more words than actions. Especially

on the part of the komsomol. Discussion takes place, but no actions. And here is what disturbs us. The majority of secretaries of komsomol raykoms have not gone through basic training in the army. This is very bad, for unless they know what the modern army is like it is difficult to be concerned about its needs and demands. Here serious reproaches are in order for the DOSAAF, the school, and the military commissariats. All these are organizations that are responsible for military patriotic work, but "too many cooks spoil the broth." Is this not where the boys get the idea of "taking off" 2 years and turning the service into a superficial game. Or take the poor physical training. For it is the weak ones who become the objects of jokes, insults, and petty extortion.

[Afanasyev] Incidentally, about petty extortion. This takes place in the army, but it also comes from civilian life. Everyone has heard of it: vocational and technical school students meet a chap somewhere in the rayon center and ask him for 20 kopecks. What do they ask for in the army?

[Lyashchenko] And the monetary transfers to the soldiers. Today everyone is living better than they were, say, 20 years ago. It is rare that a rural family is unable to send their son money. They even compete: my neighbor sent 70 rubles so I am sending 100. Tell me why a soldier needs 100 rubles. Most frequently so that they can wait around and have a good time until they are discharged. And they paint the town red. Vodka, loose women, and sometimes drugs as well. And they finish up their leave in the guardhouse. This is how the kindness of a well-intentioned mama sometimes ends up. Moreover, money from home has begun to play a very special role in the army. For example, a person who has large sums of money does not have to do his own laundry—he hires a young soldier who does not receive money to do this.

[Afanasyev] Does this mean that a soldier's pay is not enough for a person who does not receive "reinforcements" from home?

[Lyashchenko] That is just it. On the one hand the soldier receives clothing, shoes, and food, and he also receives pocket money. What else does he need? But the pocket money is not enough for the soldier. Where does he spend it? On stationery, cologne, razor blades, undercollars, toothpaste... And toothpaste now costs a ruble, razor blades—a ruble, soap—a ruble. Everything is getting more expensive. And if the lad smokes? A package of good cigarettes costs 50-60 kopecks. And if he has invited a girl to a movie it costs three times as much, for the Sunday shows are more expensive and then he must buy ice cream and juice. The pocket money is not sufficient. Of course, here it is necessary to find a radical solution to the problem—increase the soldiers' pay. Although when I was a soldier I never asked for any money from home. I had enough. But that is a different subject. We are speaking about how 100 rubles from home can help finance *dedovshchina*.

[Afanasyev] Comrade Army General, how is the fight against it proceeding in the subdivisions? What is the mechanism for fighting it like?

[Lyashchenko] I frequently encounter military men and spend time with them as their guest. It is noteworthy that everywhere they have adopted a strict policy of eradicating non-regulation relations. Take, for example, the collective of military construction workers commanded by officer N. Podolyanko. Here they have created under the bureau of the AUCCTU a group for fighting against nonstatutory relations. Its members are chosen at a komsomol meeting by open voting. They decisively put a stop to cases of gross violations of relations between senior and junior personnel and do individual work. There is undoubted advantage from meetings between the servicemen and workers of the military prosecutors office, open letter days, and evenings of questions and answers. The main purpose of the work that is being done is to see the concrete person, to know his attitudes and personal concerns, and to influence his awareness and feelings. In the units and subdivisions they are decisively refraining from the habit of conducting a large-scale measures on every occasion and they are being held accountable for these measures.

More work is being done to strengthen troop comradeship and fraternal friendship, which also helps to wage the battle against any *dedovshchina* in our multinational collectives. I do not think that there is any reason to fear "old timer rule." But this does mean that one can calmly wait to be called into the army without preparing for it. Do not waste time; the service is a harsh test. Authority is acquired more rapidly by those who are best prepared for the army.

Fear of Excessive Drinking Means Quarantine in GSFG

18010185 Moscow *SOVETSKIY VOIN* in Russian
No 21, Nov 88 p 23

[Letter to the editor by Junior Sergeant V. Kazantsev; "On the Principle: What If Something Were to Happen"]

[Text] I have served in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany for more than a year now. Our service is difficult. We are only a few kilometers from the part of the border with the FRG, on the territory of which, as is well known, the troops of NATO are deployed. Every day demands an extreme exertion of effort. As a result one quickly becomes weary. And it is not always possible to unwind within the four walls of the garrison. True, there are still excursions but they occur very rarely, and we go only to the three spots with which all of us are already familiar. Which three? The three whose main "tourist attraction" is the absence of stores where alcohol is sold. Why? Because as it was explained to us, the command cannot guarantee our soldiers' sobriety.

Such lack of faith is an insult. We do not need these alcoholic drinks. We just want to relax properly after intense work days. We want to learn as much as possible about the country in which we were called to serve. I am convinced that genuine rest will also be a good support for service.

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Central Financial Directorate Responds to Proposal on Economic Work

18010383 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 88 Second Edition p 1

[Response by Gen. Maj. S. Korennoy, Directorate Chief, Deputy Chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "The Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Responds to the Editors"]

[Text] The Central Financial Directorate has examined the proposals made by Guards Maj. V. Zharkov in the letter entitled "For Whom is the 'Alienation' a Secret?" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Oct), and reports the following with regard to its substance.

In accordance with the Interior Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in addition to classes in combat training and political indoctrination, service members are called upon for tasks of maintaining weapons and military equipment, refitting and improving parks and installations of the training facilities, tidying up military bases etc. An inspection and maintenance day is held every week for this purpose. Other tasks are also inevitable (unloading rail cars with fuels, propellants, food, etc.).

To carry out the tasks of constructing small and simply engineered installations using local resources, in accordance with the governing documents commanders of operational and tactical formations are permitted to create special subunits and teams composed of service members who have served on active conscript duty for no less than one year. Five days a week the personnel of these subunits and teams are called up to perform construction work, and one day a week attend classes on combat training and political indoctrination.

Since the conscript service members are on full state subsistence, they are not authorized any additional wages for performing these tasks.

The sending of service members to work in organizations and enterprises of the domestic economy can be done only by decision of the USSR government or the USSR Ministry of Defense. In this case the USSR Ministry of Defense refunds all expenses related to sending personnel to the work, and the service members, in authorized cases, are paid an additional financial remuneration.

Defense Charitable Funds Noted

18010319a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Viktor Ivanovich Bukato, Chairman of the Board of the USSR Housing and Social Services Bank, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent S. Ostanin: "At the Call of Charity"]

[Text] "How can one help the former soldiers/internationalists? To what account can one send funds?" asks V. Polyakova from the city of Makeyevka, Donetsk Oblast. Other readers of the newspaper have also written or telephoned the editors to ask about the charity accounts.

Our correspondent S. Ostanin asked Viktor Ivanovich Bukato, Chairman of the Board of the USSR Housing and Social Services Bank, to respond.

"We now have several dozen charity accounts. While previously we could count them literally on our fingers—the Soviet Peace Fund, the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin, and so forth—many new accounts for veterans were opened last year. One of these is special account No. 700412 for aiding the earthquake victims in a number of areas in the ArSSR. This has not been a special outpouring of charity in the nation, of course. Compassion and a readiness to help have always been a part of the Soviet people. It has been manifested more powerfully in times of serious disasters, however.

Remember the battle with hunger in the Volga region in 1921-1922. In his speech at the 11th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Congress], V.I. Lenin stressed the following: "Right now the people and all of the working masses see their main cause as that of providing practical aid [to alleviate] the desperate need and hunger..." He asked the Ukraine's peasantry to share their surplus. Nor did the military remain on the sideline in that important matter. Fighters of the 1st Division of the Chervonnyye Cossacks, for example, gave part of their meager rations to help the starving. The following slogan was declared: "Four Cossacks feed one hungry person." These donations were used to feed children in children's homes in the Volga region.

Today's charity reminds one of similar cases from history. The "Afghan" officers from the Syzran Higher Pilot's School imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR, for example, donated a thousand rubles for their fighting comrades wounded in Afghanistan and for the families of those who died.

We have two special accounts. No. 708702, the Dolg fund, is for social acquisitions, the funds going to build a center for the social and physical rehabilitation of the fightingmen/internationalists and veterans of the Great Patriotic War, as well as to help the families of fightingmen/internationalists who died. The second account, No. 700755, is called the "Fund for Designing, Building

and Maintaining Memorial Complexes, Monuments, Grave Markers and Burial Sites for the Homeland's Defenders, and Fightingmen/Internationalists."

Voluntary donations, gifts and contributions from public organizations, creative unions, the labor collectives of enterprises and establishments, and individual citizens go into these accounts. Contributions can be made at any bank in the nation.

With respect to information on the amount of funds in the accounts and their expenditure, this can be provided by the executor of the account.

In our opinion, the public should be informed about receipts of voluntary contributions and about the undertakings for which the funds are used. If all-around, and not one-sided, information is provided the citizens, it will ensure their participation in the charity movement and reinforce their confidence that the funds are being used for their designated purpose.

Readers' Responses on Pensions for Officers' Wives

18010319b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 89 First Edition p 4

[Report: "A Pension for the Officers' Wives"]

[Text] For a long time the society closed its eyes to the problem of social protection (more accurately, lack of protection) for the wives of servicemen. In the meantime, the problem has become more acute every year: the matter of job placement and pension security for the wives of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, among other things. For many different reasons, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR are evolving into a variation on benefits at the sites: not for everyone, not always and certainly not everywhere.... KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ye. Agapova brought up this subject in an interview with Maj Gen E. Busarev, deputy chief of one of the directorates of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, on 18 October 1988. The editors have received many responses, some of which we are publishing today. For the rest of them we are grateful to the authors and inform them that their proposals will be submitted to the Central Finance Directorate for study.

It Is Time to Resolve the Problem!

You have finally brought up the problem of job placement and pensions for the wives of officers! I served in the Far East for many years. I was on Kamchatka and in Maritime.... Very rarely could one of the wives find a job there. My wife is a teacher by education, but because of our frequent moves she lost her specialty. Here, in Alma-Ata, she finally took a job in a library in order to earn a meager pension. It is the same situation today with the wife of our son, an officer. She is also a teacher, but there are no jobs at the school. She took a job at the

club as a hatcheck clerk. This is a person with a higher education. Does this mean that her diploma was wasted? The life of the families of servicemen is, if not hell, at least far from a paradise. It is time finally to put into legal context matters which the families of military personnel encounter.—Maj (Retired) I. Andreyev, Alma-Ata

What Have I Done Wrong!

I am a math teacher by profession. I have fallen into a vicious circle. I have always had to be satisfied with occasionally replacing sick teachers, without any sort of official status. What kind of length of service can I earn? I am now experiencing enormous joy: I am teaching for the second year at a Leningrad school. This is only possible until my husband completes the academy, however. We shall then return to the North, and I shall once again be without work. There are teachers far younger than I at our school with three or four times my length of service. And I am not at all certain that I will be able to work the required length of time to earn a pension. But how am I to blame? For having ended up in this situation through no fault of my own? I totally support the proposal that years spent in closed garrisons where there is no work be included in length of service.—T. Asipenkova, wife of a captain 3rd rank, Leningrad

Through No Caprice of Mine

They have finally thought of us wives. The article mostly discussed women who, due to circumstances, are unable to find work and therefore end up without a pension. Our problem is somewhat different. We have work—not in our specialty, to be sure. An order was recently issued on the payment of an increment for length of service at one place in the Armed Forces. What happened? Everyone receives this increment except the wives of servicemen. How can we protect our length of service continuity if we have to spend a month looking for an apartment, registering and finding work in the military unit? This is just unrealistic.—Bobrova, Govyadinova, Smolina and others, Smolensk

Excerpts From Letters:

I propose that the years constantly spent doing social work by all unemployed wives of servicemen be included in the overall length of service. We would thereby resolve an acute social problem and enhance the role of the women's councils at remote garrisons....—K. Kryukova, Syzran

The problem of job placement could be resolved if garrison life were thoroughly studied. The unit commanders should be interested in this. After all, they sometimes do not know the family situation of a subordinate....—Ye. Mikhaylova, Gomel

Why should the benefits for length of service apply only to those wives who have lived in closed garrisons? This too is no way to resolve the matter. Many wives who live in ordinary garrisons are in no better a situation.—L. Safronova, Belgorod

For many officers' wives the figures of 20 or 30 years of length of service are like a fairy tale from "A Thousand and One Nights." Why not adopt a decision to count the years spent with the husband abroad where there was no work as length of service? This would be fair and humane treatment of officers' wives.—M. Yarkova, Zhitomir

My wife, Mariya Ivanovna, took part in the Great Patriotic War, brought up three children and was always with me at the most remote garrisons. I put it like this: She always served with me. She does not have the length of service for a pension, however, and she does not receive one. Is that fair? The problem of providing pensions for the wives of servicemen needs to be resolved extremely soon.—P. Vasilyev, retired officer, Odessa

Following the article "A Pension for the Officer's Wife" the editors received a response from the State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Problems, signed by N. Kuznetsova, Chief of the Social Security Administration. It states that the issues raised by the newspaper are worthy of attention. They are being considered in the work of preparing the draft new Law on Pension Security for Workers. There has been a meeting of officials from the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, who worked out specific proposals pertaining to pension security for the wives of officers and increasing pensions for the widows of servicemen killed. With respect to improving job placement conditions for the wives of servicemen, these matters could be resolved more successfully if there were closer interaction between unit commanders and the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies.

It would also be a good thing to hold a conference of representatives of ministries and departments, at which they could work out practical steps on matters pertaining to job opportunities for the wives of servicemen.

From the editors: We are publishing a selection of letters and a response from the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. The editors are not closing the chapter on this subject, which troubles many people. We will be monitoring the problem of job opportunities for the wives of servicemen and will keep the reader informed of the situation.

Letters Note Lack of Official Response on Housing

18010324 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 89 First Edition p 4

[Letters to the editor and editorial postscript under the rubric "The Housing Problem—Monitored by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Time for Discharge into the Reserves..."]

[Text] *An article by Lt Col N. Medvedev with that title was published on March 19, 1988, along with a selection of readers' replies on March 26. But letters are still coming in to the editors today. Many of them pose the question that the newspaper presented its feature, but how did the officials react, what steps are being taken to overcome the difficulties associated with providing housing for reserve or retired officers? These questions are especially topical in connection with the impending reductions in the armed forces.*

We give the floor to our readers.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has undoubtedly begun addressing the topic of providing housing for reserve and retired officers more often. In my opinion, a really unfair attitude toward it is being detected more and more here.

I will soon also be discharged into the reserves. I will have to wait a minimum of two or three years for housing. Wouldn't it be better in that case to leave the family in the military settlement until I am set up? Don't even dream of it. The living space in the garrison has to be freed up, otherwise the KECh [quarters and utilities unit] will not issue a receipt for the surrender of housing; without it the ispolkom will not put us onto the register for living space. So it turns out that I have completed my term—and it's off to the four winds?

Our garrison is overflowing with "retirees." Officers assigned to vacant positions are forced to wait years for housing. But the veterans can also be understood: they can't be thrown out to who knows where in their old age. A knot of problems, in short, has formed. It is understandable that they cannot be solved with a wave of the hand. But if we investigate seriously, then we must begin, it seems, with solving the housing problem for those in the reserves or retired.

Lt Col M. Goncharevich, Moscow Oblast

Many of us on active military service have not been thinking about how life will shape up after our discharge into the reserves. We give all our strength and energies to our service. And what are seemingly the problems? There will be a roof over your head in any case—this is stipulated by law, after all. The appropriate decrees have even indicated the time period: no later than three months. But that is the whole point, it turns out that these decrees have not been "working" for a long time.

Here in Bobruysk, for example, we have to wait three or four years for an apartment. Where do the reserve officers live in the meantime, if they have authorization? No one is interested in that. I am not writing to "cry on someone's shoulder." If the aforementioned decrees are not effective anywhere, isn't it time to review them?

Col (Ret) V. Golovin, Mogilev Oblast

What levels of authority haven't we appealed to on the score of the apartment ordeals of reserve officers and warrant officers living in our city! There is, as a rule, one result—the complaints are returned to Ulyanovsk, while the city ispolkom chairman V. Vasilyev ignores the decrees that stipulate the procedure and deadlines for granting them housing.

There is nothing illegal in our demands. The aforementioned decrees moreover were adopted not only by the central directive organs, but also by the oblast ispolkom, the presidium of the oblast trade-union committee, the buro of the city CPSU committee and, finally, the buro of the oblast party committee. The concern for the veterans of the armed forces, however, is manifested only on paper, and many have been forced to wander from pillar to post for years. Do they really deserve to have such an attitude toward them?

We have more than 180 people on the privileged list (if it can be called "privileged"). We have formed a committee for the defense of our rights. We hope that the city authorities will be engaged in setting up housing for veterans of the army and navy nonetheless.

Lt Col (Res) N. Golubovskiy, Lt Col (Res) A. Belov and others (a total of eight signatures), Ulyanovsk

Matters here in Voronezh have reached a point where officers discharged from military service intended to hold a demonstration at the city ispolkom building. An organizing committee was even formed. No, this was not just emotion—it was a reflection of bitter reality. The uncertainty in the solution of day-to-day issues is depressing. You have to wait 4-5 years for an apartment, and this is after already wandering from pillar to post, roaming from garrison to garrison.

That is why we decided to attract the attention of the city authorities to our problems in such a strange, perhaps, fashion. References to the fact that "economic accountability" [khozrashchet] is to blame for everything were not convincing. The facts say they see us just as a "burden." The local authorities have not even thought through the procedure for offering temporary authorizations, naturally with a regard for the situation of the officers that have been discharged into the reserves. One often even has to go to private owners with hat in hand.

These problems have been raised in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. We know that a special commission on housing issues has been formed in the Ministry of

Defense. But we have yet to feel any real improvements ourselves. On the contrary, the situation is growing steadily worse. We receive replies very close to being brush-offs to our appeals to city and higher authorities. The impression is forming that there are plenty of discussions surrounding this urgent issue, but matters are at a standstill.

Reserve officers V. Tkachenko, B. Korolev, Ya. Khaymenov and V. Chekhov, Voronezh.

I was discharged into the reserves after serving 30 years in the Soviet Army. My wife and I finally decided to "drop anchor" in Tula. At the oblast military commissariat they told me that we would have to wait two years for an apartment. If you have to wait, you have to wait, so we agreed, although it is not so easy at our age. Most distressing of all, however, was the impending "procedure" for getting onto the housing rolls. We needed a certificate of surrender for our last living quarters. It seems you have to become homeless to get onto the preferential list.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has more than once raised the question of why the procedure for getting onto the housing register is not simplified. Departmental interests evidently hinder a look at this "procedure" from the point of view of social justice. Some superiors assume that the faster the living space is freed up in the garrison, the simpler it will be, they say, to solve the apartment problem for officers who are continuing their service. In practice it only makes it worse. Many veterans, after all, are refusing to move to the cities from which they were called into service at all.

The unfortunate certificate is proving to be all but a stumbling block to the solution of the housing problem. How many residential dramas and family conflicts arise due to it, or more precisely due to the forced departure from garrisons? Wouldn't it be better to get rid of this certificate and permit a reserve officer, using some standard document, to house his family in the garrison until he receives housing from the ispolkom?

Another entirely sensible suggestion, in my opinion, was expressed in the paper: put officers on the housing register two or three years before discharge. It unfortunately also seems to be "hanging in midair."

Col (Res) G. Pikiner, Perm.

One of the replies to the article "Time for Discharge into the Reserves..." reminded me of this episode: the local bureaucrats forced a reserve officer to go in for a certificate of surrender of housing space in the garrison. They for some reason did not believe the analogous certificate that was presented. It was disgraceful, of course, that the certificate had had to be brought almost 4,000 km. But here they thought of something else. According to existing law, other citizens do not present such a document to the ispolkom, it is not required that

they surrender the living space they occupy. And that is natural. The discussion, after all, concerns being placed on an apartment register. People have to live someplace until they obtain living space.

So why is it then that what is sensible in regard to other citizens is not permitted to former servicemen? An exception is made for them, naturally "for their own good." But in practice this puts people in a hopeless situation: either give up your apartment in the garrison or live there forever, far from relatives and friends.

Lt Col (Res) N. Medvedev, Astrakhan Oblast.

Postscript from the Socio-Economic Problems Department

There are many such letters in the editorial mail. Sharply "colored" with emotion, they sometimes unilaterally evaluate the housing problem that faces the whole country. Nowhere can you escape the fact that it cannot be solved all at once, even with the help of the boldest and most original solutions. A home must be built before it can be lived in. But the readers are undoubtedly correct about the main thing, however: the situation that has taken shape today cannot be satisfactory.

Today's procedure for providing living space for servicemen in the reserves or who have retired according to their state of health, age or through staff reductions really does obligate the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies to offer apartments first and foremost, but no later than three months from the time of arrival at the place of residence selected with a regard for the existing authorization procedure. It is namely that elaboration that is given to those discharged by the commanders and workers of the personnel and apartment organs of the Ministry of Defense. This procedure is in fact being violated everywhere in practice. This can be seen from the readers' letters published today. This has also been confirmed by verifications conducted by the the USSR Committee for People's Control.

It would be unfair, however, to see the cause only in the callousness and inattentive attitude toward housing arrangements for former service people on the part of local organs of power (although there are no few such instances, unfortunately). The situation is such that in many cities, especially in the European part of the country, they are unable to provide housing for those discharged or retired in the time periods stipulated by the operative decrees. There is coming to be less and less housing constructed through centralized capital investment. The erection of housing takes place primarily through the profits earned by labor collectives with the conversion to self-financing. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in Voronezh, for example, officers are forced to wait several years to get an apartment. The deputy chairman of the Voronezh Oblast ispolkom, V. Oshevnev, reported this to the editors. The limited capabilities of the city ispolkoms makes it impossible to

allocate housing for them in timely fashion, by way of example, in Kemerovo and Dnepropetrovsk, as the editors were informed by city party committee secretaries Comrades E. Zhigulina and G. Fatova. Where is the way out?

The reply from the Main Apartment Operations Directorate [MAOD] of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the feature "Time for Discharge into the Reserves...", along with the letters from readers that have been received by the editors, are convincing that changes are needed in the procedure for providing housing for servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or have retired by the ispolkoms of the local soviets.

It also follows from the reply that the USSR Minister of Defense has appealed to the government of the USSR with a request to take additional steps aimed at the observance of the stipulated time periods for the allocation of housing to them. The proposals that have been prepared by the Main Apartment Operations Directorate this time envisage the acceptance onto the register for the provision of living space of servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or have retired by the local soviets without the presentation of discharge documents for the former place of residence or the surrender of the living accommodations that are being occupied. These documents are proposed to be required immediately upon the receipt of the housing. The readers have come out almost unanimously for just such a procedure.

These proposals, as has been reported to the editors by the deputy chief of the MAOD, Col V. Matveyev, are currently being considered by the USSR Council of Ministers. A request has also been directed to the Moscow city ispolkom to simplify the procedure for authorizations in Moscow for discharged servicemen called to active military service from the capital.

Finally, quite recently, at the beginning of December, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on the sale of uninhabited apartments in buildings of the state and public housing stock that are subject to modernization to citizens for private ownership. The decree states that servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves according to age, state of health or personnel reductions who are on the housing register, along with other categories of citizens, will enjoy the right to the priority acquisition of that housing for personal ownership.

Draft Criminal Laws: Proposals on Military Authority

*18010351b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 89 first edition p 4*

[Article by Col. V. Bakharev: "Based on Experience"]

In the "Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation" project brought up for discussion, there are undoubtedly included many cardinal measures for the implementation of a course to strengthen law and order, as noted by

the 19th All-Union Party Conference. In my view, however, a few of the laws of the new redaction of the "Fundamentals" need to be refined.

Thus, the project does not foresee the application of the rules of the Disciplinary Code of the USSR Armed Forces (Articles 45, 46) for military transgressions committed by servicemen. I think that it is necessary to include these laws. After all, the primary responsibility of commanders of military posts and ships is to provide for legality and law and order.

I propose that the "Fundamentals" project provide the military post commander with a possibility, such as a board of inquiry, to determine the impact of the reduced circumstances and consequences of certain types of military crimes: to give the material to the military prosecutor or to limit it to disciplinary punishment. Such a system has existed to this day, and, I think, was justified. In my view, it allows avoidance of cases of a formal approach under the agitation of criminal proceedings, and increases the authority of the post commander, who, in times of war and peace, bears personal responsibility not only for military discipline, but for the education and political-moral condition of the personnel.

I consider the "Fundamental's" project version of article 34 (limiting freedom) to be a failure. It states that this measure of punishment is not administered to compulsory term servicemen. Does that mean that it is applied to officers, ensigns, midshipmen and extended term servicemen? And they can be directed to locations, "determined by the organs cognizant of the execution of the sentence," that is, the organs of the Ministry of Internal affairs?

I propose a supplement to the above article, to determine its application to servicemen: "For sentenced officers, ensigns, midshipmen and extended military servicemen, limitation of freedom will be implemented at the military unit for a term of six months to three years in cases as provided by the law. While serving the sentence, the convicted serviceman's freedom is limited in that he does not have the right to leave the garrison, other than departures involving the execution of service assignments; he cannot be promoted in rank or responsibility, and his time served under sentence does not apply to the period needed to advance in military rank. Unit commanders, institution and military school chiefs monitor the behavior of those convicted."

I feel that Article 35 (arrest) needs some work. In the first place, it states that servicemen must serve their arrest in the guardhouse. This, I think, can lead into a number of negative consequences, above all, in the educational sphere, as the arrested ones in the guardhouse are watched by officers, sergeants and soldiers of combat units, not by specially trained personnel. I suggest that the "Fundamentals" projects specify that servicemen under arrest be contained in disciplinary battalions in the guardhouse.

Secondly, I suggest that the aforementioned article specify that pregnant women and women with children under age 8 not be subject to arrest, in units where applicable. This rule should be expanded to include all women in military service. Their confinement under arrest is impossible due to the lack of female troops in the guardhouse. Should special female watches be created?

I propose that Article 37 (Limitation of service) be completely excluded by the "Fundamentals" project, since limitation of service is an incorrect interpretation of the very concept of military service of the officer corps, the active military service of ensigns, midshipmen and extended term servicemen. In comparison to the civilian, the military man already has a number of limitations connected with the fulfillment of his service duties. The punitive measures indicated in Article 37 deprive the military unit commander of his empowerment to independently make decisions regarding his subordinates.

Additionally, withholding accrual of time in rank and promotion in rank and responsibility, which are proposed for convicted servicemen, cannot be viewed purely as a punishment. For objective reasons, this frequently happens in life.

I submit that it is also inadvisable to withhold 10-20 percent of the convicted serviceman's pay and reduce leave time by half. In any event, such punitive measures are not taken against civilians. Withholding monthly salary can have a significant effect on the material well-being of the servicemen's families, where frequently wives are not employed, and quite a sum goes to sub-leasing an apartment.

I discussed all the aforementioned statements with other specialists involved in projects of new general military codes, and with many unit commanders, political workers from the Moscow military district, and people from the the military prosecutor's office. The overwhelming majority supported the opinions above, based on the practical experience of their work with the troops.

DT-10 Jointed, Tracked Transporter, Parts I-II
81440359 Moscow *TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in
Russian No 11, Nov 88, ;No 12, Dec 88

[Article by engineers I. Pleshakov, Yu. Smirnov, V. Shangin, T. Grishev, I. Noskov, V. Rozhin: "Jointed Transporter"]

[No 11, Nov 88 pp 14-15]

[Text] The DT-10 jointed, tracked transporter and its modifications are irreplaceable for hauling various cargo and equipment in particularly adverse road and weather conditions. It can be used also as a tractor for evacuating and towing vehicles on ground with poor supporting capacity (virgin snow, swampy ground and so forth).

A low specific ground pressure (0.22 kg/square centimeter), an independent torsion-bar suspension, two airtight, operating sections, internal and inter-section interlocking systems and a rotary coupling give the transporter good cross-country ability and the ability to cross water barriers afloat without preliminary preparation. A powerful power unit (740 hp), hydraulic transmission (GMT) and crawler belts with prominent cross members make it possible to develop a speed of around 40 kph and give the vehicle good traction.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the vehicle's reliable operation depends to a significant degree upon how strictly the operating and maintenance requirements are observed. Among other things, it is important to consider its specific summer and winter operating features. In cold weather (in temperatures below +5 degrees C) the preheater must be used (or in certain cases, water must be run through the cooling system)

prior to starting the engine. Starting a cold engine results in extreme wear on its parts and breakage of the hose joints in the lubrication system.

It must be remembered that the transporter's engine operates on diesel fuel, various grades of aviation kerosene or A-72 gasoline, while the PZhD-600 preheater operates only on diesel fuel or kerosene. To avoid fires it is absolutely forbidden to use the preheater when the fuel tanks contain gasoline.


After warming up the engine, it is started and allowed to idle for a time. A cold engine does not develop full power, in addition to which there is great wear and tear on the pistons and cylinders, and the pistons and valves become clogged with coke and gum up.

Before moving the transporter in temperatures below -20 degrees C, the hydraulic transmission must be warmed up (to +45 degrees C) in third gear with the brakes engaged. This eliminates extra wear on the clutches and bearings.

In extreme cold (below -30 C), the transporter's hydraulic control system is also warmed up. This requires flexing the vehicle's sections horizontally and vertically several times with the vehicle in place.

The vehicle's rotary coupling device (Fig. 1) serves not only for turning the transporter in motion or in place, but also for forced flexing and for absorbing vertical oscillations of the sections, and permits reciprocal rotation of the sections.

FIGURE 1 Rotary Coupling




Key:

1. Drawbar
2. Hydraulic Horizontal Flexing Cylinder
- 3., 4., 5. Axes
6. Hydraulic Vertical Flexing Cylinder

The drawbars 1 are of a welded, tubular design. The sections are rotated (around axis 3) by means of the horizontal hydraulic flexing cylinders 2. There is forced vertical flexing of the sections (rotation axis 5). The sections rotate relative to one another around axis 4. The hydraulic control system is located on the first section and includes a gear-type pump, slide-valve distributors (Fig. 2), a valve-type safety device (Fig. 3), vibration absorbers (Fig. 4) and an oil tank.

FIGURE 2 Slide-Valve Distributor



Key:


1. Slide Valve
2. Housing. During operation of the transporter it may pull to one side or another despite pressure on the steering wheel. This may be caused by improper adjustment of the slide-valve control drawbars. Furthermore, complete loss of control can occur as a result of the side-valve's wedging in the housing.

When the steering wheel is turned, the valve-gear distributor shifts and oil is forced into the cavities of the horizontal hydraulic flexing cylinders. To avoid overheating of the oil in the hydraulic system and premature breakdown of the pump's sliding bearings, it is forbidden to retain the sections in either extreme horizontal or vertical position more than 30 seconds.

Before starting to move the vehicle it is essential to ascertain that the brake pedal and the manual control braking levers are released. Otherwise, the brake bands will catch on the drums and cause excessive wear on and overheating of those parts.

It is best to start off in second gear on surfaced roads. The shift to higher gears is made after maximum acceleration has been reached in the preceding one. The fuel


FIGURE 3 Safety Valve Device



Key:

1. Slide-valve
2. Valve. The speed at which the sections flex depends upon the proper adjustment of the valve's position, which, in turn, determines the position of the slide-valve, and this determines the pressure in the hydraulic system. If flexing is sluggish, the pressure in the hydraulic system is checked and the necessary adjustments are made.

FIGURE 4 Buffer



Key:

1. Stop Valve
2. Tappet
3. Spring
4. Check Valve
5. Sleeve Connector If the lock washer on the stop valve breaks after the buffer is engaged, the hydraulic control system can remain in an unlocked position even after the vertical flexing mechanism is unlocked. In this case the stop valve remains pressed against the sleeve connector after the air pressure has been released.

feed is reduced when shifting through neutral. Low gear is engaged on good roads and the fuel feed is reduced. It is then immediately increased to the maximum. The shifting of gears from higher to lower on bad roads is done without reducing the fuel supply to the engine. Strict observance of this procedure for shifting gears reduces the load on the hydraulic transmission and wear on the clutches.

The steering wheel is turned slightly to hold the vehicle in a turn. If the transporter cannot negotiate a curve, the transmission is disengaged and rpms are increased. The output of the hydraulic system's pump will increase and the corresponding hydraulic piston rod will move more rapidly, reducing the turning radius. Upon completing the turn, one should engage the gear corresponding to the engine rpms and the vehicle's speed.

[No 12, Dec 88, pp 20-21]

[Text]The hydraulic transmission's design provides for locking the fuel converter in third and fourth gears, producing a perceptible fuel saving. It is recommended that this be done only at speeds of at least 15 kph in third gear and at 30 kph in fourth. Before encountering an obstacle, before braking or simply drastically reducing speed, however, the locking mode should be engaged to avoid critical wear on the parts and breakage (or sticking of the clutch disks in the locking system).

The operator/mechanic must get used to observing the monitoring instruments and warning lights while underway. He must pay particular attention to the oil pressure in the hydraulic transmission.

The pressure must not fall below 15 kg/square centimeter, since this will cause the hydraulic transmission to break down due to clutch slippage and sticking plates.

The transporter has three interlocking differentials, two of which are installed in cone reduction gears in each section (see figure) and are internal interlocking systems, and one in the hydraulic transmission, an inter-section interlocking system. They make it possible to achieve the most efficient mode for various road conditions.

On soft ground, on inclines, on ice and in other situations in which the tracks slip, the appropriate differential in the cone reduction gear or the hydraulic transmission must be locked.

The track should not be permitted to slip more than 10 centimeters to prevent excessive wear on the sliding bearings in the differentials. When the road is slick and the transporter is loaded, it is recommended that the inter-section differential be engaged. All differentials are locked before entering water and unlocked upon leaving it.

The internal and inter-section interlocking systems and the rotary coupling device considerably enhance the transporter's survivability. Depending upon road conditions, it can

continue to move on three, two or, in an extreme situation, one track. The tractor does not lose its mobility if certain assemblies in the transmission and the tracks and suspension break down: the cone and final drive gears, the universal shaft, the driving sprocket and idler wheels.

In order to continue moving on one track—on the second section, for example—the internal locking mechanism on it and that of the hydraulic transmission must be engaged. If the onboard reduction gear of the first section jams, the track is released on the side of the jammed onboard reduction gear, the coupling between the cone reduction gear and the damaged onboard reduction gear is disconnected and attached to the onboard reduction gear using braces from the kit containing spare parts, tools and accessories. The internal locking unit of the first section is engaged and travel is continued.

A signaling device on the operator's panel indicates whether the locking device is engaged or disengaged. If the signal lights do not light up or do not go out when the internal and inter-section locking devices are engaged or disengaged, it is recommended that the units be flexed slightly horizontally or vertically. This produces a reciprocal turn of the differential half-shafts, and the gear couplings mesh.

Before crossing a water barrier the operator should make certain that the doors and hatches and the fuel tank fillers are tightly closed and that there is no penetrating damage to the section hulls.

To prepare for evacuating a tractor one end of a towing cable is attached to the towing lug on the first unit, the other to the roof of the cab.

The water should be entered slowly, or else it will splash onto the intake screen of the air cleaner. This can result in a hydraulic shock, warping the crank shaft and connecting rod assembly and breaking the engine's gas seal.

It is recommended that frozen branches and streams up to 10 meters wide with unknown ice thickness be crossed in reverse. If the ice breaks, it is easier to remove the transporter from the hole and there is no danger of warping or damage to the front part of the cab.

Great care must also be taken when moving over flooded terrain afloat and over virgin snow. One should not develop great speeds, since an impact with such things as stumps and boulders could break the crawler belts and warp the hulls. If the cone and onboard reduction gears are knocked out of alignment in the process, they will cease to function. It is recommended that first gear be used for crossing ditches and trenches, entering and exiting bodies of water with steep banks, since at high speeds there is greater dynamic pressure on the driving sprockets and idler wheels and the rotary coupling assemblies, and they can be broken. The cranked axles of the driving sprockets and the pipes on the front of the rear section are most frequently damaged in this situation.

When the transporter is used as a tractor for extricating bogged-down vehicles, this should be done without jerks to avoid breaking the rotary coupling assembly. When extricating a line of vehicles, the transporter should always be coupled at the head of the column. It should be borne in mind that using the vehicle for this purpose increases stress on the rubberized fabric components and sections of the crawler belt, which also suffer far more wear and tear when the transporter is moved with locked differentials over solid ground. This is due to the abrupt stresses on the track drive in turns and while moving over uneven ground.

The transporter is designed for use on ground with poor supporting capacity, and it is therefore not recommended that it be used for a long time on surfaced roads. This preserves the ground-gripping cross sections of the crawler belt and the roller tires.

It is recommended that condensate be released from the transporter's pneumatic system after every 2 or 3 hours of operation to prevent the formation of water or ice obstructions in the lines. Condensate should be drained from the pneumatic system also upon returning the vehicle to the pool. Before stopping the engine it is recommended that it be allowed to idle for a time, until the temperature of the coolant is no greater than 70 degrees C. This makes it possible to avoid hot spots and warping of the cylinder block. When the vehicle is parked for a long time the louvers and air ducts should be covered with a standard-issue canvas cover. Otherwise, in rain or snow moisture will enter the engine cylinders through the exhaust manifolds.

The transporter is designed so that the front section can be used separately. It is controlled with special manual braking levers, with the hydraulic transmission differential locked (it is recommended that the brake bands first be checked for tension). Before moving the vehicle the PSU [pneumatic control system?] must be moved to the top position and locked. To prevent damage to the flexible connecting hoses, they are gathered into a single bundle and secured to the PSU. In the field the sections can be connected or disconnected without extra tools.

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BTR-80: Preparation for Winter

81440360a Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 11, Nov 1988 pp 10-13


[Article by Col V. Moskalev, Col V. Matveyev, Lt Col Yu. Stoyakin, Lt Col V. Spichakov, and Lt Col (Res) M. Igolnikov]

[Text]

Cooling System

Before replacing the water with low-freezing liquid, the cooling system is flushed in order to remove accumulated sediment, sludge deposits, and corrosion products. When doing this, the vehicle should be on level ground.

Cone Reduction Gear



Key:

1. Gear Coupling

2. Differential Cup. When the internal locking mechanism is engaged the cams of the clutch coupling may stick in the cams of the differential cup. In this case, in order to complete the locking, the sections are flexed horizontally, which produces a reciprocal turn of the differential cup relative to the clutch coupling, and they mesh.

To drain the water from the system, the hatch covers over the engine compartment are opened and secured to the stops, the overflow tank filler cap is removed, and the crew compartment heating system cock on the cylinder block head is opened. Next, after putting clean metal containers under the drain openings in the floor of the vehicle (Figure 1), the drain cocks are opened: one on the heat exchanger; two on the heater boiler; and four on the heaters of the crew compartment heating system. When the water has left the overflow tank, the radiator filler cap is removed. After the coolant has been drained, it is categorically forbidden to remove sediment from the system by starting the engine, since this can result in damage to the packing rings of the cylinder sleeves, valve seats falling out, and warping and burning through of the head gaskets.

Next, the cooling system thermostats are removed and checked for serviceability. To do this, the thermostat is sunk into a warming water bath (water level should be above the flange of the thermostat). After heating the water to a temperature of +70°C, the heating intensity is reduced to 3° per minute, and the amount of movement of the valve is measured by an indicator. The thermostat is serviceable if the valve movement is 0.1 mm at a water temperature of 78-82°C and is fully open at 91-95°C. The full movement of the thermostat valve should be at least 8.5 mm. The beginning of valve opening can be at 77-83°C and full opening at 90-96°C, with loss of movement of not over 20 percent.

A three-part solution consisting of a mixture of potassium bichromate (GOST 2652-78), sodium nitrate (GOST 19906-74) and trisodium phosphate (GOST 201-76) is used to flush the system. To prepare this solution,

Figure 1.(top) Diagram of location of coolant drain openings in floor.



Figure 2.(bottom) ITE-type freezing temperature indicator.

Key:

1. From front heater;
- 2, 3, 6. From rear heaters;
4. From preliminary preheater boiler;
5. From heat exchanger.

it is necessary to heat up 5-6 liters of boiled water to 60-80°C, pour 0.05 percent (by weight) of each component from the mass of the water being filled, and thoroughly mix. The water becomes a light green color. For example, to 100 liters of soft (boiled) water add 50 grams of each component (weighing them on a counter balance or commercial scale).

The flushing solution is poured through a funnel with a linen filter; next, the system is filled with boiled water to the level of the lower edge of the opening above the steam discharge pipe and this cap closed. The overflow tank filler cap is opened and boiled water is added to it (40-50 mm from the bottom of the tank). After this, the tank cap is closed. The engine is started and warmed up until the water reaches a temperature of 80-90°C. Two to three hours after stopping the engine, the flushing mixture is drained and the thermostats installed. The cooling system is filled to the necessary level with low-freezing liquid (ONZh) of the appropriate type.

Standard ethyl glycol solutions grades 40 and 65 (GOST 159-52) or Tosol A-40 and Tosol A-65 (TU6-02-151-78) are used. It is not prohibited to mix regular antifreeze with Tosol, but it must be taken into account that the quality of the latter is reduced significantly when doing so. Before using, it is necessary to check the quality of the antifreeze by density, measured by using a GEG-type aerometer-hydrometer or an ITE-type freezing temperature indicator (Figure 2).

Immediately before filling, a sample is taken from each tank with antifreeze to visually check its quality: by color, clearness, and presence of mechanical impurities and oil products. If mechanical impurities are detected, the liquid is filtered through a closely woven fabric. If oil products are detected, the ONZh is discarded.

Antifreeze is poured into the radiator filler neck to the level of the lower edge of the opening under the steam discharge pipe. When doing this, the filler cap of the overflow tank must be closed. Next, the tank is filled to a level 10-20 mm from the bottom with the radiator filler cap closed. After filling, the overflow tank filler cap is closed and the engine is run for 3-5 minutes. After stopping the engine, the liquid is filled to normal level.

If coolant is lost through leaks, air is sucked in from the tank and a water-and-air mixture begins to circulate through the system, which causes intense cavitation and corrosive damage to the water pump impellers and housing, the cooling chambers in the heads, and other cooling system elements. Cavitation damage to parts also occurs when the engine is operated with a defective steam-air plug on the radiator filler neck.

The steam-air valve is checked to be sure it is in working condition before pressure testing the cooling system. Using a universal pressure tester (PPGU), the gauge pressure at which the steam valve opens and the opening

pressure of the air valve are determined. The steam valve spring should be adjusted for a gauge pressure of 64-78 kPa (0.65-0.8 kgf/cm², otherwise the valve needs to be replaced.

In order to pressure test the cooling system, the gauge pressure (not over 0.8 kgf/cm²) is created in it, and the system is checked for leaks. The coupling union from the instrument kit is screwed into the overflow tank filler neck in place of the cap, and the air hose is connected to it. The valve on the panel is opened, and the pneumatic tumbler switch is placed in the opposite position of the arrow on the panel.

After creating the necessary pressure, the valve on the panel is closed. If the vacuum gauge records a drop in pressure in the cooling system after 10 minutes, this indicated that there are hairline cracks or leaks. After correcting the defects, the system is again pressure tested.

The radiator louvers should open without much effort, and in the closed position the flaps should fit tightly against one another. When preparing the cooling system, the joints of the parts driving the flaps are cleaned and lubricated with a winter motor oil. The lifting height of the air-intake covers should be 43-45 mm, otherwise the drive is adjusted.

Full opening and closing of the louvers of the air intake and outlet is adjusted by changing the length of the linkage by using pipe connectors. After each adjustment of the drive, the louvers are checked and, if necessary, the end releasing devices are adjusted using screws. When the louvers are fully closed (or open), the electric motor should shut off.

After checking the cooling system's air path, the electronic jet device (EFU) and preliminary preheater are prepared. The EFU fuel lines are cleared of summer fuel, the sparking plugs are rinsed, and the protective sleeves and screen are cleaned of deposits and rinsed in gasoline. The serviceability of the EFU is checked by starting with serviceable storage batteries. The EFU is in working order if heat can be felt on the hand in the areas of the air intake lines heated by the sparking plug flame jets. The gas vents of the preliminary preheater are purged with compressed air, the electrodes and insulator of the sparking plugs are cleaned of carbon deposits, and the fuel system is filled. Operation of the fuel heater is checked in the "Scavenge, fuel heating" mode, and the preheater is checked by starting. If necessary, the filters, injector, and solenoid valve are flushed out.

Fuel System

The list and sequence of operations performed when winterizing the BTR-80 are outlined fairly completely in the manual. We will dwell only on certain operations for servicing the engine and its systems.

First of all, the sediment should be drained from the coarse and fine filter housings, and the filter elements in the fine fuel filter replaced.

The summer fuel remaining in the tanks is drained using a device contained in the vehicle spare parts kit. This makes it possible to avoid splashing fuel. Before draining the fuel, three plugs are removed: the filler cap, one in the hull floor, and the fuel tank drain plug. The device is screwed into the latter. First, the sediment is removed (into a separate container). The remaining fuel is drained into a clean container and turned over to the fuel dump.

If necessary, the fuel tanks are flushed out directly on the vehicles, using an OM-1509 pneumohydraulic gun. The tanks can be flushed with steam and water heated to 70-80°C.

Clean fuel is one of the main conditions for normal operation of the fuel system and, therefore, the engine. In order to check its condition, a fuel sample is poured into a glass cylinder 40-45 mm in diameter. The fuel should be clear and not contain any suspended or settled foreign matter, especially water. Mechanical impurities cause increased wear of the fuel pump plungers, and water corrodes the parts. In addition, water breaks down the cardboard filter plates in the fine filters. In the winter, engine breakdowns are possible due to chunks of ice in the fuel lines and filters.

After fueling, the filler caps should be tightened; fuel should be manually pumped into the fuel lines and filters. The engine is then run for 10-15 minutes in order to use up the remaining summer fuel.

In order to remove summer fuel from the EFU, it is pumped manually until there are no more air bubbles coming out with the fuel from under the nuts of the joints of the left and right EFU. After this, the nuts are tightened and the operation of the EFU checked in the usual manner.

The airtightness of the fuel system is checked by inspecting it, but it is better to pressure test a filled system using a universal pressure tester (PPGU). Gauge pressure is created in the system by an external source of compressed air or by the hand pump included in the instrument kit. To check a joint, it is best to replace the air filter with the air hose contained in the kit. It is mandatory that the excess fuel drain valve be closed. If not, the fuel will overflow and leak from the tank.

One must keep in mind that in cold weather, if the tanks are not filled completely, condensation forms on the inner walls. This precluded in filled tanks.

Stricter demands are placed on the fuel-priming pump in the winter than in the summer. This is because when the fuel gets cold, the filters are likely to get blocked by ice crystals during the first 10-15 minutes the engine is running at idle and warming up. During this period, the

priming pump must provide a reliable flow of the necessary amount of diesel fuel to the high-pressure pump through the filters. The serviceability of the pump, taken off the engine, is checked on an SDTA-1 stand.

When preparing the BTR-80 for winter operation, it may become necessary to check and adjust the high-pressure fuel pump and spray nozzles. This is done only by qualified specialists of the maintenance subunit using the appropriate bench equipment.

Before turning on the preliminary preheater, the fuel must first be preheated in the heater: if the air temperature is -20°C , it is preheated for 20 seconds; -30°C , for 30 seconds; -40°C , for 60 seconds; -50°C , at least 90 seconds. The electric heater can be checked only after its chamber is filled with fuel. To do this, the control plug is loosened $\frac{1}{2}$ turn and, after placing the switch handle in the "Operate" position, the system is primed with a hand pump until fuel appears from under the plug.

Fuel is drained from the coarse filter housing. The fastening bolts of the shell are loosened, and the shell is removed together with the ring. Next, the filter element is removed from the housing; its screen and also the cavity of the shell are flushed out with diesel fuel or gasoline and blown out with compressed air. Assembling the filter, a sealing washer and distributor are put on the filter element. The filter element is screwed into the housing. After tightening the drain plug, the shell is filled with diesel fuel and is mounted and secured with the bolts. In conclusion, be sure that no air is being sucked through the filter. In replacing the fine fuel filter elements, it is necessary first to loosen the drain plugs 2-3 turns and remove the fuel from the housing. After completing the operations, be sure that air does not pass through the filter.


Lastly, the oil in the fuel injection advance coupling is replaced.

Transmission

First of all, summer-grade oil is replaced with winter-grade in assemblies and components. The oil is drained from the transmission assemblies (immediately after the vehicle has been run, before it cools off), first from the gearboxes and then from the drive axle housings, the transmission case, and transfer box. The M-16-A(T) (Mt-16p) in place of TM-3-9 (TSp-15K) and Tm-3-18 oil is drained without flushing the units; the TM-3-18 (TSp-15K) in place of TM-4-9 (TS-9gip) is drained with flushing, after the summer oil has been removed.

To replace oil in the transmission, the plug in the hull floor of the vehicle under the transmission case drain openings is loosened, the magnetic plug is taken out, and the oil removed. After cleaning dirt and metal particles off the magnetic plug and floor plug, they are put back in place. Fresh oil is poured in to level marker V.

Figure 3.(top) Checking oil level in first, second and third axles. Figure 4.(bottom) Checking oil level in fourth axle.



Key:

1. L-shaped wrench;
2. Axle housing.
3. Dipstick;
4. Seal;
5. Pipe;
6. Axle housing.

Before draining the oil from the drive axles, the stoppers in the floor over the servicing openings of the first, second and third axles are opened. Oil is poured into the first, second and third axles through the servicing openings of the cases until it reaches the top notch of the L-shaped wrench (Figure 3); oil is poured into the fourth axle through the oil-filling tube (Figure 4) until it reaches the top notch of the dipstick.

Before replacing the oil in the transfer box, the seats are raised and secured to the straps; the three plugs in the vehicle hull floor under the drain openings of the transfer box case are unscrewed. The plugs under the right and left lugs and the magnetic plug in the center of the lower

half of the transfer box case are removed and the oil drained. The plugs under the lugs are unscrewed using a 17 X 19 mm L-shaped; the magnetic plug is removed using an adapter-wrench (22 mm) with the aid of an assembly blade. When the oil flows out, all plugs are put back in place in the transfer box case and the hull floor. After this, having removed the breather cap, oil is filled to the upper notch on the level indicator. After making sure that the oil has been filled to specifications, the level indicator and the seats are returned to their original position.

If there is no winter-grade oil, as an exception it is permitted to dilute summer oil with diesel (10-15 percent) arctic or winter fuel. The solidification temperature of the oil is reduced by approximately 10-15°C. The oil in assemblies is diluted without draining. The oil level is first brought up to specifications. Then, the necessary amount is removed using an injector, after which the same amount of diesel fuel is added. If the oil has thickened from the cold, this operation is done after the vehicle has been run for 10-15 km. After diluting the oil, the vehicle is driven for 5-7 km. Movement is begun in the lower gears with the front axles, step-down gear in the transfer box, and the differential interlock engaged.

When the vehicle begins moving, as long as the oil in the transfer box is still cold and thick, the oil pressure indicator may remain lit for a while (until the oil warms up). After warm-up, it is necessary to disengage the step-down gear in the transfer box and the differential interlock.

In order to warm up the working fluid in the hydraulic steering booster, the wheels are turned several times to the right and left before driving.

Operating Peculiarities

Depending on the specific conditions, four grades of fuel are used in the personnel carrier. When outside air temperature is above zero, summer fuel L-06-40 (GOST 305-82) is used. During cold weather, winter fuels Z-0.2 -35°C (at temperatures 0° to -20°C) and Z-0.2 -45°C (to -30°C) are used; in extremely cold weather (to -50°C), arctic fuel A-0.2 (GOST 305-82) is used. We would remind you that both winter fuels can be used any time of the year. In addition, at temperatures of -20°C to -55°C and for a short time (not more than 10 percent of the service life time) at temperatures above -20°C it is permitted to use TS-1 (GOST 10227-62) fuel.

Before starting the engine, it is necessary to check the cooling and lubrication systems for fullness. The engine crankcase holds 28 liters of oil (corresponding to level marker V on the oil dipstick). When filled with water, the cooling system holds 50 liter; it holds 1 liter less when filled with low-freezing liquid. This corresponds to a water level of 30-40 mm and a low-freezing liquid level of 10-20 mm from the bottom of the overflow tank.

The procedure for starting the engine depends on how warm the engine is and the outside air temperature. When the air temperature is warm or the engine is warmed up, the starter button is pressed and held until the engine starts, but not longer than 15 seconds. The starter can be re-engaged no sooner than 1 minute after the previous attempt. If the engine does not start after three attempts, subsequent attempts can be made only after finding and correcting the cause of the unsuccessful starts.

At an air temperature down to -20°C, the electronic jet device (EFU) is used to start a cold engine. It warms up the air being fed into the cylinders. The manual fuel feed handle is moved to the minimal feed position. After pressing the EFU button, it is held down until the "Ready to start" light is lit, but not for more than 1 minute. In doing so, the generators are disconnected and current is fed to the helixes of the glow plugs through a booster resistor. As soon as the plugs heat up to the required temperature, the solenoid valve and indicator lamp are activated, signaling that the EFU is ready for starting the engine. After the engine starts, the starter button is released, but the EFU button can be held down until the engine is running smoothly, but not for more than 3 minutes. It is not permitted to stop the engine or operate it above 1600 rpm.

At an air temperature below -20°C, the preliminary preheater is used for reliable engine starting. If the cooling system is filled with low-freezing liquid, the preheating is accomplished in the following sequence. The fuel shutoff knob is placed in the "Pump" position and the valve on the preheater tank is opened, after which fuel is pumped until it appears in the valve. The valve is closed and the fuel shutoff knob is turned to the "Operate" position. The cover on the outlet pipe is opened and the operating mode switch knob is placed in the "Pump," "Heat fuel" position. The heating time for fuel is 20 seconds at an ambient air temperature of -20°C, 30 seconds at -30°C, and 60 seconds at -40°C. The preheater is started by turning the switch knob to the "Start" position until there is a characteristic rumble in the boiler, but not for more than 30 seconds. The switch knob is released and is automatically put in the "Operate" position. The liquid in the cooling system is heated to 60-80°C. If it is necessary to start it again, it can be done 1 minute later. The preheater is turned off by putting the knob in the "Pump," "Heat fuel" position for 20-30 seconds and then in the "Off" position. The fuel shutoff and outlet pipe are closed.

A different procedure is used when water with a 3-part additive is used as a coolant. In this case, the radiator cap and preheater funnel plug are opened; the drain cocks of the cooling system and heating system, as well as the heating system shutoff valve are closed. A trial start of the preheater is made for no more than 15 seconds. Two liters of water are poured through the funnel into the preheater boiler, and the preheater is started. Then, 4 more liters of water are added, and the plug is put back

into the funnel. When the engine warms up to the point where steam appears from the radiator neck (the thermostat opens), water must be poured into the radiator and the preheater operated for 3-8 minutes more. If the engine does not start, it must be warmed up periodically by turning on the preheater until the malfunction is corrected, or the water must be drained. When the coolant temperature reaches 40°C, the heater valves are opened and the cooling system is filled to specifications.

The preliminary preheater can also be used when the ambient air temperature is above -20°C if the EFU is inoperative. In order for the engine to warm up more quickly, it is recommended that the louvers and hatches be closed and the engine compartment be warmed with rugs or canvas. After starting, the engine is warmed up to 40°C, gradually increasing crankshaft speed to 1300-1500 rpm.

The brake systems must be serviced and adjusted regularly at specified times.

Before adjusting the brakes shoes, the wheel reducing gear bearings should be checked for play. Then, the adjusting screw is unscrewed from the housing and the brake shoes are adjusted so they touch the brake drum. The screw is turned into the housing 7-9 clicks. The brake drum should turn by hand in both directions without brushing against the brake shoe.

The normal clearance between the push rods and pistons of hydraulic boosters is 2.5-3.5 mm: this precludes the possibility of incomplete release of the braking system when the main cylinder pistons return to their initial position. Brake pedal travel should be 14-20 mm. If the brakes are adjusted correctly, the pedal should feel "firm" on the second half of its travel; when the brake pedal is depressed sharply, the vehicle should "skid" to a stop without skidding to the side. The brake drums should not heat up when driving without braking. The brake valve is adjusted by changing the length of the brake pull rod. In doing this, the length of the compensating spring should be 104-107 mm when compressed. When correctly adjusted, air should not feed into the boosters from the air cylinder when the pedal is released.

The linkage systems are filled with working fluid (MGE-10A brake fluid) separately, and then air is bled in the following order: for system I (left master cylinder)—the right third, left third, right first and left first braking gears; for system II (right master cylinder)—the right fourth, left fourth, right second and left second braking gears. After bleeding air from the brakes, fluid is added to the master cylinders to the level of the top edge of the square opening, and the plug is screwed in tightly. When pressure of 50-60 kgf is applied to the brake lever, the pawl should move 9-10 notches (clicks). Adjustment is made by changing the length of the linkages. If the linkages have been shortened the maximum amount and do not provide braking, it is necessary to move them to the corresponding openings in the releasing levers.

In the process of operating the vehicles, it is necessary to strictly observe the heat conditions of engine operation. The recommended oil and coolant temperature is 90-100°C, and 100° and 105°C, respectively, for brief periods. Oil pressure in a warmed-up engine at 2600 rpm should be 392-539 kPa (4.0-5.5 kgf/cm², and not less than 98 kPa (1 kgf/cm² at 600 rpm. Engine crankshaft speed when operating on land is from 1600 to 2600 rpm, and on water is from 1600 to 2400 rpm. Maximum permissible engine crankshaft speed is 2930 rpm. One should bear in mind that extended operation of the engine under a load with a coolant temperature below 70°C results in gumming of the piston groups.

If the oil filter light comes on when operating an engine warmed up to normal temperature, this means it is necessary to replace the filter elements. The light should come on only when starting an engine that has cold oil, when warming up the engine, and at minimum idle speed of a warmed-up engine. The engine is not to be run when the clogged air filter indicator is red. In this case, the filter elements must be serviced or replaced.

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BTR-70: Engine Ignition

81440360b Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 11, Nov 1988 p 13


[Article by Maj V. Donets: "Adjusting Ignition Timing on a BTR-70 Engine"]

[Text] This operation is performed by the driver and electrician. The tools required are: spark-plug wrench; 8 mm, 10 mm and 14 mm wrenches; screwdriver; trouble light; feeler gauge; and wrench for turning the crankshaft.

First of all, it is necessary to place the first cylinder piston at top dead center of the compression stroke. To do this, the first cylinder spark plug is removed, the plug opening is covered with a finger (if special device is not available), and the engine crankshaft is turned using a wrench until air begins to escape from under the finger and further until the mark (ball) on the flywheel coincides with the arrow on the clutch housing. The wrench for turning the crankshaft is placed on the notched washer located between the collar of the distributing box and the intermediate universal-joint shaft.

If the distributor and contact breaker unit is being replaced, the drive shaft is adjusted so the groove on its side is aimed along the axis of the engine and off-center on the right of the vehicle. Only this shaft position is correct. After this, the shaft is inserted into the block opening. The housing of the ignition distributor drive is fastened using a mount and nut. One must bear in mind that the arm must be aimed to the front of the vehicle and turned 23° to the right of the longitudinal axis of the engine (see figure).

Positioning of elements of distributor drive during installation (broken-line arrow indicates forward engine direction).



The cap and rotor are removed from the distributor mounted in the seat and checked. If necessary, the gap between the points is adjusted. Next, after putting the rotor in place, the crankshaft is turned through the angle of ignition advance setting. To do this, at the end of the second revolution the arrow on the clutch housing is matched with mark 4 on the flywheel. The rotor should be opposite the spark-plug point of the first cylinder on the distributor cap. After this, the octane-selector dial is moved to zero using the adjustment nuts, and the low-voltage wire coming from the ignition coil is connected to the distributor. After turning on the ignition, the points are adjusted turning the distributor housing counter-clockwise until they start to break contact, the moment of which is determined by ignition of the trouble light connected to the breaker wire and the frame.

The screw (bold) of the octane-selector plate is tightened, and the distributor housing is secured. In doing so, the housing must be held so that it does not turn. The distributor cap is fastened.

The timing adjustment is checked when the engine is warmed up. The vehicle is run up to a speed of 25 km/h, the direct drive is engaged and, sharply depressing the throttle pedal as far as possible, it is held in this position. A light combustion knock should be heard in the cylinders, which disappears at 45-50 km/h. If there is considerable knocking, the distributor housing is turned clockwise, thereby decreasing the angle of advance. If there is no knocking, the angle of advance is increased.

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
Air Transport of BTR-80

81440360c Moscow *TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
No 11, Nov 1988 pp 16-17

[Article by Lt Col A. Mosunov and Maj V. Chepelevskiy:
"Air Transport of the BTR-80"]

[Text] During the course of preparing the vehicle for transporting, daily maintenance is performed on it. Special attention should be given to airtightness of all systems:

Figure 1. Device for disconnecting suspension.



Key:

- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Stop | 5. Lock nut |
| 2. Stop booster | 6. Upper suspension arm |
| 3. Bolt | 7. Stop bolt |
| 4. Bump stop | |

leakage of fuel, oil, and operating fluids is not permissible. The engine cooling system is filled with low-freezing coolant.

If the system has been filled with water, it is necessary to coordinate with the aircraft commander to see if it should be drained out or if it can be left.

Immediately before loading on the aircraft, the engine is warmed up and the temperature of the coolant in the cooling system raised to 80°C. The pressure in the central tire inflation system is brought to 600-700 kPa (6-7.7 kgf/cm²). The wheel valves are then closed.

The suspension of the first and fourth wheels is disconnected using special devices (four sets are packed in the tool box on the right side of the BTR). To do this, stops (1) (Figure 1) are installed on the bump stop (4) and secured by stop bolts (7). After this, they are unscrewed until they touch the upper suspension arm and are locked with lock nuts (5).


Fuel level in the tanks is checked. It should be no more than 95 percent for transporting in a pressurized aircraft or 75 percent in an unpressurized one.

The vehicle is driven into the aircraft under its own power with the first or reverse gear and in the reducing gear in the distributing box, without any abrupt jerks or braking. After the vehicle has stopped, its parking brake is set, the engine is shut off (manual fuel feed lever in the "Stop" position), the lowest gear in the transmission is engaged, the batteries are disconnected, the position of the suspension releases is checked, and all hatches are locked.

The vehicle is tied down in the aircraft using tie-down cables or chains (Figure 2). When securing the BTR to the floor of the aircraft cargo cabin, the cables (chains) must not touch the BTR's pneumatic or hydraulic drives. The cables should be tightened up simultaneously from two directions diagonally 3-4 times so their tension is uniform.

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Figure 2. Diagram of positioning and tying down vehicles in in IL-76 cargo cabin (a.—loading vehicles frontwards; b.—loading vehicles backwards).



Key:

1. Tie-downs on floor of aircraft;
2. Guy (cable or chain);
3. Front towing hooks;
4. Lower suspension arms;
5. Floor of cargo cabin;
6. Rear towing hooks; TsT—vehicle center of gravity (figures in circles are the rib numbers).

Laser Simulators Used in Combat Training
18010194a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Maj A. Plotnikov: "Laser Simulators Used in Combat Training"]

[Text] Presently an important and effective form for checking the level of combat training for the tank troops and motorized infantry is the tactical exercises with field firing. However, from time to time the editors receive letters, for example, as follows:

"...What sort of quality of combat training for the tank commanders and gunners can it be when each time they fire at a 3-m piece of plywood and here do not experience the fire effect of the opposing side...."

Maj V. Chernyayev,
Belorussian Military District

"...The apparently fine attacks, for instance, behind the rolling barrage are a source of satisfaction only to incompetent observers. Officers who are concerned actually with the training of subordinates term them a purely external effect...."

Maj A. Stepanov,

Far Eastern Military District

Judging from the statements by the authors of the letters, there is a great deal of artificiality in organizing such field exercises. And clearly as well there is a striving for mere effect. So one can agree with them in part. Our tank troops and motorized riflemen actually do feel overconfident on the combat training field. The leaders of the tactical exercises with field firing are concerned primarily that the percentage of hit targets is impressive. They are much less concerned with maneuvering, the rate of fire, the use of the protective properties of the field and many other components of real tactics.

Such questions as the absence of return fire from the "warring" sides in the course of the tactical exercises, the dubious criteria for assessing the skills of both the specialists as well as the subunits as a whole participating in them have long concerned the developers of range equipment. The fruit of their creative efforts has been a standardized laser fire and hit simulator and which from the start of this year has begun to be delivered to the military districts. It is designed to simulate, using a laser beam the firing from the artillery weapons of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, for reciprocal hits in the course of two-sided tactical exercises and for training crews at tank firing drills.

The operating principle of this device is as follows. By pressing the button of the cannon electric trigger, the transceiver emits a probing (control) pulse of a laser beam and which activates the target's photodetector. A portion of the laser beam energy is reflected from the target's triple prism and is returned to the transceiver of the "firing tank." If the aim has been correct, then in a fraction of a second the transceiver of the "firing tank" receives a return pulse which is transformed in the target photodetector and activates the servomechanisms of the hit simulation system. In the next second on the tank being fired upon a signal light goes on, a smoke charge explodes and the engine stops. If the aim at the target has been done incorrectly, then the hitting pulse of the laser beam is not emitted and the commander and gunner of the "firing tank" are displayed information on the error in range and direction. At the same time, their rivals receive data on the "miss." Now let us imagine the following situation in the exercises. The tanks, for

instance, of the "blues" are rushing against the positions of the opposing side. Suddenly they are counterattacked by combat vehicles of the "reds." In the sights and viewing instruments instead of the customary gray-green targets one sees "live" targets which maneuver on the battlefield and fire. In a word, everything is as if in real combat. The only difference is that in the poorly trained crews there will be no casualties. The combat vehicles where they are will be marked by simulating smoke. The value of an exercise organized in this manner for forming high morale and professional qualities of the men without any doubt is inestimable. And this is no longer a mere fantasy. With the delivery of the laser simulators to the troop units the conducting of such exercises is a completely realistic matter. They will become more interesting and productive.

However, with the delivery of the innovation to the troops, as we learned in talking with officers at the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Troops, many difficulties arise. For example, highly skilled specialists are required to operate and adjust these devices. Here, obviously, a special repair facility is indispensable. Ultimately such equipment requires a person in charge. But a TOE position is still not provided. Why then has this training device been developed?

The problem that the laser fire and hit simulator is a portion of a planned integrated system of range equipment. But for a number of reasons the question of providing servicing for it has remained open. So for now the simulator adds to an arsenal of isolated, unconnected trainers. One can only regret this.

Mi-24 Rotors

81440384a Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 11, Nov 1988 p 31

[Article by Lt Col V. Sidorov: "Inspecting Mi-24 Rotors"]

[Text] Helicopter rotors are one of the most critical design elements of a helicopter. The main rotor creates lift and motive force; it is used for longitudinal and lateral control of the helicopter. The tail rotor counters the reactive torque of the main rotor and provides controllability and stability.

Despite the different functions of the rotors, they have much in common in design, in nature of in-flight loading, and also in what consequences arise from the effect of damage-producing elements. Therefore, operations to check the technical condition of the main and tail rotors are basically the same and involve a step-by-step inspection of the hub, blade spars, and their tail sections.

The design of the Mi-24's main rotor hub has three hinges on each blade. The flapping and drag hinges ensure freedom of flywheel movement of the blade, and the feathering hinge enables it to turn relative to its longitudinal axis and thereby change the amount and direction of total aerodynamic force of the blade. The tail rotor has one integrated universal joint instead of spaced flapping hinges. The tail rotor's feathering hinge performs the same functions as that of the main rotor.

The high unit loads taken up by the hub structural elements make them quite sensitive to stress concentrators, particularly in places where there is a sharp change in cross-section area. When inspecting the hub, it is first of all necessary to be sure there are no cracks in its parts and that the hinges are airtight. With the blades removed, the racks of the feathering hinge housing are carefully inspected. Deep nicks and abrasions on the surfaces of parts, breakdown of the protective covering, and corrosion damage contribute to the formation and development of fatigue cracks, particularly if the defects appear at the edges or around fillets on the housings and journals of the hinges. If some part is suspected of having a crack, it must be inspected using a 7X magnifier, after first cleaning the spot of the defect with emery cloth.

Breakdown of the protective covering is identified by dark spots which are the beginning of the corrosion process. The affected area should also be cleaned with emery cloth and covered with clear lacquer. Sanding the defective area with No 5 emery cloth for 15 minutes is sufficient to remove mechanical and corrosion damage.

The appearance of traces of grease on the outer surfaces of the hinges indicates wear of their packing rings and seals. Therefore, it is mandatory to monitor the level of oil in the hinges between servings. To assess the technical condition of the internal parts (casehardened layer of thrust bearing rings) in the feathering hinges of

the main rotor hub, drain plugs are made of magnetic material. If metal particles or metallic powder is detected on the plug after changing oil, the helicopter is not operated until the causes are identified. It should be remembered that leaking of drain and filler plug seals and of hydraulic damper seals of drag hinges is not permitted at all.

Sealing grease is used in the tail rotor hub universal assembly and also in the blade rotator roller hinges. Since the rotor is subjected to considerable operational loads from vibrations of the helicopter's tail and keel booms, it is very important to lubricate the hinges correctly and regularly as specified by the periodic technical servicing schedule for reliable operation of the hub. The lubrication in the hinges is checked by squeezing the ball of the grease cups; if the level is normal, grease squirts out from under the ball. In order to be sure there is no play in the universal joint, the hub housing should be depressed vertically and horizontally by hand.

Cracks, dents, deep abrasions, and corrosion damage also significantly reduce the fatigue strength of the main load-bearing element of the blade—the spar, which absorbs the load from centrifugal tensile force and alternating aerodynamic forces. In open areas of the spars, dents and abrasions which form during the process of operation are, as a rule, a source of stress concentrators. If dents or cracks are detected in the paint and varnish coating, one must check to be sure that these defects have not affected the spar surface. To do this, according to procedures outlined in the helicopter maintenance manual, the paint and varnish coating should be washed off, not allowing remover to get on the edges of the glue lines; the spar should be cleaned with emery cloth without disturbing the anodic coating. Then the worked area is inspected using a 7X magnifier.

The area where the first row of bolts attaching the end to the spar should be inspected particularly closely and checked to be sure that there are no cracks on the sides of the main rotor blade. The inspection must be made using a magnifier; when inspecting the butt portion of the blade (through the access hole on the upper and through the special openings on the lower surfaces of the fairings) it is advisable to light up the end facepieces using a trouble light.

It is necessary to check constantly the adhesive joints of the tail sections with the spar, of the section lining with honeycomb filler, and also of the fiber glass layers of the butt fairing of the de-icing system heating mat, rubber, and anti-abrasion covering. The tips are inspected especially closely to see that there are no cracks leading from the screw holes for attaching the tip to the spar.

Damage to the adhesive joint between structural elements of the blade can be visually detected by local swelling of the rubber coating, cracking of the paint and varnish coating, and flaking of the sealer along the adhesive joint. Separation or damage to the adhesive

joint of the skin with the honeycomb filler, as a rule, occurs where the curvature of the aerodynamic contour of the skin has been disturbed and where there are dents and other operating damage. It is sometimes difficult to detect these defects visually or by tapping. Flaw detectors IAD-2 and IAD-3 can be used quite effectively for this purpose. The size and location of permissible separations are outlined in the helicopter maintenance manual. However, it should be remembered that in all cases it is impermissible to have separations that have reached the edge of the adhesive joint, since this can result in intensive development of separation in flight under the effect of the windstream.

If misalignment of main rotor blade rotation or change in rotor vibration is detected in flight, the blades must be inspected most closely after the flight. Sometimes, misalignment of the main rotor blades is not the result of technical problems. The bending angles of the flaps or trim tabs, the spread of which in the blade set, as we know, must not exceed 3°, and the difference in length of the trim tab of one blade must not be more than 1°. The misalignment of the blades is corrected only after setting these angles in accordance with the requirements of the manual.

Helicopter rotors are to a considerable degree subjected to the effects of unfavorable natural and climatic factors. When operating helicopters in heavy dust conditions, for example, increased wear on the anti-abrasion covering and the protective rubber layer of the heater mats, and abrasion of the paint and varnish coverings, particularly on the end sections of the blades, may be observed. Hail may damage the trailing sections of the rotors which have a thin skin.

When a helicopter has been operated in extreme natural and climatic conditions, the specially developed procedural recommendations should be followed explicitly.

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Mi-24 Fuel System Maintenance

81440384b Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 12, Dec 1988 p 18

[Article by Lt Col V. Sidorov: "Mi-24 Helicopter: Fuel System Maintenance"]

[Text] Checking the technical condition of this system includes visual assessment of the airtightness of fuel tanks and main lines, checking the serviceability of transfer and booster pumps, the system for transferring fuel from external fuel tanks, and finally, if necessary, adjusting the fuel distribution apparatus.

The five main cell-type fuel tanks are located in pods which (under normal operating conditions) are not opened when performing scheduled maintenance. Disturbance of their airtightness is determined from traces of fuel leakage on the outer skin or inside the fuselage and radio compartment.

To avoid the formation of cracks on the inner surface of the tanks due to aging of the rubber, they must always be filled. Fuel should not be allowed to get on the outer surface of the tanks, since this contributes to blistering of their outer layers. External or supplemental (depending on the helicopter modification) metal tanks are inspected along the welded seams and in the area of the suspension assemblies or in the area where they are attached to the supports.

The fuel lines are inspected to determine if their airtightness has been disturbed at joints and also to see if there is any mechanical damage (dents, nicks, abrasions), breakage of mounting and safety clamps, or touching of fuel lines and airframe structural elements. Correct installation of a fuel line without twisting and misalignment with reliable flanging helps to keep the system airtight. The clearance between fuel lines and other structural parts is considered normal if the fuel line does not touch the adjacent parts when pressed with a finger (approximate force of 2-3 kgf).

Special attention should be given to checking the condition of the transfer pumps and cut-off valves. When testing the pumps, a strange noise in the pumping unit is a sign of abnormal operation. At the same time, a typical noise when the cut-off valve flap activates indicates normal operation. However, the time it takes the flap to activate should also be checked (it should be approximately 3 seconds).

Operating synchronization of the fuel transfer and distribution units of the system is ensured by the float-linkage fuel level indicators, which automatically shut off the transfer pumps and indicates that fuel is no longer being burned from the tank. If during operation it is discovered that fuel is being burned up prematurely from the main tanks or that there is no automatic shut-off of the transfer pumps after fuel from the tank is burned up completely, the serviceability of elements of the automatic fuel system must be checked thoroughly.


As experience shows, when suspending and installing external fuel tanks on the support mounts and mating the fuel and drainage lines, it is sometimes difficult to turn the extension-type connecting nipples, which move vertically when rotating the special nut. In order to avoid this, it is recommended to pour 10-15 drops of MS-14 oil in the space between the sleeve unit and the nipples when installing the tanks and periodically every 100 flying hours. When there are filled external fuel tanks, the main fuel tanks must also be completely filled to avoid false activation of the transfer control system.

An important condition for reliable operation of the fuel system is refueling the helicopter with quality standardized fuel, quality filtration of fuels in the system, and timely flushing of filter elements. Fouling of the fuel filters can result in failure of the engines to start. In flight, it can result in engine failure due to deterioration of the permeability of the mesh of the regulator pump filter elements. As we know, the regulator pump has a fine filter at the inlet which provides the main supply of fuel to the power plant. The filter has a relief valve which activates when the pressure drops 0.5-0.7 kgf/cm². As the filter becomes dirty, the pressure drop in it increases, and when it reaches the limit, the valve opens, passing unfiltered fuel into the regulator pump. If the fine filter is not serviced in a timely manner, the central filters of the regulator pump and meter will also get dirty.

The condition of the filters is determined when performing periodic maintenance on the helicopter. It is assessed by the so-called spillage time using the PKF instrument. For a clean filter element, this time should not exceed 5 seconds. The figure shows the relationship of spillage time and pressure drop in the filter to the extent the filter element mesh is fouled. The filter pressure drop at which the relief valve can open ($P=0.5 \text{ kgf/cm}^2$) is achieved at a filter spillage time of 30 seconds. Taking into account that under the effect of vibrations the relief valve can open at lower pressure drop values than determined by its adjustment, the limit of guaranteed fuel filtration is usually considered to be a spillage time of 20 seconds. If this is exceeded, it is advisable to flush out the filters of the regulator pump at the same time as the fine filter. This operation is accomplished on a UZU4-1.6 ultrasonic filter element cleaning unit.

When operating a helicopter under heavy dust conditions or if the tanks have been filled with polyurethane foam, the time periods between flushing of the fuel filters should be reduced, as is pointed out in the maintenance documentation. With a high ambient air temperature,

Relationship of spillage time and filter pressure drop to degree of blockage of filter element mesh



the temperature of the fuel also increases and, consequently, so does the pressure in the capacities being filled. As a result, the fuel expands, and its volume in the tanks increases. Therefore, the amount of the fuel being poured into the tanks must be reduced by 2-3 percent. In conclusion, let us recall that high intensity of fuel evaporation requires strict observance of prescribed safety measures when refueling, above all, mandatory grounding the helicopter and the fuel supply vehicle.

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**Chief of Naval Combat Training Interviewed on
Combat Readiness**

*18010164 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Vice Adm A. Kuzmin, chief of Naval Combat Training, under the heading "Combat Readiness: Parameters of Quality." "We Need Creators, not Craftsmen"]

[Text] Vice Adm A. Kuzmin, chief of Naval Combat Training, answers questions from the editorial staff.

[Editor] Comrade Vice Admiral, since the start of the new training year, the ships and units of the Navy have been living under a new combat training program. Do you believe it is sufficiently oriented on achieving qualitative parameters in military skill?

[Kuzmin] Judge for yourself: The main goal is for combat training to hold a place in the vital activities of the Navy corresponding to its rank. Can we manage without changing anything? Of course not.

Now, it seems to us, we have discovered the necessary "thread" in knot of problems of combat training. We may see a new side of combat readiness of naval forces if combat training is assigned paramount importance in the activities of commanders, staffs, and political bodies. Unfortunately, these three forces have not always acted synchronously. Sometimes it turned out that there were more people next to the commander who were checking and ensuring things were carried out than there were real assistants. We believe it necessary to even out responsibility.

The commander is in charge of combat readiness, and he must be saved from resolving accompanying issues and be given the opportunity to engage in his immediate duties. I believe that if a day goes by in which a commander is not involved in issues of combat readiness, that is a day wasted.

Most likely, my categoricalness may appear extreme. But let us discuss it sensibly. The attitude towards a worker who spends a day in the shop without turning on his machine tool is quite specific. Why should we regard differently a commander who does not engage in his direct duties or does not have the opportunity to do so?

[Editor] But, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, you yourself say that commanders sometimes are not given enough opportunity to engage in combat training...

[Kuzmin] Unfortunately. But this is only one side of the problem. As we know, the commander himself is a person concerned with achieving high results in combat improvement, therefore I am always put on guard by his passiveness. Generally speaking, a commander who is unable to defend and stand up for his views is not a

commander in the full sense of the word. We, both on the bridge and at the head of matters associated not only with problems of combat training, would above all like to see the personality.

By the way, special attention is being given to this aspect in new combat training courses. Non-specific leadership of combat training does not suit anyone now. The commander must be at the center of this process—not only to organize, but also to conduct measures for tactical, special, and general training personally (which assumes the highest level!). In short, he must be not only an organizer, but also the best performer. I am not talking about the high methods skills of commanders at all levels. This is an indisputable truth!

[Editor] One must assume that increased demands for professional training will be imposed not only on commanders, but also on the entire officer corps? What role do you see here for the announced written and practical examinations for field, air and naval combat proficiency of officer personnel?

[Kuzmin] In my view, this is an effective means for increasing theoretical knowledge and acquiring practical skills in an officer's own military specialty. We are placing specific hopes on the examinations as a stimulator of initiative and creativity in combat training which can make it interesting...

[Editor] Interesting?...

[Kuzmin] ...You see, it turns out that you are also troubled by such an assertion. But what is unnatural about relating to combat training with interest? Is "interesting" really a synonym for "frivolous?" The time has come to make certain adjustments in individual forms of training which earlier have not always yielded the desired results. Above all, this applies to professional training of officers and warrant officers. Why are these categories named first? It is not because I tend to belittle the importance of personnel training. But we must realize that officers and warrant officers are professionals who hold up the entire way of life in the Navy. By the way, professionalism is also a qualitative category. It gives rise to a completely different attitude towards the job, gives rise to love for the combat specialty, which in turn is the key to learning to apprehend the finest professional structures inaccessible to the craftsman. And the next step in improvement leads to creativity. Combat training can hardly get by without this. We also need creators first and foremost, not craftsmen.

[Editor] But are there any guarantees that this time it all will not end up just as changes on paper?

[Kuzmin] I believe that there are opportunities to implement this. One is introduction of computer technology, which will make it possible to expand the set of training forms and provide an opportunity to make more active use of individual training methods. Among them, the

so-called "intimate" form of training will be possible—this is when a trainee will be left one-on-one with the computer, when his mistakes and errors will not for the time being be the property of everyone...

Of course, the introduction of computers and the use of machine instruction—all this will require expenditures. But we should not be afraid of expenditures with a benefit. Much more time and money are now being spent, for example, on building a conventional stationary simulator. This takes several years. During this time, it becomes obsolete, and other ship designs and other equipment come to take their place. It turns out that we have to begin everything all over again. But with computer equipment, it is sufficient to change the program in this instance.

Generally speaking, we are now pursuing a course of developing built-in simulators. This is the new direction of the future. Suffice it to say that built-in simulators will make it possible to use the consoles of ship battle stations during the course of training drills. Mechanisms will not be used here, and that means the training itself will become more economical. This factor also has to be taken into account.

[Editor] Based on what you have said, can it be concluded that with the use of built-in simulators the center of combat training will shift to the ships, to ship subunits? What is to be done with the materiel of bases, will their role decrease?

[Kuzmin] By no means. When we talk about built-in simulators, we have in mind a family of simulators intended for training a shipboard specialty. At shore-based training centers we plan to create tactical simulators which make it possible to train ship combat crews, command posts, and staffs. The role of specialized training set up in well-equipped shore-based training centers will not diminish. So, base training will acquire a new quality, taking into account the creation of new simulators.

[Editor] Do you believe the existing system of summing up will change with the move to qualitative parameters in combat training? Do you find it possible to abandon the school ratings altogether when determining what has been achieved by a ship or unit?

[Kuzmin] We thought about this matter. But we concluded that for the time being it is unreasonable to abandon ratings. In the new conditions, we want to untie a large unit [soyedineniye] commander's hands completely. He can give his ship commanders the ratings he considers necessary. "Superfluous" two's, believe me, will not disturb higher command authorities and will not in any way influence "successfulness."

But ratings received at test tactical exercises under the leadership of higher commanders will count for both the ship and the large unit commander. Thus, we will try to interest everyone in a high end result in combat training and form an attitude based on principle towards what has been achieved.

Warship to Be Named for Admiral Kuznetsov
18010175 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 89 p 2

[unsigned article; "To the Ship—The Name of the People's Commissar"]

"Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov"—such is the name received by one of the warships currently under construction.

On September 1st of last year in our newspaper a letter from a group of Navy veterans was published in which it was proposed to give the name of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov to the Naval Academy, to establish a stipend in the name of the renowned naval commander, and also to name a street in his honor in several cities. The veterans came forth so that in memory of the people's commissar N. G. Kuznetsov, a modern warship would receive his name, and so that on the house where he lived a memorial plaque would be erected. These suggestions were supported by hundreds of readers.

As we were informed by the Navy's Main Staff, by petition of the Military Council of the Navy and by resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, a warship currently under construction has been given the name "Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov". The Deputy Chief of the Navy's Political Directorate Rear-Admiral V. Zakhartsev specified that the name of N. G. Kuznetsov was given to a cruiser of the most modern design.

As for the other proposals regarding the immortalization of the memory of N. G. Kuznetsov, Rear-Admiral V. Lyakin informed the editors that "a decision based on their review is currently being withheld." But it must be supposed that such a formulation will hardly be likely to please anyone today. The readers have the right to receive a concrete answer why all of their proposals were not considered.

Morale 'Crisis' in Search and Rescue Service
18010166 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Gorbunov, Northern Fleet senior diver: "The Deep-Sea Diver Profession: Why Has It Been Losing Its Prestige in Recent Years?"]

[Text] When I was informed that Sr Lt K., commander of a diver team on one of the rescue ships, was refusing to dive, pleading that he was not feeling well, I was not even

surprised. As usual, I became interested in the medics' reason for the officer's lethargy. After hearing what has become so usual—medicine could not find any significant departures from the norm—I gave the senior lieutenant the "OK" not to dive.

I could make no other decision. According to existing rules, any complaint by a diver—be it about his health or a low moral-psychological state—is weighty grounds for being released from a dive. Not a single dive officer would dare violate this rule, for he is fully responsible for diving safety.

But I am not surprised at what took place—moreover, I was almost sure that the senior lieutenant would refuse to dive—here is why. Sr Lt K. is one of my subordinates who does not demonstrate a desire to become a true deep-sea diver and does everything possible to dive as infrequently as possible to the maximum—and not only the maximum—depths. There are quite a few ways to avoid dives. Some, like K., allude to not feeling well; others go on the dive, but at a depth of 60 meters they suddenly begin experiencing "pain in their joints" and have to stop the dive. We are unable to check whether or not the diver actually was getting the "bends." Even if we were able to prove the person was not telling the truth, nothing would change: We do not force them to dive.

I would not have recalled such incidents negatively characterizing certain young officers in our specialty if they, these incidents, did not reflect a phenomenon which forces us to ponder the future of the deep-diver specialty. The essence of the phenomena is this: Today, I can count on my fingers the number of officers having the highest diver qualification who have dived to the 100-meter mark. And if the situation does not change, in several years we will have to note down in a unique "Red Book" an officer with the additional qualification of "deep-sea diver."

This is all fairly easily explained: The heroic, courageous specialty is going through a crisis. We—meaning the command personnel of the Search and Rescue Service (PSS)—cannot change the training conditions of diver specialists or the regulations governing their performance of duty. But they, the specialists, do not want to serve "in the old way," do not want to risk their life, as some say, for nothing. You see, the military ranks for the positions they hold are low, and the pay is more than modest... I will cover this in more detail later.

There are, in my opinion, three main reasons for the drop in prestige of the deep-sea diver specialty. The first is insufficient professional training of diver specialists at the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy. Another school used to train these specialists, and its graduates had a good initial training, some practical experience in performing diving operations, sound health, and excellent physical toughness. But the main thing is that each graduate knew that his basic duties would involve performing diving operations,

including at maximum depths. They actively adopted the work methods from their senior comrades on dives and persistently studied the deep-water job. There was continuity in the work, and personnel stability was preserved.

After PSS specialists began graduating from the Dzerzhinskiy School, the Navy began getting generally competent officers, but poorly trained divers. By no means do I doubt the path selected in training personnel for the search and rescue services. But still, in my opinion, something very important was lost in transferring the class of diver specialists from one place to another, which to this day has not been recovered.

Now, the graduates of the school have begun to receive, besides the diver specialty, the additional qualification of military engineer. And...they try at any price to avoid being assigned to positions directly involving work as divers. They strive, as they say, to follow the engineer command line, to become specialists of manned diving devices or commanders of shorebased salvage and rescue subunits. And this active dislike for diving appears in some young people long before they finish the school. I will cite such an example.

Last year, eight fifth-year cadets from the above-named school arrived in the fleet PSS for a tour of duty in a line unit. During the course of the interview, only three of them, S. Skvortsov, A. Mironov and V. Persiyanov, expressed a desire to begin their service in the position of a diver specialist. However, over the course of 1 month, not one out of the eight cadets was able to pass the prescribed tests authorizing them to make independent dives. What is more, they all avoided dives on various pretexts. By the end of their tour of duty, only five of them had barely mastered the 60-meter depth. None of the cadets fully completed the program. Comments are hardly necessary.

Those who are "unlucky" and still end up in diver positions find opportunities to leave them as quickly as they can.

The second reason discouraging young officers from becoming divers is the high degree of risk associated with the fact that the gear being used by military divers is not, to put it mildly, the most modern. For example, at deep depths it is recommended that they use pressure suits with active, force heating—say, using hot water. But we use the old method of passive means of heating. To put it more simply, two pairs of long underwear. This causes inconveniences in moving on the ground. Moreover, with this "passive heating," a diver often has to work on the verge of becoming too cold. As we know, not everyone is up to the risk, especially an unjustified one.

Finally, the third reason: Shortages in financial incentives for deep-sea divers. There is no denying this.

In my opinion, neither the level of pay nor the military rank envisioned for the position held corresponds to the risk, responsibility and labor-intensiveness of our profession. Let us say that the commander of a diving team on a rescue ship has a low rate of pay for his position and the authorized rank of senior lieutenant. Of course, there is the one-time grant for diving, but it does not correspond to the moral and physical loads to which deep-sea divers are subjected.

Here is another fact for comparison: In the engineer position, for which graduates of the school—PSS diver specialists—are longing so, they can serve at least until the rank of captain-lieutenant, moreover receiving a higher pay rate. I have not even mentioned the problem of professional growth. It takes at least 7-8 years to train an excellent deep-sea diver capable of performing any kind of underwater work and finding a way out of any situation. But where will we get them if the shoulder boards of a senior lieutenant become "too small" for an officer after 4 years? He needs a new position—chief of a salvage and rescue service—for good service advancement. But he can spend only 3-4 years there without damaging his professional growth. In this respect, a young officer can feel easy in his mind for 6-7 years in an engineer position or shorebased commander's position.

All I have said makes it possible to draw a conclusion: If we do not want the crisis in the deep-sea diver specialty to worsen, we must radically change the attitude towards it and eliminate the causes of the drop in its prestige. Again, I see several ways to do this.

We must get rid of the mistakes the school is making in training diver specialists. Namely: select cadet candidates mainly from service members in compulsory term of service in the diving specialty; not accept entrants into

the salvage and rescue service class from among those who have not undergone competition for other faculties of the school—that is, random people (which takes place now); begin diver training of cadets on rescue ships in the second year and training dives in the school pool after the first semester of the first year. It is also necessary to develop an individual program of physical training for the search and rescue service class.

In addition, officer-instructors at the school who are qualified in the diver specialty must be with the cadets of the corresponding specialty in practice and on the tour of duty in a line unit. They themselves must practice in the fleets on dives under real and not artificial conditions, that is, right in the ocean. This will make it possible to get more out of the practice and the tour of duty, and improve the quality of cadet instruction within the walls of the school.

In addition, we should vigorously replace the deep-sea diving equipment and gear existing on rescue ships with the most modern equipment, since delays in resolving this matter lead to one thing—an increase in the risk when making dives to great depths.

Finally, it is desirable to review the organization and establishment, if only with respect to primary officer's billets for the fleet search and rescue service, so that a deep-sea diver can accumulate 6-7 years of experience without worrying about professional growth.

Our specialists remember well the words of Yuriy Gagarin: "Deep-sea divers—here are people whose courage I admire..." In these remarks I have listed only the main causes for the degeneration in the Navy of a profession so admired by the world's first cosmonaut. If we do not resolve these causes, if only these, it will very soon be very difficult to find a real deep-sea diver in the Navy.

Further Details on Military Air Transport Effort to Aid Armenia

18010317 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 89 First Edition p 4

[Letter to editors and response by Col A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Antey Crews Flew Special Flights to Armenia"]

[Text] Respected Editors: During the rendering of assistance to the victims of Armenia's earthquake I helped unload military transports. I saw how hard the military airmen worked. Please tell about their work in detail.—Jr Sgt V. Shatrov

At noon on 7 December 1988 the telephone rang in the office of Lt Gen Avn V. Yefanov, commander of the Military Transport Aviation. The conversation with the commander of the Air Forces was brief. The mission was precisely defined. Minutes later the signal to assemble went out to the Military Transport Aviation units. The crews of the Ruslans, Anteys and IIs rushed to their stations. To the airfield.

Military pilots always have their helmets with headsets and microphones near at hand. Maj Vitaliy Pogodin, aircraft commander, Capt Yuriy Kuznetsov, his co-pilot, Capt Gennadiy Tyutyunikov, senior aircraft technician, Sr Lt Sergey Ryzhnev, aircraft equipment technician, WO Anatoliy Manuyev, specialist for the Antey's airborne landing equipment, and WO Mikhail Pyatak, senior aircraft radio operator, knew that a disaster had occurred in Armenia. Capt Yuriy Drozhzhin, navigator and secretary of the air detachment's party bureau, immediately plotted the course to Yerevan on a flight chart.

"On the first trip," Maj Pogodin told me, "we were to deliver a blood transfusion unit and 16 doctors to Armenia. The crews of Lt Col Vladimir Chindyayev and Maj Petr Rusik were making preparations next to us...."

The cargo was not of the standard size for air transport, not designed for it. But it had to be done! This expression would more than once be the order issued to the military transport airmen, rousing them to demonstrate initiative, inventiveness, imagination and precise calculation, and bolstering them during times of physical and nervous overexertion.

The crew itself loaded the blood transfusion unit. The doctors watched them carefully. The men and women glanced timidly into the belly of the Antey, which had swallowed up the cargo, and were hesitant to start up the boarding steps.

Maj Pogodin noticed how the people were feeling and wanted to reassure them:

"Go on up, comrades. We are about to take off."

"But where are the pilots?" someone asked.

"The crew is here," Pogodin said and introduced the airmen to the doctors. The latter looked doubtfully at the people in the blue jackets who had just put their uniforms into professional order, taking them for loaders. They could not believe that these men, flushed from the hard work, would now take the 200-ton Antey into the air.

"The sky over the Transcaucasus during those December days was like a disturbed bee hive," Pogodin told me. "Dozens of aircraft circled in the air simultaneously. One could rarely make a landing on the first try. The air traffic controllers, unnerved by the complicated situation, sent the crews to reserve sites. We burned up hundreds of tons of fuel for nothing."

The Military Transport Aviation crews sometimes wanted to cry out of a sense of their own helplessness. Their hearts wanted to cry out in pity for the people in trouble, but this was not enough to overcome the callousness of certain bureaucrats upon whom the efficient performance of the military airmen depended. And the latter did not spare themselves.

In the regiment in which Majors Pogodin and Minullin serve I saw a map of our homeland. Lvov, Murmansk, Irkutsk, Kamchatka, Vladivostok—the routes flown by the crews (the commander's name was indicated above each) spread out over the nation like an enormous fan. The Yerevan airport was at the center. The Military Transport Aviation had become a powerful air artery feeding cargo to the disaster areas. Day and night the airmen flew their assistance routes. They had no time for shaving. Constantly in a state of readiness for takeoff, they did not know the taste of hot food for days at a time and frequently spent their nights at interim airfields in the fuselages of their aircraft.

"I can frankly say," Maj Gen Avn V. Baranov, chief of the Political Section of the Military Transport Aviation, said, "that the crews operated in the equivalent of a combat situation. Missions were assigned abruptly. Not hours but minutes were spent on preparations. Not just professional skill but an all-out effort and the greatest of discipline were demanded of the personnel. Not a single mission was aborted...."

Maj Pogodin and his crew made six flights to Yerevan during the first 2 weeks. During that time the airmen slept a total of no more than 48 hours. Such was the intensity of their work. I was told that when the An-22 landed at the Yerevan Airport, people bowed down to it.

The duty officer at unit headquarters came up to Maj Pogodin while I was talking with the Antey crew. He handed the major a message form. Pogodin signed it, and I memorized its content: "On 2 January 1989 Maj Pogodin's crew will depart for Yerevan with a cargo of special equipment."

The Military Transport Aviation airmen, workers of the skies, began to prepare for the new mission. People were waiting for their help.

To wrap up my far from complete account of the work performed by the military airmen, I consider it essential to cite the following figures obtained from the Main Staff and the Political Directorate of the Air Forces.

By the end of last year the Air Forces had activated 400 military transport planes and 61 helicopters to provide assistance to the victims of Armenia's earthquake.

They transported the following: 40,590 people, including 14,705 into the disaster area, and evacuated 5,923;

—32,406 tons of cargo, including 377 cranes, 98 excavators, 61 bulldozers and 588 special-purpose vehicles;

—Around 700 tons of medical equipment and medicine, including two hospitals, a blood transfusion unit and two operating rooms;

—7,524 tents, 1,309 yurts and 72 small houses;

—1,320 tons of food.

The military airmen are continuing to help the victims of Armenia's earthquake.

Defense Industry Converting to Civilian Output

Chernyshev Outlines Plans

LD0602115489 Moscow TASS in English
1148 GMT 6 Feb 89

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

The Soviet Union, which called on the international community to move from the economics of arms to an economics of disarmament, has already embarked upon the road of converting defense production to civilian uses.

Mikhail Gorbachev said at a meeting with representatives of the Trilateral Commission on January 18 that the Soviet Union has begun to integrate defense and civilian production and that the Soviet defense budget would be reduced by 14.2 percent and the production of armaments and defense hardware would be cut down by 19.5 percent. In 1988 the Soviet Union began to convert a number of defense plants to civilian uses because of the implementation of the INF Treaty.

A program has been worked out in the Soviet Union for the coming eight years (1988-1995) for the establishment and development of a mass production of high-performance technological equipment for the processing of farm products.

The conversion of the defense industry has a prominent place in this programme and specific areas of civilian production have already been determined.

It is planned to build 29,000 plants and technically to re-equip 38,000 ones for the processing of agrarian raw materials. The aggregate volume of up-to-date equipment to be produced will be worth 37,000 million rubles, including 17,500 million rubles worth of equipment to be turned out by the defense industry. In all, 4,500 types of new equipment are to be developed between 1988 and 1995 for the needs of processing, including 3,000 by defense plants.

With this end in view, more than 200 design bureaus which now engage in the development of defense equipment and approximately 250 defense industry plants have joined in the development of machinery for the USSR State Agri-Industrial Committee. Some defense plants which are under construction are already being converted to civilian uses.

Evaluating conversion prospects as a whole, one should emphasise that this is not a supercomplex or utopian task. There is no doubt that its accomplishment will call for a solution to difficult problems of a technico-economic and social nature. However, the difficulties connected with this, in the opinion of Soviet specialists, will be short-lived and will not damage the economy, which possesses sufficient flexibility to find ways, during the

conversion process, for rational utilisation of the financial, material, technical, and manpower resources being released for peaceful constructive purposes.

The temporary difficulties connected with conversion do not alter the positive effect from a curbing of the arms race, the improvement of the international situation, the building of trust in the world, and the release of resources for steady socioeconomic development.

Karpov on Problems of Conversion

PM0602122589 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 5, 4-10 Feb 89 (Signed to Press
2 Feb 89) pp 1, 3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. Karpov by correspondent D. Makarov: "Disarmament and the Economy"; date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] How will the disarmament process now under way affect the development of the Soviet economy? ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent D. Makarov discusses this with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. Karpov.

[Makarov] First of all, allow me to congratulate you on your appointment to the post of deputy foreign minister and, at the same time, to put this question: What will your new functions be?

[Karpov] Thank you very much for the congratulations. Concerning my functions, they remain practically the same: Questions of disarmament and arms control and related problems; the apportioning of priorities when examining problems of disarmament and arms limitation, and what I would call adjacent spheres associated with disarmament topics but which spill over into the sphere of the economy, such as, for example, the conversion of the military industry and its switch to civilian production; questions connected with the weapons trade and its limitation—that is, questions of a kind which go beyond the framework of mere talk.

[Makarov] We now say that we are switching to a defensive doctrine. Does this mean that our military doctrine was offensive in nature in the past?

[Karpov] Well, I would not unequivocally say this about the nature of the doctrine just because we now say that a defensive configuration must be imparted to it, as though drawing the conclusion from this that it was not previously defensive. The whole purpose of our foreign policy since the October Revolution has been to defend the gains of socialism, and by our very nature we have had precisely to defend ourselves—at first against the Entente, and then also against other encroachments on our country.

The end of World War II saw the creation of the "cold war" atmosphere, when there was a clear-cut division of East and West into two camps. Under those conditions a situation took shape in which the Soviet Union, proceeding from its understanding of the strategic situation at the time, fashioned its idea of the special features of the building of our Armed Forces so that they could, if necessary, wage a defensive war in defense of our motherland and the entire socialist community. It was then that the gamble was made on creating large-scale armies equipped with modern hardware, including hardware designed for offensive operations. Under the circumstances this was evidently justified—from the viewpoint, again, I repeat, of that period and that philosophy. In response to the nuclear weapons the United States had had at its disposal ever since 1945 (while we gained access to them only some years later), we placed the emphasis on tanks and artillery, that is, on ground means that could create some counterweight to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

Under the conditions now, when the world has changed, when the new political thinking is making headway, and when the tasks of preserving modern civilization and defending common human values are coming to the fore, it has also become necessary to change the strategy of the USSR Armed Forces.

This does not mean we want to unilaterally reduce everything that can shoot and thus turn our Armed Forces into something like a pacifist organization. But we are taking the path of restructuring them. Take the unilateral measures announced by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations on 7 December. What is their import? People might say that reductions were also implemented under Khrushchev, at the end of the fifties. However, the present reductions are connected with a change in the very structure of the USSR Armed Forces. It is not just a reduction of the Army by 500,000 men; it is also a restructuring of the military by reducing the number of offensive arms and consequently increasing the defensive potential. That is, a motorized infantry division, for example, will now have fewer tanks, and it will have its large-caliber artillery pieces and assault river-crossing equipment designed to overcome obstacles during an offensive removed from it.

However, we will not, of course, be able to continue alone in this direction and totally eliminate, for example, our Armed Forces' potential for conducting large-scale operations. For this, corresponding accords with NATO are needed with regard to reductions in their armed forces commensurate with and essentially corresponding to our reductions—that is, reductions leading to the same result: a reduction in the offensive potential of the NATO Armed Forces and the imparting of a defensive nature to them.

[Makarov] An old stereotype is still current in the West: Do not trust the USSR because it totally conceals everything concerning its Army. Is it not time to lift the veil from this sphere, too?

[Karpov] I believe that the policy of glasnost simply obliges us to do so. The reform of the structure of state power, the creation of a new Supreme Soviet, and the granting of new functions to it in accordance with the changes to the Constitution, which have already been approved and which are still just the first part of the reform, must entail questions of military building, defense spending, and appropriations for the military industry all becoming topics of discussion and decision-making after a comprehensive debate in the country's supreme organ of power. Spending which, under conditions of secrecy, goes to military needs is not always dictated precisely by those needs but might result from the inertia of the administrative apparatus or from some political guidelines that are already obsolete and need serious correction.

Take, for example, the decision to produce SS-20 missiles. It was adopted in the seventies. But we are now engaged in destroying all the missiles we have produced over these years and on which we have spent billions. We are now investing money in destroying them. Maybe we should have stopped at some time in the past and ceased production, particularly since the strategic situation, as is now coming to light, did not demand such mass deployment of SS-20 missiles. FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt proposed to us at the time, in the mid-seventies, a freeze on the deployment of our SS-20 missiles. In that instance Schmidt raised the question of the possibility of preventing deployment of Pershings and U.S. cruise missiles in Europe. But our conveyor belt was running, the stagnation period was at its height, and we thought and acted out of inertia. It seems to me that now, under conditions of glasnost and openness, we can no longer keep totally secret the problems of military spending, the strength of the Armed Forces, or even, perhaps, the tactical and technical data of the main types of arms the Soviet Union possesses. Openness in this sphere could help to create an atmosphere of trust between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and must also lead to a more rational distribution of our resources between civilian and military industry. Glasnost is essential here for the correct resolution of economic questions.

[Makarov] In its time a lot of money was also invested in construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Why was a decision adopted recently to re-equip it as a civilian project?

[Karpov] The decision to erect it was adopted at the end of the seventies. By 1983 construction had reached the stage where the Americans questioned us about the station's compliance with the provisions of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. The chosen site and the fact that its construction resembled that of other radars we used to warn of a missile attack enabled the Americans to accuse us of circumventing the treaty's provisions, although the Krasnoyarsk station was being created for space tracking. We cited the Americans a whole number of reasons why the Krasnoyarsk station

was needed for those purposes. But the Americans continued to press their own line, accusing us of failing to comply with a provision of the ABM Treaty. As a result, a situation was created whereby the political cost of constructing this station had become too great. Therefore, the USSR Government adopted the decision in October 1987 to freeze construction work at the Krasnoyarsk radar. That moratorium was proclaimed for 1 year. In September 1988 M.S. Gorbachev put forward a new proposal to create an international scientific space research center on the basis of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The USSR Academy of Sciences, to whose jurisdiction the station has been transferred, is now discussing the practical tasks the Krasnoyarsk radar could resolve in investigating space and the earth's atmosphere. When this work has been completed, it will be possible to invite the international scientific public to participate in discussing possible uses of the Krasnoyarsk radar in conducting research that would be part of a worldwide system of observations of, let us say, the upper layers of the atmosphere, meteorites, and so forth.

[Makarov] You said your new duties as a deputy minister will include overseeing the conversion of Soviet military enterprises. How will you carry out this new function?

[Karpov] My functions do not include overseeing the conversion of Soviet military enterprises, but instead studying the formulation of this issue on an international scale, as well as the experience of research into this problem accumulated by international organizations and other countries.

There is a mass of problems associated with conversion, that is, with the transfer of military industry enterprises to producing nonmilitary [mirnyy] output. There is the problem of employment, the retooling of enterprises, and the retraining of workers and employees. The reduction in arms production in the USSR recently announced by M.S. Gorbachev already amounts to 19.5 percent, you know. Subsequently, as the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and the convention banning chemical weapons are signed and future accords on reducing conventional arms in Europe realized, these problems will intensify. A certain section of military enterprises will have to tackle the conversion of military hardware into civilian equipment.

In his conversation with representatives of the Trilateral Commission, M.S. Gorbachev said, for example, that 5,000 tanks will be converted into truck tractors for civilian needs. And the task of remodeling military hardware as civilian equipment will remain in the future—and on a still larger scale, moreover.

As yet, however, we have few specialists in such transformation of military enterprises, and we have done little research on this subject. Some things are being done. An

interesting study is being prepared, for example, on the conversion of the Votkinsk plant, which has ceased production of SS-23 missiles because of the conclusion of the treaty with the United States. This study is earmarked for the ILO, which is showing great interest in the subject of conversion. At the same time, there are a number of interesting studies in other countries.

In this connection it is interesting to take a look at the structure of Japanese industry, for example, where the proportion of purely military production is infinitesimal—much less than 1 percent. At the same time, the Japanese military industry is highly efficient, and its output is of high quality. By utilizing other countries' experience we should think carefully about how to ensure the military industry's efficiency, given reduced levels of production, with a possible lowering of the cost of this output and a simultaneous increase in the complexity of its specifications.

[Makarov] Perhaps the way out here will be to switch our military industry enterprises to economic accountability with a gradual increase in the proportion of civilian output in their production, for there are extremely few companies in the West which produce purely military output.

[Karpov] You are right. Even when a Western firm has production of military hardware as its profiled specialty, all the same it does, as a rule, have developed civilian production. This is done in order, in the event of an unfavorable development of the situation, for example, in the production of particular kinds of weapons, to be able to quickly switch funds and reorient enterprises to nonmilitary production.

Second, this makes it possible to use military research in civilian industry. In the United States, for example, an invention made in the military sphere is, by law, automatically declassified 1 year later and may be used by the same firm in producing civilian output, and the firm owning the patent on the invention naturally has an interest in this. A special application from the Pentagon is needed to extend the period of secrecy.

In this connection we must give careful thought to how to use the system of orders for military needs so they provide the maximum return for civilian industry too, and we must draw up a system of material incentives for scientific personnel, designers, and engineers so they have an interest in utilizing military research for civilian purposes. In any case, there must be no breach between military and civilian industry. In this area, as is known, the USSR Council of Ministers is already taking specific measures aimed at increasing the production of consumer goods in military industry.

All these questions now demand the ever-greater attention of not only the Foreign Ministry, but also other departments which have a direct bearing on them.

**Young Students Oppose Military Education,
Russian Language Studies**
18080012 Riga PADOMJU JAUNATNE in Latvian
3 Dec 88 p 1

[Two letters: "Good Day, Dear PADOMJU JAUNATNE's Editorial Board"]

[Text] This is the time of perestroyka. The Popular Front has been organized. We support this process and want something to do, firstly, in our technical school.

At the present time, while the Latvian language is recognized as the State language within the republic's borders, in our school it is only an elective course. During our 2nd year, only 91 hours are assigned for the Latvian language. For comparison, the Russian language is being taught 133 hours per year. In addition, the Russian language studies are mandatory.

The Popular Front's Program states that the number of hours assigned to the Russian and Latvian languages must be equal. It also has an article requiring that the elementary military education in schools be canceled. This also pertains to the specialized high school-type educational organizations and, therefore, we are asking to cancel the elementary military education for girls, because we consider this course unnecessary.

At the same time, we all will be mothers and wives. We think that the school could help us to get prepared for this sacred duty. Therefore, instead of the military educations, we could learn the basics of family science (as they do it in high schools), which would include the care of newborn babies, cooking, family budgeting, some

medical knowledge, etc. We understand that to start teaching us these subjects requires tremendous work, namely, teachers and books must be found, etc. However, is it not worth a try?

Students of the clothing designers' department at the Riga technical school for light industry (28 signatures)

This is the first year we are taking military education, because we are in the 10th grade. Our class has 19 girls and only 4 boys. However, this subject is mandatory for all. In our time, when there is peace in the world and our Government is fighting for peace, we, the girls, have mandatory military education! We think that it is good to study first aid, because it may be used by anybody. Is it really so that this knowledge, which we will obtain in our school, will be useful and the girls will be asked to help? We think that it is enough for two people to push the buttons, and the world's fate will be decided. Why cannot the girls, who now spend 2 hours a week on military education, during the same time get some knowledge about other things, which may be necessary, for example, in their future family life? A woman is the one who maintains fire in the hearth. She is not a fighter!

We think that now, during perestroyka, somebody could resolve this problem too. In our opinion, no special discussion of this matter is necessary, because the boys could get the elementary military education, and the girls could get additional knowledge in home care and medicine.

We will be thankful for an answer from the higher authorities. We would be even more happy, if the answer would be honest and democratic, and would take into account the students opinion.

Girls and their home class teacher from the 10th "A" class of the Riga 6th high school (20 signatures)

Protectionism Cited in Educational Facility Admissions

18010183 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 24, 88 pp 11-13

[Letter from Pvt I. Komarov and commentary under "A Reader Raises a Problem" rubric: "Who Is Being Admitted to the VUZ's?"]

[Text] Transbaykal Military District—Hello, dear editor's office!

I am writing you in great bewilderment and vexation. The fact is that I was entering the Higher Military School imeni A.S. Popov and did not get in. And it seems to me that it is not my fault alone. I will tell everything in order.

I applied for admission through channels. The time came for training and I turned to the construction section. And that is where I had my first trouble. It turned out that I was late and did not yet have the necessary documents together. Well, the good people set me straight. I went to the staff of the Naval Forces Directorate of Transbaykal Military District and there they explained to me that it was not yet too late, so get your documents together quickly and assemble for training. While I was doing this, of course, I was late for the preparatory courses. So I had to submit my first exam, a composition, just 1 day after I arrived. The result was that I received a two [poor]. I was already preparing hard for the next exams and got satisfactory marks. But I did not get through the credentials board because of the poor grade.

All right, it was my fault. But this is not what made me sit down and write this letter. What surprised me most of all is that most of those who came for training did so not to be admitted to a school but simply to rest, to get away from their service obligations—in general, to spend their time idly. One fellow, for example, admitted to me that he was joining only to get out of Transbaykal Military District.

In the mathematics examination, while I was preparing to answer, the commission was questioning another soldier just like myself. They gave him the simplest questions, ones that a fifth-grader could have answered, but he floundered, somehow even managing to make mistakes in the multiplication table. Imagine my surprise when they announced our marks: he received...a good! I could not help asking him: "How can it be that you answered nothing and got a satisfactory mark?" He was not embarrassed at all and explained that his papa is a high-ranking officer in the army, that they are obliged to give him such marks, and that doors are open to him everywhere. So why is there such injustice?

And another thing. There was no representative of the naval schools, so they assigned us to a captain third rank, who examined the officers enrolling in the academies. He did not even talk with any of us. What kind of

representative is this? But the fellows entering the Ryzan Higher Airborne School were fortunate. The representative talked with them and gave them support, so that we even became envious.

It may be that I should not have written to you about this but I have no other way out and one must fight for truth to the end.

Pvt I. Komarov

The editor's office asked Maj Gen Yu. N. Podionov, section chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to comment on this letter.

Yes, there are "guest artists" among those admitted to studies, people who are trying to skate at the government's expense. The letter tells about this correctly. Unfortunately, admissions boards are not always able to recognize such candidates. And at times, those with a good general education are enrolled for studies, taking someone else's place, and 6 months later they request that they be released, saying that they made a mistake in choosing their occupation. By the way, I have been told that the editor's office of "Agitator Armii i Flota" is getting a lot of letters from current or former cadets requesting information on whether or not the time of their studies will be counted in the period of active military service. I am convinced that in most cases these are precisely the ones for whom the decision to enter a school was extraordinarily easy.

I am bothered by still another thought expressed in the letter. This is the fact that many soldiers are late in getting their documents in order and do not get in the training courses to prepare them for entrance exams. This happens because not all commanders and political officers of subunits and units know the rules for acceptance to VUZ's, are doing poor work in the military-occupational orientation of soldiers and sergeants, and are not getting the detail on the selection of candidates for training to their subordinates. It seems to us that too few service personnel of the basic military specialties and class specialists with service experience are being sent for training. They sometimes strive to hold on to such specialists, explaining that they are the nucleus of the subunits and give good indicators in final evaluations.

It is necessary to change this psychology. The selection and sending of the best soldiers and sergeants to training should be carried out in an atmosphere of glasnost, on a democratic basis. The candidates for studies must be discussed at the general assemblies of subunits and units and it is precisely the collective that must determine who is most worthy to study at higher schools. Such a measure will make it possible for us to reduce the number of former soldiers and sergeants dismissed from military higher educational institutions.

Now about protectionism. Such influence is still tenacious. The reason is insufficiently high demands on the part of the admissions boards that show a lack of principle in the holding of exams. All revealed cases of violations of the rules for admission to higher military schools are examined carefully and justice is restored. If the author of a letter knows of cases where an admissions board has violated the rules, we are always prepared to ascertain the truth.

Now about the comparison of the style of the work with candidates by representatives of naval and airborne schools. The naval command will draw the appropriate conclusions about the work of the instructor at the Pacific Higher Naval School in this board. It must be said that there are still cases in which the representatives of military educational institutions working in visiting admissions boards have a careless attitude toward their duties, even though they receive a detailed and thorough briefing on work methods. Here there is obviously poor control of the results of such representatives by the directorates of the service branches of the USSR Armed Forces, combat arms, and main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense.

I want to point out that the number of those wanting to study in the VUZ's of the Ministry of Defense is rather large. On the average, there are 3 people competing for every available academic spot and in some schools it is 10 for every spot. For this reason, it is not enough for the future graduates merely to want to study. Needed are solid knowledge in the comprehensive secondary school program, good physical training, and superior moral qualities. For the best competitors win.

FROM THE EDITOR'S OFFICE. Having asked for comments on the letter of Pvt I. Komarov, we were not

thereby striving to finish with this problem. As is obvious from the letters to the editor's office, many of our readers are concerned about questions dealing with admission to VUZ's. We therefore think that the conversation is only beginning. We await your letters.

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Statistics on Students of Military Educational Facilities

*18010184 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA
in Russian No 24 Dec 88 p 13*

[Unsigned article; "Our Information"]

[Text] Among the matriculants at military academies and institutes of the USSR Ministry of Defense for 1988:

- 99.1 percent are communists and komsomol members,
- 19.4 percent are draftees from the Suvorov and Nakhi-mov military schools,
- 80.6 percent are students,
- 43.1 percent are from worker families,
- 05.1 percent are from peasant families,
- 33.7 percent are from white collar families,
- 18.1 percent are from military families,
- 14.8 percent are cadets with work experience.

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French Nuclear Forces and East-West Balance

French Posture Considered

52000001 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
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[Article by Colonel B. (a pseudonym for a group of officers and diplomats): "Things To Think About: Defending Western Europe—Without American Leadership"; from REPUBLIK [REPUBLIQUE], a quarterly social-political journal by the French socialist party; first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] We are happy to see a lot of positive ideas in official statements by French officials that show a readiness to facilitate the search for ways to reduce the levels of armaments on the European Continent. While speaking at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly recently President F. Mitterrand stressed the paramount importance of reducing the conventional weapons that have been amassed in Europe, expressed his opinion against not only the use of, but also the production of chemical weapons and confirmed his position rejecting the arms race in space. This article analyzes possible approaches to the problem of guaranteeing European security "from the French point of view." It has some realistic evaluations and very promising conclusions. We will have our commentator address the methods presented by the authors to resolve these issues.

The discussion about the problems of European security have progressed so far in the first three months of 1988 that it has confused many of the observers whose analyses or judgments have begun to lag behind the course of events. Those who want to eliminate the "evil empire," remain true to the principles of the "Cold War" and feel that Reagan betrayed them (these people even "begged" the United States Senate not to ratify the INF Treaty) certainly feel that there is no need to get into the essence of the changes that have taken place; their goal is simply to continue their attacks. But others who sincerely want to understand where we are moving often do not have factual information.

What can we say about the U.S.-USSR agreement that was formulated as the Washington Treaty? It certainly represents an event of paramount importance for peace in the entire world and in Europe in particular.

J-P. Chevenement (France's Defense Minister—ed.) stated, "The Washington Agreement is first and foremost a positive manifestation, the result of the efforts that we have put forth; it should be hailed as a success and opens futures that can be fruitful if we show clear thought and the ability to imagine."

The minister continued, "Moreover, and this is not the least of the agreement's importance, it presents the problems of European security in a new manner and forces every one of our countries to ask itself the question of what its role and responsibilities are in light of

this new situation. Finally, this agreement brings us, and this is its logical consequence, to the necessity of all of us thinking together about the Atlantic Alliance, its desirable future evolution and the possible initiatives that have to be made. We are entering a new phase; we are being confronted with new problems; and there is no assurance that we will be able to resolve them in the necessary manner by being content to preserve the structure and mechanisms that were established in the early 50's."

A Positive Treaty

Despite numerous misgivings, hysterical shouts and whining lamentations, the main thing is that this is a positive treaty. Chevenement says, "I am surprised by the reaction that many officials have to it. Have we already forgotten the situation under which this "bilateral decision" was adopted? Have we already forgotten that we tried to eliminate the inequality that arose in 1977 because of the Soviet Union's unilateral initiatives? Have we already forgotten our goal which has been stated so many times—that there be neither SS or Pershing missiles? One of these missiles was only needed as a response to the other. Their dismantling, removal and destruction meets our present desires."

Chevenement asks those who have been "disappointed in Reaganism" the following basic question. "What is there to fear? Is it the weakening of our defensibility? But concerns about balance answer this and negotiations allow us to achieve exactly this. Do we fear the undermining of "family bonds"? But our alliance (NATO) is a voluntary union of free peoples and sovereign states and in the end is based on the desire that each of them has to carry out the responsibilities they have assumed in the event the very worst should take place. This desire, this will does not depend on having military equipment of one type or another in position. This will either exists or does not exist."

Francois Mitterrand gets to the root of the question without unnecessary ceremony. A journalist (from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT), undoubtedly thinking about the European or French "experts" who were confused by Reagan's agreement with Gorbachev, asked him whether he agreed with those in Europe who feel that the summit meeting in Reykjavik and the INF Treaty weakened the American forces' conviction in deterrence? In answer Mitterrand countered with, "This conviction was not weakened at Reykjavik but rather twenty six years ago when its concept was developed and twenty one years ago when NATO adopted the strategy of so-called "flexible response," a concept that was no longer identical to the strategy of deterrence. Disarmament supplements deterrence. Deterrence is used to hinder the outbreak of war and the goal of disarmament is to reduce the risk of war. These are mutually linked. I do not think that the INF Treaty hides the risk of the

United States being alienated from Europe. But the strategy of "flexible response" gives rise to an uncertainty that could lead to such an alienation."

It has not been acceptable to talk about this. Never. Hence the bewilderment on the part of the American journalist who asks the question, "Without flexible response we risk 'exchanging' New York or Washington for Berlin and many Americans feel that this is unacceptable both from a political and a moral point of view."

But do they think that the converse is acceptable? And to whom? Francois Mitterrand had no problem answering the journalist: "It was precisely such an analysis that prompted General de Gaulle to choose an independent French nuclear strategy. At this configuration we remain in the exact place as before. You can totally understand that the United States does not want the consequences of a nuclear war in its own territory. But then let us not talk about deterrence any longer."

In addition to this we should ask another question—why are the West Germans so resolutely for the elimination of very short range missiles. F. Mitterrand feels, "The FRG cannot very easily stand the position of a territory that has been sprinkled by a nuclear explosion, a territory that is the very first target in case of a nuclear war. It can (and must) understand this. For the security of Europe we must immediately conduct negotiations for balanced conventional weapons."

Based on this analysis there is one question that automatically comes up. Does the West have to immediately modernize its very short range nuclear weapons? F. Mitterrand answers, "No. It would be paradoxical and inappropriate to get involved with over-arming at a time when both alliances are making progress toward disarmament for the first time in the post-war period. Let us look for a balance at as low a level as possible."

The main essence of the French position was presented in this manner. The only thing that remained was for the French president to remind us that the "defense of (West) Germany is the responsibility not only of France, but of the entire North Atlantic Organization." He continued, "Chancellor Kohl and I decided to revitalize the military articles of the 1963 Franco-(West) German Treaty that has been in a state of hiatus. This means that by observing all the conditions associated with the various statutes, France and the FRG, with regards to a combined command and nuclear weapons, will make our defense, our military forces and our weapons as mutually complementary as possible. The fact that these two countries are located in Europe, maintain friendly and good neighborly relations and are linked by numerous treaties, want to work even closer together has to be more beneficial for all of their partners. It would suit me if the embryo of some type of European defense were to come to light as a result.

It will take time for Europe to create a European defense. Europe is still affected by the two alliances which divide it into two parts. It is impossible to somehow miraculously transition immediately from this situation to one where Europe is the master of its own fate. But if Europe has the wisdom to act in a measured fashion we will reach our goal."

See how interesting it is to compare formulations by Francois Mitterrand with those that Chancellor Kohl applied a few days before. "We Europeans are aware that stability at the global strategy level and, in the end, European security will also depend to a decisive degree on the counterbalance of American military power vis-a-vis Soviet military power on the European Continent. The presence of American Armed Forces in Europe is a guarantee of American nuclear protection for Europe and no autonomous European security systems can replace that."

Going Beyond the Limits of "Atlantic Orthodoxy"

Unfortunately the majority of our experts have become accustomed to building their arguments based not on our reality (from the point of view of the French and the Europeans), but by confining themselves to the conceptual limitations that, regardless of what they are called, are still always within the limits of "Atlantic Orthodoxy." The central question with Mitterrand's initiatives raise is undoubtedly as follows—"Must we limit our efforts to participating in internal NATO debates which are usually held on the basis of a doctrine that has been dictated by the United States and that is accepted by everyone, as a result of which we are included in the circle of disagreement that is going on among American experts? Or, on the other hand, are we able to THINK [emphasized in original text], basing our thought on the idea that we are defending the interests of France and the those of Europe, defending OUR defense and security policies and therefore, also defending OUR policy of disarmament?

This is in no way a purely French question. It is taking on a progressively more general European character. How do we continue to give the impression that there is total harmony in NATO and that the alliance is prepared to blindly follow the slightest changes in American strategic thinking, which, as we know, is itself in the full swing of evolution? How can we not underscore in discussions relative to the FRG question the doubts that all of that country's political officials are now expressing more and more openly?

Based on all of this, we will give three observations to clear up the choices.

The first, with which everyone agrees, even if no one dares to say it, is: the thesis of "flexible response" is dead. At this time NATO does not have a strategy because this organization no longer has the weapons to

carry out its strategy. The subject "modernizing" battlefield weapons actually has the goal of expending an enormous amount of assets to restore the instrumentation for nuclear war on the European continent, a topic the French have always felt was absurd in a military sense, not only for themselves, but for everyone, and something that would not stand up to criticism from a political point of view. And the West Germans who would be the first victims in the battle categorically reject a course promising such a future.

Thus now is an extremely auspicious time to calmly explain to all our partners that the path the United States chose more than 20 years ago (and this explains our "exit" from NATO), with its allotment of priority to the tactical employment of nuclear weapons and battlefield weapons, was a serious error from a European point of view. Do we have to continue persisting in the erroneous decision and again look for very small conditions that support the strategy of "flexible response" only because the Americans, concerned only, and quite naturally, about their own interests and never asking themselves the question of whether their interests coincide with Europe's interests, are not able to think up something different? This question at least deserves to be raised.

The second observation naturally arises from the first. In questioning the strategy of "flexible response" and the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, we are by no means moving toward depriving Europe of nuclear weapons, but are looking at the necessity of reviewing the role of strategic deterrence whose goal is not to win a war, but to prevent war from breaking out. That which was "improbable" in 1966 is obviously more conclusive today and no one disputes the fact that any country in Western Europe whose "vital interests" are certainly not locked within its borders, has a strategic deterrent force available and is faithful to the strategic concept of "the weak deterring the strong," is an inherent component of the security of the continent as a whole. There is no need to support the geographically delineated "screen" or any division of responsibilities that no one is demanding from us. If the French strategic deterrent forces did not exist, the moment would now be suitable for creating them since even American leaders are now admitting that the United States no longer envisions the possibility of putting its own territory at risk to defend Europe. In actuality it is no longer a question of Americans and Europeans combining both their nuclear and conventional forces and standing shoulder to shoulder to repel possible aggression (this became problematic beginning in the 60's). From the European point of view and with the Americans working their way toward isolationism (SDI was an exceptionally graphic symptom of this evolution and Soviet-American negotiations have only confirmed it) the question is as followed: is it possible to hold back a potential aggressor when there is no resolute frame of mind to show the aggressor that the Europeans, if necessary, will be able to inflict such losses, especially within the aggressor's territory, that even if he "wins" this first test of strength he will be in no condition to then

resist America which will have remained unaffected. This is precisely what the French Armed Forces are for. And if not for this, then for what?

We Have to Re-evaluate the Old Mechanisms

The third observation is: if you feel that in the end Europe must be defended by Europeans (this is undoubtedly one of the necessary elements in the creation of a real political union and does not in the least exclude the need for the Atlantic Alliance whose real mission is to be a mutual aid pact), then the problem for the intermediate period is not one of "returning France to NATO" (this idea is more ridiculous then ever before); the problem is how much longer will NATO (a joint military organization) be able to last in its present form after the disappearance of the conditions that explain why and for what reason it was started in the early 50's (conditions which basically no longer exist in a world that has changed so radically)?

Why have we not looked reality right in the face for forty years? If real progress is to be made in the area of eliminating conventional weapons, if we are to achieve "equivalence at the lowest level" in this area, if we are to succeed in transitioning to the formula of a "defensive defense" that excludes any kind of surprise attack, it will become evident that the mechanisms that support American leadership (military and then political) in Europe have become outdated and the path toward uniting the conventional forces of the European states, especially France and West Germany, under an integrated command, one that will not be American, but European, will be open.

It would have been possible to select the formula for resolving this under the aegis of a strengthened and expanded Western European alliance (a "European support" for NATO).

In short, by criticizing the strategy of "flexible response," publicly expressing doubt as to the advisability of "modernizing" nuclear battlefield weapons, putting a Franco-West German rapprochement into effect and maintaining his Armed Forces' strategic role of deterrence and its dedication to disarmament, Francois Mitterrand asks his partners and European social opinion a question of singular importance to the future of Europe—the question of its independence.

Further Development Could Block Arms Control Process

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[Article by Vladimir Ivanovich Yerofeyev, Soviet diplomat, ambassador and member of the USSR delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Measures to Increase Trust, Security and Disarmament in Europe; he worked in France from 1955 to 1959 as an embassy advisor: "Thoughts On 'Colonel B's' Argument"]

[Text] The Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles goes beyond the limits of the relationship between the USSR and the U.S. and is

extremely important for Europe. As a matter of fact, it directly affects Europe, for the major part of that class of nuclear weapons is being removed from the European continent. Moreover, the treaty bears powerful political impulse and is stimulating further discussion on the problems of European security with regard to the positive changes that it is making in the international situation.

During its 15-16 July 1988 meeting the Political Consultative Committee for Warsaw Treaty Member States welcomed the entry into force of the INF Treaty, the first important measure for real disarmament. At this meeting European socialist countries called as well this year for the immediate start of negotiations for substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons on the European continent—from the Atlantic to the Urals. Their reaction was active and was directed at guaranteeing further movement along the road to disarmament.

Against the background of a generally favorable European evaluation for the Treaty certain circles there have shown certain signs of anxiety and symptoms of a "crisis of confidence" towards the U.S.'s readiness and NATO's ability to implement the future defense of North Atlantic Treaty members. This in turn has given rise to new and rekindled old plan for organizing the defense of Western Europe using forces under the leadership of the Europeans themselves. The article published in the French journal *REPUBLIK* is of interest in this regard.

The article recognizes that the INF Treaty "represents a event of paramount importance for peace in the entire world and particularly in Europe" and cites French Defense Minister J-P. Chevenement's statement that the treaty "opens futures which could become fruitful," "raises the problem of European security in a new way," and "forces each of our countries to ask itself what its role and responsibilities will be in light of this new situation."

In light of the removal and elimination of medium and shorter range missiles as called for by the treaty "Colonel B" concludes that the thesis of "flexible response" is dead and that NATO no longer has a strategy since it does not have the weapons to carry out its strategy. As regards the U.S., it is slipping into isolationism, does not intend to subject its own territories to attack in order to defend Europe and in general no longer questions whether it will unite its own nuclear or conventional forces with the Europeans to repel possible aggression. Thus there is a "crisis of confidence" in the U.S. and NATO.

This is not the first time such a crisis has arisen in France and in Western Europe. In the late 50's, when intercontinental ballistic missiles appeared in the Soviet Union and U.S. territory lost its invulnerability, European NATO members began to express doubt as to whether the U.S. would defend them in the event of a regional conflict, thus risking a Soviet retaliatory nuclear missile attack on itself. How did France react at that time? General de Gaulle, who was critical of NATO and its

organization and methods of leadership from the very beginning, evaluated the changed situation in a somber manner and based on his conviction that the system of military integration was out-dated and that the defense of France had to be French, resolutely withdrew his country from NATO's military organization. In carrying out this action in 1966, he explained to his partners that he was doing this because the situation under which the NATO treaty had been concluded had undergone substantial changes: the U.S. had lost its former nuclear monopoly and Europe had ceased to be the center of the international crisis.

De Gaulle freed his policies, his armed forces and his country's territory from its state of dependence on the U.S. and NATO. He gave French nuclear forces a national character. Moreover he outfitted them to serve the concept of "a defense on all azimuths," i.e., against all types of possible threats. In doing this he openly rejected the assertion that the Soviet Union was aggressive and was the first Western leader to do this. De Gaulle began reproachment with the USSR even during the "Cold War."

And what does this group of French officers and diplomats who united under the pseudonym "Colonel B" offer today for the security of France and Europe under conditions that are much more favorable from the point of view of processes limiting and reducing armed forces and weapons, processes that are gathering speed?

The French people and the Europeans must not blindly follow the swerves of American strategic thinking, but must think for themselves, basing their thinking on their own conception of the interests of France and Europe, their own defensive policies and, consequently, their own policy of disarmament. One can totally agree with this premise. But "Colonel B's" suggestion goes further. It boils down to the countries of Western Europe uniting into an integrated organization under the aegis of an expanded and strengthened Western European alliance which is nothing other than "NATO's European support." France's nuclear weapons would serve as a means to restrain a potential aggressor both during the transitional period and after the formation of such an organization.

The following is an interpretation of how France and Western Europe on the whole would be defended. "If needed, a potential aggressor will suffer such losses, first and foremost within his own territories, that even if he 'wins' this initial test of forces, he will be in no condition to then resist America which will have remained unaffected."

Let us sort out what we have. Instead of guaranteeing France's security using political means, "Colonel B" is guaranteeing her unavoidable destruction, not even for the sake of saving Europe which could hardly survive the consequences of an exchange of nuclear missile attacks, and all so that someone can then take vengeance against

the other side after her destruction! Isn't this paradoxical about the same thing that some are accusing the U.S.—sacrificing Europe at the beginning of the conflict and then getting involved using fresh forces. It seems paradoxical that "Colonel B," who would hardly regret it if things moved toward the disappearance of NATO, makes a recommendation that can breathe new life into that organization since he envisions the creation of a "European Support" for that organization.

And one has to agree with "Colonel B's" assertion that the idea of France returning to NATO is "more hilarious today than ever before." However what still remains unclear is how he, in discussing the thinking within the framework of "Atlantic Orthodoxy," imagines the creation of "Europe—the master of its own fate" and of an independent French and European defense, leaves the door wide open for France's involvement in NATO's strategies and activities.

The collective author's article in the journal *REPUBLIK* asserts that France is a critical component to the security of the continent as a whole. This is not debated by anyone. There is a lot within Europe's movement toward a firm peace and collective security that depends on France's position. But the question is—what specifically is France putting into this important matter.

According to "Colonel B" France's importance to European security is that it has at its disposal nuclear forces that are a strategic deterrent relative to other parts of Europe. He even feels that if French nuclear deterrent forces did not exist, it would now be time to create them. But this does not tally with the statements by France's president as cited in the article, statements to the effect that "its would be paradoxical and inappropriate to get involved in over-arming at a time when for the first time in the post-war period both alliances have begun making progress toward disarmament"! And it in no way corresponds to the general trend in the development of international relations, a trend toward arms limitation and reduction, the reduction of military opposition and the strengthen of trust.

Although in this article the French strategic concept depends on the "weak deterring the strong," the situation is such that France has a very ambitious program for comprehensive modernizing and quantitatively expanding its own nuclear weapons many-fold, as a result of which by the year 2000 France will have up to 15 percent of the nuclear weapons that the USSR or the U.S. will have in the even of a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

"Colonel B's" suggestion that France's nuclear potential would serve the continent's security through some Western European military organization cannot, of course, hide the fact that its expansion will become a factor that seriously complicates and may even block the progress of negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and even block nuclear disarmament itself.

Because of its own integrated nature the military organization of Western European states that the article's authors recommend we orient on strongly resembles the regrettable European Defense Association (YeOS) that was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954 as not corresponding to the national interests of France. "Colonel B" adjusts the Western European Alliance to the reality of today and links it to the development of negotiations limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. He feels that when the out-datedness of the mechanisms supporting the U.S.'s military and political leadership in Europe is exposed (and according to his words, this will take place after substantial progress in the area of eliminating conventional weapons is made), when a "balance at the lowest level" is reached and any possibility of a surprise attack has been eliminated, the path toward uniting the conventional forces of the European states, and especially France and West Germany, under an integrated command will be opened.

The measures listed above, measures that the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty are persistently working to bring to fruition, have as their goal the strengthening of general European security, the primary prerequisite for overcoming the division in Europe. The question then is, if this is accomplished, why is it necessary to create some new integrated military organization in Western Europe, one which will only consolidate military opposition on the European Continent?

When the conversation moved to plans for military integration in Western Europe and the development of a "Common Market" during his recent conversation with FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs H.-D. Genscher, M. S. Gorbachev stressed the responsibility of European politicians to insure that this did not cause the loss of positive beginnings in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of trust that are already becoming a reality and does not undermine the Helsinki progress and the conception of a "common European home" oriented on general cooperation for the interests of everyone. It would not be bad for the group of French officers and diplomats who published under the pseudonym of "Colonel B" to pay heed to this observation.

The new political thinking is undoubtedly making its way to France and it has specifically found its expression in the report about military doctrine given by President F. Mitterrand on 11 October and in the Paris negotiations by USSR Secretary of Foreign Affairs E. D. Shevardnadze. In his speech F. Mitterrand spoke about a French defense "against any aggression" without naming the enemy (the Soviet Union) beforehand as he had previously done, for example, in the preamble to France's military program for 1987-1991; he praised the INF Treaty and stated that France "intellectually, psychologically and morally subscribes to the idea of the necessity of disarmament." The Franco-Soviet dialogue that was held during E. A. Shevardnadze's visit exposed the high level of commonality in priorities that the USSR and France have in the area of disarmament and also their readiness to operate in a practical level in this area.

M. S. Gorbachev's upcoming meetings with F. Mitterrand will undoubtedly strengthen and develop the positive trends and take Soviet-French relations to a new, higher level.

Nikitin Examines U.S. Naval Policy, Strategy in Mediterranean

18010345b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 89 First Edition, p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Ye. Nikitin: "Old Postulates of the 'New Strategy' 2. The U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea"]

[Text] The Mediterranean Sea is the crossroads of the world. There is no other sea that washes the shores of three continents—Europe, Asia and Africa—and almost 20 countries. The Mediterranean Sea is also unique in that it is one of the most explosive regions in the world, filled with huge arsenals of weapons, and is a complex center of contradictory interests. Nowhere in such a closed space is there such a concentration of naval forces, especially American.

The Mediterranean Sea witnessed the barbarian shelling of Beirut by the 406mm guns of the battleship New Jersey, the landing of thousands of U. S. Marines on the coast of Lebanon, and the piratical strikes against Libyan cities by ground attack aircraft flown from American aircraft carriers. The new crime by American carrier-based pilots, who knocked down two Libyan planes on 4 January, caused universal indignation. U. S. warships were transferred from the Mediterranean Sea into the Persian Gulf.

From the military standpoint the Mediterranean Sea is the main link in the NATO Southern European Theater of Military Operations. Therefore, American and NATO strategists continue to assess this region as one of the main bridgeheads for waging war against the USSR and the other socialist countries. Inertia in views, formed over decades, is difficult to overcome in the West. For over 40 years the U. S. and its allies have viewed the Soviet Union as nothing other than the probable enemy. We recall in this regard that back in 1946 the Pentagon plan "Pincer" envisioned "initiating operations to prepare for land and air offensive actions in the vitally important regions of the Soviet Union from the area of the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East."

Much has changed since those days, both in the plans themselves, and in the calculation of forces and resources to fulfill them. Strategic parity became a reality, and then so did the new political thinking born on Soviet soil, which is ever more persistently gripping the minds of sober-minded Western politicians. Ever more often now one can hear acknowledgements there that in our day war must not be waged, and that in war there will be no victors.

However, the NATO bloc remains just as real, with its aggressive thrust. The manifestation of aggressive U. S. naval strategy in the Mediterranean, as well as in other regions, is just as real. The consequences of this are difficult to anticipate. "The likelihood of war in this area," states Adm Crowe, chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "is much higher than in any other area."

What does the U. S. Navy Mediterranean grouping consist of? Back 40 years ago it received the status of an operational fleet—the Sixth. It is formed from ships that have undergone military training as part of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and is considered the most combat ready formation of American general purpose naval forces. Under everyday conditions the 6th Fleet includes up to 80 warships and auxiliary vessels, including one or two aircraft carriers (90-100 airplanes, of which half are nuclear weapons carriers); 2-3 missile cruisers; up to 20 destroyers and frigates; nuclear guided missile and general purpose submarines; assault ships and auxiliary craft, as well as shore-based patrol airplanes. The fleet is manned according to wartime tables even in peacetime, and numbers approximately 25,000 men. The majority of the time the ships are at sea.

In an organizational respect, the Sixth Fleet consists of task forces. One of the main ones is the 60th, which includes one or two carrier strike groups (AUG). Each AUG is formed from 1 aircraft carrier, 6-7 escort ships, and 1 nuclear powered general purpose submarine. Along the route of movement of the aircraft carrier, which may cover 1,300 km in a day, all types of security and three air defense zones (close, intermediate and distant) are organized. In other words, for a distance of more than 1,000 km AUG forces and resources can detect and oppose aerial targets of an opposing grouping.

In the 61st Task Force are brought together amphibious assault forces, which are led, as a rule, by a large, assault helicopter carrier, capable of accommodating up to 20 helicopters or several Harrier-type airplanes. A reinforced marine battalion, numbering up to 2,000 men, is located on board the amphibious ships. Amphibious assault forces are given an important role in offensive operations. It is believed that even before the beginning of military actions, marines must seize a port or airfield in the country subjected to attack, to where the main invasion forces will begin to be delivered.

The 64th Task Force includes nuclear missile submarines (PLARB). According to foreign press data, three PLARB are allotted for patrolling in the Mediterranean Sea, each of which has 16 C-3 Poseidon missiles, each equipped with 10 nuclear warheads. In the Mediterranean Sea American PLARB are placed under the NATO command.

There are also minesweeping and maintenance squadrons, etc.

There are more than 40 bases and strongpoints of the U. S. Navy and its NATO allies on the coast and islands of Italy, Turkey and Greece.

Western military specialists distinguish four main basing areas: central, northeastern, eastern and western. The central area is considered the foundation of the entire American-NATO infrastructure in the Mediterranean Sea. It encompasses the continental and island territory of Italy, where the most dense and modern network of bases of various types, experimental-testing and training centers, firing ranges, depots, etc., has been created. Naples, Maddalin and Gaeta are considered the most important among them. Jutting deeply into the central part of the Mediterranean Sea, the bases in Italy make it possible to keep in their sights many areas of the basin, as well as monitor international communications of economic and strategic importance. "Italy represents the foundation of the entire NATO military system in southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin," stated U. S. Gen B. Rodgers, former supreme commander of NATO Combined Armed Forces in Europe.

The bases in the northeastern and eastern areas are of particular importance for the U. S. and NATO navies primarily due to their proximity to the borders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, and their capability to monitor the strait zone linking the Black and Mediterranean seas, and the approaches to it. Supremacy in this zone can, in the opinion of American strategists, influence the entire operational-strategic situation, and the course of armed conflict in the NATO Southern European Theater of Military Operations. Therefore, existing military facilities on Turkish territory are being improved, and new ones being built. It must not be forgotten that American warships, for purposes of provocation, intruded into Soviet territorial waters along the shores of the Crimea through the strait zone.

Bases in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, are viewed in the Pentagon also as a bridgehead for combat actions in the Middle East. They are being adapted to the specific needs of the U. S. rapid deployment intervention forces.

Military infrastructure facilities in the Western and adjacent Gibraltar areas provide communications and coordination between NATO naval forces in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations, and the Atlantic Theater of War, and make it possible to organize supply of U. S. and NATO armed forces operating in the Mediterranean.

The southern European peoples perceive the presence of American bases on their territory as a gross violation of sovereignty. Spain, as is known, achieved a reduction in the U. S. military presence. Greece is persistently seeking the same. The Western press indicates that there is growing dissatisfaction in Turkey and Italy as well.

Particular danger to the fate of the world is found in the huge concentration of American nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean. Hundreds of nuclear weapons are stored on the territory of Italy alone. In addition to the approximately 400 nuclear warheads disposed onboard American nuclear missile submarines, there are 50 nuclear weapons for antisubmarine weapons systems, and more than 40 depth charges, intended for use by shore-based patrol aviation aircraft. The Pentagon is maintaining more than 500 nuclear warheads at its bases in Turkey, according to the newspaper (HURRIET). In addition, Sixth Fleet warships have their own nuclear weapons. Marine Corps subunits also have them.

In short, despite the reduction of international tensions that is taking place, the situation in the Mediterranean remains complex. Therefore, the Soviet Union is supporting a security program put forth by Mediterranean member states in the non-aligned movement, and is making its own constructive initiatives. They provide both for reducing military capabilities in the region, and for a number of other important measures, all the way to the removal of the USSR and U. S. military fleets from the Mediterranean. The Soviet proposals are supported by the public in all the Mediterranean countries.

However, up to now there has been no positive answer to them from the U. S. and NATO. They continue to view the Mediterranean not as a possible zone of peace, but as a potential theater of military actions.

B-2 Dependence on AWACS Noted

18010345a Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by A. Pokrovov: "To Where Will the B-2 Fly?"]

[Text] Aerial refueling has been carried out. Behind are hours of flight over the ocean; Europe is below. Early warning radar stations should notice the large airplane, with its widespread wings. But the radar screens are clear. There are only slight reflections of an unknown nature. This is the super-secret B-2 "Stealth" super-bomber. It is an invisible airplane. And it is flying to destroy the mobile missile launchers and strategic and tactical facilities of the presumed enemy.

It is true that so far the B-2 "Stealth" operates thus only on paper. But, only so far. As U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT states, the first test flight is planned for early 1989. The long years of developments behind the super-secret locks of U. S. Air Force laboratories and hangars cost the military department \$200 billion. The B-2 became the second aircraft, following the F-117A fighter, made with the use of "Stealth" technology, a technology for manufacturing aircraft that are difficult to intersect by radar.

The operating principle of modern radars was taken into account in creating the bomber. Their ground transmitter sends radio waves toward the aircraft, and a receiver

at the same location fixes the beams reflected from the object, turning them into a picture on the radar screen. Aircraft from the "Stealth" family are designed so that radio waves are not reflected from their fuselages, but are absorbed, or directed away from the receiver. For this purpose, the "Stealth" is made out of non-metallic construction, with the use of epoxy resins. The surface of the fuselage is cellular, resembling honeycombs (such an outer casing absorbs waves, and does not reflect them). Moreover, fuel tanks and all weapons are not suspended, but are concealed beneath the skin of the bomber. It has accessories for protection against infrared tracking and guidance devices. The noise radiation and overall visibility of the bomber have been reduced.

The B-2 "Stealth" justifies its name, which in translation means "stealth" [kradushchiysya]. On the radar screen it looks like a large bird (eagle or heron). By comparison, a human figure is 100 times more noticeable, and a passenger jet aircraft 10,000 times so.

The U. S. military-industrial complex cannot conceal its satisfaction. A new spiral in the arms race is approaching, which they calculate will weaken the USSR, after the U. S. has plunged into the next hysteria of military expenditures. In order to create a new generation of radars, capable of "seeing" the B-2, the Soviet Union will require gigantic capital investments, and years of research. The Pentagon demands more and more funds for the B-2 project from the U. S. Congress, and has also obtained the approval of newly elected President George Bush. The estimated price of the innovation—\$500 million per plane (twice as much as the cost of the B-1-B strategic bomber, its predecessor)—does not frighten military industry officials, but gladdens them. Each F-117A "Stealth" fighter plane is also costly—\$100 million.

The Pentagon does not regret the monetary cost, assuring Americans that the B-2 is a defensive weapon, created to defend the U. S. from Soviet missiles. This is not a new slogan. The American military even calls the star wars program defensive. However, the same magazine, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, cites the opinion of American scientists, speaking in favor of curbing the arms race, who are convinced that the B-2 "Stealth" has been created exclusively to make a first strike against the USSR.

Nor was the moment at which the "hawks" removed the mantle of secrecy from the "bomber of the 21st century" accidental. The USSR and U. S., in accordance with the treaty, are destroying intermediate and short-range missiles. A positive dialogue is underway, which is sowing hope and optimism in people, and the Pentagon again threateningly brandishes its weapons, demonstrating its novelty.

The military hopes that the new bird of prey will supplement the Pentagon menagerie, and become the next terrifying mythic weapon. However, the B-2 is not all that invulnerable. American specialists believe that

the "Stealth" airplanes have one important shortcoming. They cannot orient themselves without assistance from the AWACS early warning system, for which Indigo-Lacrosse satellites serve as elements (such a satellite was placed in orbit by the Atlantic Space Shuttle). What awaits the B-2, if its coordinators in space, for any reason, do not function? The helpless bombers will turn into useless, costly toys of the Pentagon generals, and hundreds of billions of dollars will be thrown to the winds to oblige the next military psychosis.

Comment on U. S. Decision to Modernize Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

*18010345d Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Jan 89 p 2*

[Article by Vladimir Lapin: "A 'Difficult' Choice"]

[Text] A few days ago reports leaked to the American press that the U. S. Department of Energy was developing a large-scale program to modernize the entire system of nuclear weapons producing enterprises. Some \$250 billion are to go toward this. In other words, for the next 22 years annual expenditures on nuclear rearmament in the U. S. will average 50 percent more than in the current fiscal year.

The Department's report is notable first of all because it clearly reflects an attempt by certain circles in the U. S. to torpedo the positive processes begun in recent years, and sounds a dissonant chord to the program of eliminating all nuclear weapons during this century, put forth by M. S. Gorbachev in his statement of 15 January 1986. The report unambiguously emphasizes that nuclear weapons must remain "a vitally important element of American policy in the security field."

And if that is so, in the logic of the authors of the document, it is necessary to replace obsolete equipment, some of which has been serving for more than 30 years already, and to take measures to eliminate radioactive and chemical contamination at nuclear weapons production sites. This goal is noble enough, considering that the American public is alarmed by reports about accidents at U. S. nuclear facilities, which recently have practically turned into an avalanche! However, juggling the patriotic concept of security, those concerned about nuclear modernization do not even permit the thought that it would be simpler and more humane merely to cease this ill-boding production.

Moreover, this would be many times less costly, which is not unimportant to the country, burdened as it is by a huge budget deficit. Specialists indicate that this problem will inevitably become one of the most difficult for the new administration. It is not for nothing that a report by the U. S. chief accounting office indicates that it is not possible to solve the deficit problem without reducing military expenditures. After all, the departing administration was unable to eliminate it, even after cutting funds allocated for social programs by 29 percent.

Such are the conclusions of reports by two official U. S. departments, which appeared on the eve of the beginning of congressional discussions on the 1990 budget. And their contradictory nature indicates that there will be a true battle over military expenditures (planned at more than \$300 billion), between good sense and nuclear thinking, which has outlived its age, but is still alive.

Cuban Presence In, Withdrawal From Angola Discussed

18010345c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Displaying Good Will"]

[Text] There were flowers, embraces, and words of farewell; i.e., everything that takes place when good friends part. The first group of Cuban soldier-internationalists, consisting of 450 men, has left Angola. Members of the UN monitoring mission, headed by Brazilian Gen P. F. Gonzales, were also present at this ceremony.

Having arrived in Angola at the request of its government, the Cuban internationalists fulfilled their duty with honor, helping the country defend freedom and independence against the encroachments of the South African aggressors. And now, in accordance with the agreements signed in New York at the end of last year, the return of the Cubans to their homeland has begun. Demonstrating its resolve to fulfill the understandings reached, and displaying good will, Angola and Cuba pledged to remove 3,000 Cuban soldiers already by the beginning of March. Then, beginning on 1 April, over the course of 27 months all the Cuban internationalists will leave Angola, in accordance with an approved schedule. Thus, by 1 August 1989 Cuban units will withdraw to the north to the 15th parallel, and 7 months later, behind the 13th parallel. Every month 2,500-3,000 Cubans will be sent home, and withdrawal of the entire 50,000 man contingent is to be completed by 1 July 1991.

Undoubtedly, in southwestern Africa, which for so long was torn by regional conflicts, a very important process has begun. Its result is to be true independence for Namibia, and the opportunity for Angola to continue to build a new life under peaceful conditions. Everyone to whom the cause of peace is dear, and who is truly striving so that the flames of regional conflicts will cease blazing in the planet's hotspots, is hoping for this outcome.

However, not everything is as simple as one would hope. Influential circles, who are opposing in every way normalization of the situation in various regions, still have

strength. Thus, while the rulers of Pretoria, although forced to do so, nevertheless rejected certain obsolete stereotypes and embarked first on negotiations, and then on signing the agreement, in the Republic of South Africa itself there are many who prefer to think in the old way. The appeals of local "hawks" ring out for all to hear, calling for a continuation of the buildup of the might of the country's armed forces, so that the "front line states" have no doubt of the "resolve of South Africa to maintain order in the region with a firm hand." But, up to now, constant armed invasions by the Republic of South Africa of neighboring countries have been an inevitable element of such "order."

Simultaneously, as the leaders of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) testify, Pretoria is knocking together a bandit grouping in Namibia, similar to the terrorist organizations that are operating in Angola and Mozambique. South African instructors are arming and training one group for it in the area of Koa Veld in northwestern Namibia, and another is undergoing training in Dzhambé, the main camp of the anti-Angola UNITA grouping.

At the same time, the actions of the United States cannot help but cause alarm. On the one hand, it contributed to the achievement of the current understandings on southwest Africa, but on the other hand, it is supporting the terrorists from UNITA. As the Angola press agency ANGOP reported, by the beginning of 1989 Washington's total military assistance to UNITA had exceeded \$50 million, and Washington does not conceal its intention to continue this assistance. More than 40,000 peaceful Angolans have been killed and wounded by the weapons delivered to the terrorists. In this regard, ANGOP states that Washington declares that the "freedom fighters" being armed in the republic are terrorists, who are guilty of the deaths of thousands of people.

All of the countries of southern Africa, stated Zambian President K. Kaunda, chairman of the group of "front line" states, welcomed the signing of the agreements on South-West Africa. But, at the same time, they are extremely disturbed that the U. S. is continuing to assist the UNITA grouping. Through its actions, Washington is undermining the efforts of the Angolan leaders to carry out peaceful transformations in the country. Kaunda called upon the new American administration to reexamine the U. S. position with respect to UNITA.

This is truly necessary, since the process of normalization of South-West Africa has already begun. The departure of the first Cuban internationalists from Angola was also an indication of this.

'Immorality' of Requiring Veterans to Pay for Property Losses in Afghanistan

18010341 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jan 89
First Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Sokolov: "A Bill from the War"]

[Text] The headline carries words from one of the comments that came to the editorial office on the article "A Debt Which Former Soldier-Afghantsy Are Paying Off" in the No 292 issue of IZVESTIYA. The article talked about how money is being collected under a writ of execution from soldiers A. Ryabkin and A. Kireyev, who have returned from Afghanistan, for motor transport that they damaged on Afghan roads.

Many comments arrived. The letters shout, wail, cry and even swear. From all appearances, that the facts of heartless treatment of young people returning from Afghanistan were made public on the pages of other publications as well had an effect on the emotionality of the reaction of the readers.

"Any attempt to injure former soldier-afghantsy morally or materially, after having miraculously survived," writes N. Ilinykh from Nalchik, "evokes a wild protest in my soul, and I want to shout with the full force of my lungs: 'What is wrong with you people, have you gone mad?!'"

There are so many letters like this that to quote all of them is very difficult. Moreover, setting them forth in the columns of a newspaper survey, with the loss of inimitable handwriting, style, grammar, accent, accuracy and roughness, but with the sincerity of the original, will unavoidably lessen the force of this lively response. Nevertheless, we will try. . .

"We became so indignant that my wife felt unwell. Must we stoop to such cynicism! When will this end? Pensioners Romanov's. Liyepaya"

"Television repeatedly showed Afghan roads and tanks, BTR's and motor vehicles that were burned and put out of commission? Are soldiers really also paying for these? Captain 2d Rank Strekopytov. Sevastopol."

"The collection of any kinds of debts from soldier-afghantsy looks like blasphemy, like blatant immorality, like the result of martinet bureaucracy. It must be assumed that such a measure was conceived to improve discipline and accountability in military units. But then it would be fair if these officials made compensation for a soldier's death, disability or wrecked destiny to a full extent. Participant of the VOV [Great Patriotic War]. V. Rylov. Stavropolskiy Kray."

Alas, death and wrecked destinies cannot be indemnified. And even a posthumous award is only salving one's conscience. But this our conscience and our spiritual reserves are needed all the more by the living, because, as is generally known, the dead who gave their lives cannot be touched by shame.

"Now when truth has become not only the title of a newspaper, one frequently experiences a feeling of pain and shame. But there has not yet been the kind, it seems, as from this article. For when they collect these ill-fated kopecks from soldier-afghantsy in the name of the state, it means in my name as well. What a disgrace! O. Chekov. Nakhodka."

"We know that a lot of letters will come to the editorial office in response to the publication, but we would like you to publish our letter regarding the immorality of this kind of deductions, inasmuch as all generations exist among us. This includes disabled persons from the Great Patriotic War, persons disabled in peacetime military service, servicemen, young men of the same age as the soldier-afghantsy, and the entire medical staff. Oblast hospital. City of Magadan. (26 signatures)."

"They found the debtors! Indeed, we are indebted to them all the way to the grave. V. Chernova, Gorkovskaya Oblast."

"These young boys are being skinned for damages, I suppose, for what the Brezhnevtsy borrowed from the people and the state and for which, according to our humane laws, no exception can be made. What scoundrels we are! With respect for the newspaper, Sergunina, city of Riga."

"I am now writing this letter, and I am boiling over and want to shout: Dear Comrades! What a disgrace we have come to! I am a driver first class, and I fought at Odessa and Sevastopol. I am completely confident, by a full 100 percent, that there is no such hairsplitting in any army of the world. V. Dmitriyev, Lyuberetskiy Rayon."

Unfortunately, the facts of hairsplitting, as qualified by comrade Dmitriyev, are not isolated. And, to put it mildly, one does not feel quite oneself when reading written evidence of this.

"My son," writes comrade Glafirov from Lvov, "went through service in Afghanistan. He was ordered to accept property that was subject to shipment for major repair. He accepted. Soon they went on a raid and, naturally, the defective property was left in the unit. After returning, it was discovered that parts had been removed and that it no longer worked. A commission set the damage at about 1,700 rubles. For educational purposes, the commander issues an order holding back a sum three times higher—about 5,000 rubles. A part of the sum was held back during service in Afghanistan, and the remaining part is being deducted in the Soviet Union."

"My son-in-law is also an 'afghanets'. He went in with the very first unit. He was brought to the hospital barely alive. It was not possible to take his coveralls off, and they were cut off in pieces. He paid tenfold more for these coveralls when he left Afghanistan. He asked that inquiries be made at the hospital—this did not help. G. Kiseleva, city of Chelyabinsk."

"There simply are no words to express fully the indignation that overcame me as a result of this article. Both for myself personally and, I am confident, on behalf of all mothers (I am not afraid to write this), not only of those whose sons served in Afghanistan, but of those also who did not serve. On behalf of many mothers of the city of Kiev. T. N. Sakhno."

"The end result is that no kind of TsRU [CIA] and numerous "voices" can be drawn into the matter of injury to the prestige of Soviet authority. The most frightening thing in this story is that those who presented such a bill to former soldier-afghantsy in their feeble mindedness believe sincerely that they are defending the interests of the state. War veteran V. Kolyakov. City of Pskov."

"Open an account in Gosbank under the name 'Debt which a soldier-afghanets did not pay with his life'—and we, the mothers, will give everything back. Petrova. City of Maykop."

"If someone else's injury is taken as one's own, this means that not everything is lost. Of course, it is strange that at the hometown enterprise ATP-22 in the city of Dmitrov, where Sasha Ryabkin And Sasha Kireyev who accepted the writ of execution for fulfillment work, they were not amazed, they were not disturbed, and they did not try in an elemental way to pay off the debt by any means, from awards on tanker day, or artilleryman day, or geologist day, or to give material help through local committee channels."

". . . If there is some kind of law or procedure that prohibits returning them the money from the treasury, I am ready to contribute my two-month pension to one of those former soldier-internationalists mentioned in the article. F. Kadyrov, VOV veteran. City of Baku."

See, "if it is the law or procedure that prohibits." A paradox? Not at all. This "procedure" simply is at variance with the humaneness that has been developed over the centuries and which is multifaceted and of many languages.

For the sake of truth, it should be observed that of the hundreds of letters there are two whose authors believe that all of this is right, just and normal. The gist of these letters is that the subject is not worth a wooden nickel and that the violation of "Traffic Rules" by soldier-afghantsy has to be treated very strictly.

See how simple everything is! The entire palette of human morality, emotion, goodness and humanism—all can be examined through the "Traffic Rules."

And it immediately becomes clear that the vehicle on which a fighter is diving must not increase its speed in order to hide in a little forest. And it is not permitted to take the wounded in the body of a vehicle that is not equipped for the transport of people and not supplied with a special "PEOPLE" plate. And especially to break into an enemy settlement, if a "brick" is hanging at the entrance.

Well, fine, unofficial opinions and letters can be different both in their emotional coloring and their erudition, and in various aspects of perception and language also.

The language of the official response sent to the editorial office was teletype dry, brief and simple.

". . . The facts set forth in the article were checked on the spot. Former servicemen Ryabkin A. S. and Kireyev, A. V. during the period of service on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, were made answerable for material accountability in accordance with Regulations on the material accountability of servicemen for damage caused the state, which was approved by an ukaz of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 13 January 1984.

The indicated regulations prescribe different material accountability of servicemen depending on the conditions under which damage was caused.

Thus, in addition to the partial compensation for damage caused the state, making the servicemen materially accountable has as its aim to promote an increase in the responsibility of servicemen for the preservation of equipment, weapons and military property entrusted to them.

The application of the Regulations with regard to servicemen serving in the Republic of Afghanistan is also justified in the sense of improving accountability, because negligent and careless treatment of weapons, equipment and other military property lowers combat readiness. But under conditions of executing combat operations, this can lead to the death of the guilty party himself and to other servicemen. . . "

From the Editorial Staff

The Regulations, which were approved by an ukaz of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 13 January 1984, state: "Servicemen and reservists called up for training courses are materially accountable to the extent of damage incurred for damage caused as a result of their negligent execution of their service duties as stipulated in military regulations, orders and other acts. . . "

There is not and there cannot be any objection to material accountability for damage caused. But there is and should be an understanding of that special moral

situation in which young people returning from Afghanistan find themselves. Hundreds of eyes, and at times thousands, are fixed on them. Each of the former soldier-internationalists affirms or refutes the values he fought for with his reminiscences and confessions and, what is more, with his destiny.

Under these conditions, "indemnification of damage" in the eyes of colleagues in civilian life who do not know anything looks like punishment for participation in this difficult war. Because no one informs the colleagues about anything! The short lines of a writ of execution, on the basis of which bookkeepers of plants, sovkhos and institutes deduct a 10-ruble note or more monthly from the salary of Afghan veterans explains nothing. But the indignation grows. . .

The impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan returns to the regulations mentioned above their original integrity. Of course, the demand made for a ruined diesel or a lost tire rim is different for soldiers serving in Saratov or Omsk than it is for old timers from Kandahar.

Nevertheless, the main lesson which should be learned by army bookkeepers is that which was already said in our publication "The debt which former soldier-afghantsy are paying off": before you write out a writ of execution you must foresee the moral costs as well.

**Letter Calls For Honest Treatment Of
Afghanistan Veterans**
*18070099 Moscow SOVetskaya Rossiya
in Russian 14 Jan 89 p 3*

[Letter from V. Dementev: "Sacred Is the Struggle"]

[Text] The "Afghan" theme in the press is not new, but it requires a clear and precise understanding both by those who write about it and those who read about it.

Can a person who has not seen Afghanistan, who has not lost friends, who has not risked his life, who has not himself experienced in full measure all the burdens and hardships of military life, describe the participants in these events fairly and true to life? As a rule, no. However, some literary men have taken the liberty of doing so. And works are appearing in which the soldier-internationalist is a potential criminal. And yet young men are fighting and dying. Today's soldier-internationalists—living and dead—are heroes. Young people are being reared on their battle experiences and traditions. These young men, who have walked through the furnaces of war, are the honor and conscience of contemporary youth.

These young men stick in the bureaucrat's throat. He throws out, let us say, the innocent phrase: "There is no meat. The veterans and Afghans have eaten your meat...." Thus the rumor starts, and the bureaucrat is happy, he rubs his hands. And a few writers pour "literary" oil onto this fire. How does an inexperienced

kid look at the "Afghanistan" soldiers when he reads something like that? Did any of these authors think of that? It is not necessary to kill pure feelings in people.

Many are uneasy about the privileges of the "Afghans." They openly withhold their "blessings." I would like to ask such people: do they have any understanding of conscience? In peace time a person risks his life, becomes an invalid, a family loses its provider. In peace time! Ask the mothers, wives and children of the dead what will replace the loss of their near and dear ones?

Nothing on earth can replace a human life. Nothing can dry a mother's tears. And sometimes even elementary sympathy for the relatives is missing.

It's not necessary to canonize the "Afghan" fighters. They came home from battle. Yes, they saw blood and tears, and met death more than once. We need to show them as they are. Of course, there are some disappointments and spiritual breakdowns. It would be strange if there weren't. But why lay the blame on one young man or another? We need to portray various young men and their fates. And among those who have not lost faith in themselves and who form the young guard of perestroyka.

We must correctly form the public's opinions. We must all be concerned with the fate of the "Afghans." They have suffered enough physical trauma; we don't need to add to their moral trauma.

**Allegation of Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons
'Refuted'**
*18010168 Moscow SOVetskaya Rossiya
in Russian 20 Jan 89 p 5*

Article by A. Biryukov; "They Went For It"

[Text] It just does not make sense. How could such a respected English newspaper like the INDEPENDENT, literally, as we say, take such a shot in the dark?

Here is the situation. On the 13th of January the INDEPENDENT placed in its pages a letter from a certain Ghulam Yahya, a representative of the Islamic Alliance of the Mujahedin, in which in particular, it was claimed that: "the Soviet Union used chemical weapons in Afghanistan for more than two years. Doctor (Hendricks) of Belgium's Ghent University is the UN appointed, UN expert on chemical weapons. He confirmed the fact of the use of mustard gas and nerve agents in Afghanistan. . ."

I myself have been in Afghanistan and seen examples of foreign chemical weapons which have been used time and again in this country by the so-called "fighters for the faith" not so much against the enemy as against the peaceful population. Incidents of the use of such weapons by extremists, sent into the country from outside,

have been documented by photograph and film. It is in fact they, who, trying to hide their own crimes, have time and again tried to lay their own guilt on the Soviet soldier-internationalists.

The Afghans know well who brings them bread, kerosene, and other items necessary for their existence, and who brings them pillage and destruction. But here is a question: why did a respected English newspaper take on faith the irresponsible claims of this Yahya? Is it not because he hid behind the authority of the well-known Belgian scientist?

We asked our correspondent in Brussels, Valeriy Shashkov to get in touch with Professor (Hendricks). Here is what the scientist told him: "I never analysed either soil samples, urine samples or blood from Afghanistan and I never asserted that chemical weapons were used in that country."

That is the whole story.

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